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ABSTRACT 
Vehicular Networks (VN) or VANETS has become a cutting-edge topic in the development of 
innovative solutions for the automotive industry and of special interest to transit management 
authorities. Well known examples of the potential benefits of enabling communications in 
vehicles is fostering a better driving by reducing the risk of accidents on the road. Besides the 
transmission of safety messages among vehicles in the vicinity, the development of non-safety 
applications will allow the delivery of information services to potential users willing to request 
them in on-demand basis. To provide such type of services, major challenges need to be 
tackled to offer secure and reliable communication in anonymous and sometimes hostile 
communication environments on the roads. These challenges cover security, billing and 
accounting issues to provide a secure access to services. 
The objective of this thesis work is to propose a service architecture for on-demand services in 
vehicular environments. A key point to keep a robust information service supply, stands in the 
capacity to provide and manage security mechanisms which comprise authentication and 
authorization of subscribers following a temporary subscription model. These features, along 
with privacy mechanisms, will offer to the communicating peers a secure way to mutually 
access and exchange information even if no previous knowledge of each other is available. 
Policies of service providers can regulate the supply of information services according to the 
subscribers' profiles. Providers can also define the implementation of accountability models in 
the form of metering and billing schemes appropriate for VANETS. This will result in the 
implementation of incentive and collaborative mechanisms to foster service delivery among 
vehicles. 
Keywords: Service Architecture, Security, Provisioning, VANETS 
in 
RESUME 
Les Reseaux vehiculaires (VN) ou VANETS sont devenus un sujet d'avant-garde dans le 
developpement de solutions innovatrices pour l'industrie automobile. Rendre possibles les 
communications vehiculaires promeut une meilleure conduite tout en reduisant le risque 
d'accidents sur la route. Outre la transmission de messages de securite entre les vehicules, 
d'autres types ^applications pourraient etre concus pour fournir des services d'information aux 
utilisateurs potentiels. Des defis majeurs ont besoin cependant d'etre abordes pour offrir une 
communication sur la route securisee et fiable dans des environnements anonymes et 
quelquefois hostiles aux communications. Ces defis sont des problemes de securite, de 
facturation jusqu'a des problemes de comptabilite pour fournir un acces securise et fiable aux 
services offerts sur la route. L'objectif de ce travail de these est d'explorer et proposer une 
architecture de services pour les services sur-demande dans les environnements vehiculaires. 
Un point cle pour offrir des services informationnel robustes est la capacite de fournir et gerer 
les mecanismes de securite qui comprennent l'authentification et l'autorisation d'abonnes. Ces 
caracteristiques, conjointement avec les mecanismes de preservation du caractere prive des 
communications, offriront aux usagers une maniere securisee d'acceder et d'echanger des 
informations. Les politiques de fournisseurs de service peuvent reglementer 
l'approvisionnement de services d'information selon les profils des abonnes. Les fournisseurs 
peuvent definir aussi l'implementation de modeles de responsabilite sous forme de 
mecanismes de mesure et de facturation appropries pour les VANETS. Ceci aura pour resultat 
1'implantation de mecanismes de collaboration pour promouvoir la delivrance de services a 
travers des vehicules participants. 
Mots cles : ['Architecture de Services, Securite, Facturation, VANETS 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETS) are intended to enable short and medium range 
transmission for vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-roadside communications. One main service 
that is enabled by VANETS is safety applications. The potential benefit associated to vehicle 
safety applications is to reduce the number of accidents on the road. This is because 
communications makes possible the propagation of collision avoidance warnings, current road 
conditions, triggered messages about unexpected events, traffic information and the exchange 
of driving information among vehicles for an optimal drive. Given the nature of safety 
applications, the exchange of this type of information needs to be distributed in a real-time 
basis since related situations are safety critical or life threatening. Nevertheless the advantages 
of safety applications, the development of a communication technology, namely IEEE 802.1 lp 
[Antipolis, 2005], capable to support vehicular messages is still not concluded since the initial 
efforts 10 years ago. Contributors such as official transport authorities, academia and 
automotive industry have been involved in technical working groups to consolidate the release 
of the wireless vehicular standard. Given the intrinsic complexity in deploying vehicular 
networks and other external constraints such as legal issues, the completion of the technology 
roadmap has been delayed. This resulted in some inconvenience such as, for example, the 
deferral of the goal targeted by the European Union Transit Commission which aimed to 
reduce the number of accidents occurred in the year 2000 to half of that number by the year 
2010 [TERM, 2002]. 
Besides the implementation of wireless technology for safety purposes, another trend of 
potential applications increasingly being considered is the deployment of commercial non-
safety services. This type of applications can be thought of distributed mobile applications 
provided possibly by different service providers that use shared communication channels on 
the road. This means that providers might use different business models to offer multiple 
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services that exceed the limited range of services commonly offered by a single network 
operator. In this context, extended cooperative services represent a key opportunity to exploit 
that has got a huge potential of economic profitability since different providers might be able 
to offer their applications through open standard platforms. Thus in a competitive market, 
providers would be distinguished by the type of value-added services offered to their potential 
users. 
One of the main challenges in the deployment of vehicular networks is that it might require the 
installation of expensive infrastructure strategically distributed on the road. In most of the 
cases, the coverage range will depend on the density of potential users' demands; for example, 
highly populated areas such as cities would require more coverage capacity than sparsely 
inhabited rural areas. Once the infrastructure is available, the array of commercial services 
broadcasted on the road can be extensive. One can think of Internet access, vehicle 
infotainment, navigation assistance for transportation logistics management and high speed 
automatic toll collection services. 
1.1 Context and problematic 
Service provisioning models for VANETS need to consider the convergence of heterogeneous 
service applications whose success depends on the implementation of robust architectures. 
Heterogeneous service applications are considered to be open architectures from different 
service providers which can be integrated on the same wireless access infrastructure. These 
architectures must be able to maintain their overall performance when facing real life 
scenarios on the road. In many cases, communications in such a highly 'open' model can be 
subjected to many security threats that can hinder the reliability and the survivability of 
services provider businesses. For example, potential anonymous attackers might be present 
and represent a potential risk to any ongoing service delivery. Additionally, resources 
availability can be compromised by "lying" users which send false emergency messages to 
have some kind of advantage on the road, or any sort of communication attack that attempts to 
disrupt services. For these reasons, it can be assumed that any communication that takes place 
in an open public area and in the presence of non-trusted or anonymous peers can potentially 
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experience communication attacks. In other words, any vehicle in the surrounding area is a 
non-trusted entity and can be labelled as a potential attacker. 
A question that raises then is how a service offered on the road could be granted and delivered 
to a user in a secure manner in untrustworthy surroundings. In a vehicular context, it is 
legitimate to assume that any registered vehicle on the road can have the capability to initiate 
service requests to any service infrastructure. Furthermore, current trends in the automobile 
and telecommunication industries suggest vehicles must be capable to communicate among 
them and with the road infrastructure even if no previous communication has been set up 
before. This implies that the exchange of messages must be supported by non-trusted entities 
with a significant risk of presenting forwarding misbehavior. As the nature of traffic flows 
suggests, it becomes evident that one important issue in VANETS deals with dynamic and 
highly mobile drivers' patterns and which could join accessible wireless networks in a 
transient or sometimes unpredictable manner. 
Based on the above, crucial challenges need to be tackled concerning security, privacy of 
information and charging operations of on-road services. In general, a key point to maintain 
robust information services relies in the capacity to provide and manage security mechanisms 
which comprise authentication and authorization of users. These features, along with privacy 
mechanisms, need to be offered to the communicating peers to mutually access and exchange 
information. The security features can be adapted to the vehicle network domain but with the 
appropriate strategies for their implementation in highly dynamic environments. The supply 
of information services on the service providers side can also be regulated according to users' 
profiles. Depending on those profiles, it is possible to classify the type of service model into a 
compulsory subscription model or an on-demand registration model. In a compulsory 
subscription model, the subscriber is required to be registered in the provider's databases and 
to follow access control regulations, get the appropriate permissions and be subjected to 
service policies. In an on-demand registration model, no previous subscription is needed and 
the service request and use of services will last as long as the communication link between the 
subscriber and the wireless infrastructure is established. However, challenging issues arise 
concerning security and billing capabilities in highly dynamic networks. Most of on-demand 
services offered on the road can be considered as informative; for instance, a provider can 
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advertise its services through the roadside infrastructure to potential customers, i.e. current 
sales in department stores or a gas station advertising its oil prices. 
Given the aforementioned background context, the objective of this work is that: 
"The proposed service architecture must guarantee security, authentication 
and privacy features in order to establish a service session between an 
unknown transitory vehicular user and a service provider on the road in an 
acceptable delay given normal vehicular mobility." 
For the rest of this work, a user is considered to be attached to a specific vehicle in a one-to-
one relationship. 
In this work, security features address the generation of session keys by the service 
architecture for the user and the service provider'. Session keys will protect the delivery of 
any kind of services for an ongoing session. Authentication capabilities are based on the 
validation of disclosed public key certificates through Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) 
which detect and disable potential compromised certificates by verifying their most current 
revocation status. Privacy features, are related to the generation of pseudonyms during the 
establishment of a session between the user and the service provider. Though there is certain 
level of privacy granted to the user, full liability must be preserved throughout the service 
delivery process, assuring non-repudiation characteristics to maintain accountability of the 
communicating parties. 
1.2 Proposed solution 
This thesis work proposes security, privacy and incentive approaches that can be implemented 
in VANETS in a spontaneous on-demand service scenario. The work identifies some key 
assumptions relevant to the development of service models for VANETS as follows. 
1. Hybrid architectures will coexist to provide vehicular-to-vehicular and vehicular-
infrastructure communications on the road. Heterogeneous wireless access 
technologies can be deployed and support seamless interoperation on the road. 
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2. Multiple heterogeneous service providers can coexist to support a vast variety of 
services announced by the roadside infrastructure. 
3. Multiple authorities can support the operation of district regions. Collaboration 
among different transit authorities might be required, as well as, international 
transit authorities reinforcing global mobility of vehicles in geographical areas, i.e. 
North American and European Union trade regions. 
4. Governmental authorities are the entities appointed to assign official credentials 
and certificates to vehicles. This regulation is similar to the procedures followed in 
conventional license plate registers. 
5. A district region can hold private and official transit entities but governmental 
authorities have prime control of the infrastructure and its corresponding 
management. 
The key concerns that have been identified in the implementation of a service architecture 
which guarantees a secure service delivery can be summarized in the following questions and 
for which corresponding solutions are addressed along this research work. 
1. Can a non-trusted vehicle get access to an on-road service without being registered 
previously to access a provider and how can this service be securely delivered? 
In a dynamic environment such as the one experienced in vehicular networks, open 
public service architectures need to offer the possibility to deliver services to potential 
users without previously being registered or subscribed. This issue is addressed in 
chapter 4 section 4.2 where spontaneous on-demand services are explained. The 
second part of this question regarding the way secure services are delivered is covered 
in the secure model addressed in chapter 4 section 4.3 where session attributes are 
securely dispatched between a corresponding user and a provider. This proposal is 
complemented with a district service architecture defined in chapter 5 section 5.4 and 
which was published in the International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive 
Communication Systems - IJAACS 2009 [Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2009]. 
The analytical model of the service architecture was studied in detail and three types of 
protocols in an extended district service architecture were defined depending on the 
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vehicular scenario. The work was published in the Wiley's International Journal in 
Security and Communication Networks 2009 [Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2009]. 
2. How can a non-trusted vehicle be charged for a service advertised on the road? 
This concern is addressed in Chapter 5 section 5.6 where charging operations can be 
supported by a district service domain. 
3. In an ad-hoc environment, how can services be delivered to the requester if multi-hop 
communication among non trusted vehicles is required? 
To tackle the challenge of promoting participation of peer vehicles in a multi-hop 
environment, it might be necessary to define a set of incentive mechanisms for the 
delivery of services through intermediate nodes. This concern is addressed in Chapter 
5 section 5.7 where collaboration among vehicles is defined through the issuance of 
incentives to active participating vehicles. 
In summary, the service architecture must be able to issue temporary session keys for the 
potential user and the service provider. These keys must be valid only during the session. The 
dispatch of session keys must be done once verification of user's certificates and the available 
credit takes place. Additionally, policy control and authorization tasks have to be done for 
resource assignation purposes. 
Mobility must be supported by the interaction of neighboring service architectures, when a 
service session is active and the access to the network must be given in the new service 
architecture domain. The architecture uses the premise that service architectures are 
controlled and managed by official authorities defined according to their geographic location. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
The main contribution of this work is to propose a service architecture which allows access to 
spontaneous on-demand services for transient mobile vehicles. The architecture consists of a 
set of main elements and protocols that provide security, billing, and session management 
capabilities when a request of a service is executed by the potential user. As a result, this 
service architecture facilitates the provisioning of services broadcasted on the road throughout 
the establishment of the necessary session parameters between the service provider and the 
potential user. The main contributions of this work are enlisted below: 
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• The proposition of a service district domain managed by district authorities that 
supports spontaneous on-demand services. 
• The definition of the service parameters for on-demand services. 
• The definition of a service request protocol in a single hop environment (SHI-RQ). 
• The definition of a service request protocol to allow scalability in multiple district 
domain environments (EC-RQ) 
• The definition of billing mechanisms for spontaneous on-demand requests. 
• The definition of an incentive collaboration scheme for multi-hop communications. 
• The definition of a service request protocol in a multi-hop environment (MHI-RQ). 
The contributions of this thesis foster the deployment of non-safety applications along the 
roadside for traveling vehicles. Different business models can be developed around the 
proposed architecture that would allow any transitory vehicle to retrieve any announced 
service on the road. This is possible through the verification of public certificates and 
credentials disclosed by the potential user at the current service architecture on the road. This 
premise is based on the assumption that public certificates are issued and constantly monitored 
by official transit authorities. Information through inter-district domains is possible through a 
dedicated transit network. Finally, affordability of services must be checked based on banking 
credentials provided by the potential user. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
This thesis document is divided into two main parts. The first one includes introductory 
concepts and a review of literature related to the thesis project. First, a technical description of 
DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) is given, DSRC being the main wireless 
vehicular technology under standardization. Second, some references to initiatives in the 
communication and automotive industry are given in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, some security 
concepts and existing approaches for vehicular environments are addressed. Subsequent 
sections cover the concept of privacy in VANETS; and the analysis of some existing privacy 
schemes. Next sections cover specific billing and incentives models and some approaches 
suitable for vehicular ad hoc environments. An analysis of some incentive schemes is given at 
the end of the section. 
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The second part of this thesis document introduces the proposed service architecture for 
spontaneous on-demand services. Chapter 4 address some key points for service provisioning 
and an analysis of some existing approaches related to VANETS is addressed [Coronado and 
Cherkaoui, 2007]. Chapter 5 covers the security model which is the foundation of the service 
architecture in order to provide secure session parameters [Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2007]. 
Chapter 6 comprises the definition of the proposed district service architecture [Coronado and 
Cherkaoui, 2009]. Chapter 7 details the analytical model of the scalable service architecture 
[Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2009]. Chapter 8 is dedicated to the study of the proposed 
architecture including scalable scenarios in a heterogeneous network context. Chapter 9 
introduces a service taxonomy for commercial applications such as web, database, voice and 
video-based applications in a vehicular context and their corresponding simulation results. 
Chapter 10 states the conclusions of this project as well as some perspectives on the future of 
the development of commercial application in VANETS. 
FIRST PART 
BASICS ON VEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS 
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CHAPTER 2 
VEHICULAR NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES 
Standardization efforts for vehicular communications have been carried out primarily in North 
America, Europe and Japan. In North America, the DSRC technology was allocated at the 5.9 
GHz frequency with a transmission range up to 1000 meters [Antipolis, 2005]. Mainly, DSRC 
technology is focused on safety applications and traffic information supply. These 
functionalities are performed through the dissemination of information for vehicles with a data 
rate from 6 Mbps up to 27 Mbps [Antipolis, 2005]. There are two types of messages that can 
be supported by DSRC, i.e. IPv6 and WSM (WAVE Short messages). The IPv6 datagrams 
are used to carry traffic information and requested services using a TCP/IP protocol. WSMs 
are dedicated to safety applications and are intended for a priority propagation among 
vehicles. 
Based on the radio frequency specifications given in [Farradyne, 2005], channels 184 and 172 
have been proposed for public safety and low latency communications, respectively. Channel 
178 is the control channel establishing the communication link between the access point and 
the vehicle. Channel 178 can be used for communication links as well as other control and 
safety messages. The rest of the channels are intended for service data communications to 
handle IPv6 traffic. The frequency channels allocation is shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 - DSRC channel allocation 
5.850-5.925 (GHz) 
172 
174 
175 
176 
178 
180 
181 
Channels 
5860 
5870 
5875 
5880 
5890 
5900 
5905 
27 
28 
182 
184 
5910 
5920 
In relation with DSRC, the Vehicle Safety Communications Consortium (VSCC) [Farradyne, 
2005] in the U.S. is a project aiming to analyze the requirements for vehicular safety 
application with an emphasis on security issues. The project considers a security model based 
on the IEEE PI609.2 DSRC which proposes an asymmetric cryptography to sign safety 
messages by frequently changing keys between two peers. This process includes the use of 
certificates with short lifetimes that are periodically requested by the vehicle through a nearby 
roadside unit. 
A variant of the DSRC technology was developed in Japan. Instead, the vehicular 
communication takes places on the 5.8 GHz frequency. The salient applications for vehicular 
environments are logistics management, driver assistance, information services and electronic 
toll control (ETC). In particular, this technology supports different types of applications due 
to the implementation of the ASL (Application Sub Layer) on its architecture [Antipolis, 
2005]. This is responsible for handling Internet and non-Internet services through TCP/IP or 
local port performing control operations over Internet connections (IPv6), local area networks 
and non-networks applications. 
Service discovery specifications are defined in the IEEE 1609.3 [IEEE, 2003] trial standard 
for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE). Here, information related to 
specific providers and corresponding channels are contained in a frame called WAVE Service 
Advertisement (WSA) which carries the Provider Service Table (PST). Before the Roadside 
Unit (RSU) announces the availability of services within its transmission range, the WSA is 
encapsulated in an extended frame called WAVE Service Information Element (WSIE). Then, 
the WSIE frame is received and processed by transitory and potential users; and retrieved 
parameters will be employed to request specific services. The process to allow applications 
from a provider to be registered at the WAVE management entity (WME) consist of 
disclosing information such as channel of operation, address information, description of the 
services being offered and application priority. Once the application is successfully registered 
at the local PST, then it is ready to be advertised through the roadside infrastructure. In order 
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to guarantee the certainty of the information being transmitted, the WSA frame is digitally 
signed and validated. In order to distinguish the different applications available at the local 
infrastructure, identifiers are required in the form of Provider Service Identifier (PSID) which 
guarantees the uniqueness of the latter. A Provider Service Context (PSC) is also used to 
convey additional information about the service. Based on the above process, the user can 
distinguish and choose specific services contained in the PST. A vehicle-infrastructure and 
vehicle-to-vehicle scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
. - j i -
V2 
Figure 2.1 - V2V and V2I communications 
2.1 Elements in Vehicle-infrastructure networks 
Typical active elements involved in vehicle-infrastructure communications involving DSRC 
technology are briefly described according to [Farradyne, 2005] and depicted in Figure 2.2. 
These elements are: 
The On-board Equipment (OBE). This equipment is installed inside the vehicle to provide 
communication capabilities with peers and the deployment of this electronic device depends 
directly on OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers). In general, OBEs comprise an On-
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Board Unit (OBU) which is a 5.9 GHz DSRC transceiver; a GPS location system; a processor 
for application services; and human machine interface (HMI) to handle the interaction 
between the user and the services provided through communication capabilities. The 
communication link between the vehicle and the infrastructure in the surroundings is set up 
and managed by the OBU. For the transmission of safety related information, the data 
contained in the message includes a temporary ID, message type, time stamp and location 
parameters. 
The Roadside Equipment (RSE): This equipment is the interface between vehicular peers and 
fixed networks. RSEs comprise a DSRC transceiver Roadside-Unit (RSU), a GPS location 
system, an application processor and a router that connects to the fixed network. To 
communicate with vehicles, the RSU transmits a list of services contained in a Provider 
Service Table (PST). The information transmitted includes the RSU identification, application 
identification, channel assignments, data rate, modulation, GPS data location and transmission 
power limits. Any raw information coming from an OBU is first verified in the RSU 
processor and then forwarded by the router to reach the network. Note that in the following 
chapters of this thesis document, the term RSU is used to denote the RSE. 
The Message Switch (MSW): This element is the intelligence of the system and is located in 
the backbone of the network. Its main function is to handle and parse all the data intended to 
reach any network element. It also performs message management and subscription 
operations according to message priority for an efficient use of the bandwidth. The MSW will 
route subscribed messages to the corresponding service provider or network user. It is worth 
noting that all RSUs must be registered with their assigned MSW and associated to a specific 
region. 
The Map Server (MS): The main function of the MS consists of maintaining the accuracy of 
map databases and it is logically connected to the MSW. Once an update in the position 
parameters has been performed in the map database, the updated information is released and 
sent back to the mobile peers. 
Network Management (NM): The management of the network will be carried out by 
centralized entities known as network operation centers (NOC). These centers will be 
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responsible for management, design, implementation, operation and maintenance of the 
vehicular network infrastructure. 
Certification Authorities (CA): These trusted entities are responsible for dispatching secure 
attributes as key certificates, thus all messages passing through the network will be digitally 
signed. 
Vehicle 
- GPS transceiver 
- HMI interface 
- OBU (DSRC) 
Applications processor 
Roadside 
Unit 
-N >~~ 
DRSC 
v 
- GPS transceiver 
- RSU and processor 
- I/O controller 
- Router 
Service 
provider 
Figure 2.2 - V2I centralized architecture 
2.2 Projects and initiatives 
In general, initiatives that intend to provide certain level of communication capabilities to 
vehicles have closely collaborated with governmental authorities and the automotive industry. 
Most of the consortiums and initiatives have come from Europe, North America and Japan 
where car manufacturers are strong players in leading the integration of cutting edge 
technological advances within vehicles. 
One example of these projects is the InternetCar which was developed in Japan. This is an 
extensive project which aims to support Internet applications on vehicles connected to cellular 
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networks [Ernst et al, 2003]. The addressing scheme was based on IPv6 to support IP based 
services offering the facilities and robustness of a highly mobile environment. Its main aim 
was to provide Internet connectivity to a vehicle regardless of the access medium and the 
applications addressed were related to the analysis and provisioning of traffic information. 
An European project is FleetNet which was a three years project (2000-2003) founded by an 
European Consortium with the participation of OEMs and governmental institutions [Franz et 
al., 2001]. The aim was to provide Internet connectivity on vehicles besides the propagation 
of safety-related applications among vehicles. The design of this solution is based on Internet 
gateways installed on the roadside which function as gateway routers to provide Internet 
connectivity. The integration of Internet applications rely on different features [Festag et al., 
2004]. First, a cache module allows the allocation information previously obtained from the 
Internet optimizing the time of distributing the information. Second, hot spot communications 
are intended to provide connectivity. Finally, an agent based approach which consists of a 
proxy server when there is no communication link between the Internet server and the vehicle. 
The objective is to provide certain level of coverage when there is a gap of internet 
connectivity mainly caused by the mobility patterns of vehicles. 
The subsequent consortium created from FleetNet is the NoW (Network on Wheels) project, 
which deals with communication protocols for inter-vehicular communications. One of its 
objectives was to support safety applications as well as all sort of infotainment applications. 
The solution design is based on an architecture called MOCCA (Mobile Communication 
Architecture) [Perera et al, 2005], which relies on Internet gateways posted on roadside 
infrastructure. These are in charge of providing an interface between the vehicles and the 
Internet connection with a broader scope than its predecessor the FleetNet. 
Another European project is the Global System for Telematics (GST). The objective of the 
GST is to create an open architecture for vehicular services. The communication is done using 
SOAP messages and software components reside on an OSGI platform (Open Services 
Gateway Initiative). 
Among the most popular public traffic applications, there is the ETC. The electronic payment 
managed by ETC is performed in a vehicular-roadside communication architecture and 
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involves two main processes [ETC ITS, 2008]: automatic vehicle identification (AVI) and 
automatic vehicle classification (AVC) to perform the electronic transaction from the vehicle 
to the nearby fixed infrastructure. The first one (AVI) is used by the roadside infrastructure to 
identify the vehicle ownership based on an electronic number assigned to it. The second one 
(AVC) installed in the roadside infrastructure can determine the vehicle's type by its physical 
attributes. The deployment of ETC applications is wide. So far, Japan has the major 
deployment of the ETC roadside infrastructure with more than 900 tollgates [ETC ITS, 2008]. 
The ETC system sets the communication link between the on-board equipment and the 
roadside unit. In the case of Hong Kong, the ETC technology considers the use of GPS, so 
the vehicles equipped with GPS units communicate with the GPS satellite and are associated 
the corresponding toll. 
In North America, specifically in New Jersey, an ETC system called E-Z was implemented on 
highly dense highways. The aims of this system are to mitigate congestion and save time for 
commuters. The deployment of E-Z has a remarkable contribution on the reduction of cost 
related to fuel consumptions and delay time costs. 
A global integrated solution is being developed in Europe called Cooperative Vehicle-
Infrastructure Systems [CVIS, 2009]. The major aims of the CVIS project consist of creating 
a unified technical solution to communicate vehicles and infrastructure by means of an open 
framework. The CVIS salient services and features are the following: 
1. A multi-channel terminal capable of maintaining continuous Internet connection over 
different carriers, i.e. cellular, mobile Wi-Fi networks, infra-red or short-range 
microwave channels. 
2. An open architecture connecting on-board units (OBU) and traffic management 
systems, as well as, roadside units (RSU). It also comprises the operation of protocols 
for vehicle and road monitoring. 
3. Employment of dynamic mapping using GPS systems for vehicle positioning. 
A Canadian initiative is represented by AUT021 to promote research in different fields of the 
automotive industry such as intelligent systems and sensors; materials and manufacturing, 
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powertrains, fuels and emissions; and design process. In the field of intelligent system and 
sensor applications, the following issues are targeted within Auto21 projects. 
1. Vehicle guidance, navigation and telematics. 
2. Control and monitoring of vehicles. 
3. Driving assistance and automation. 
The AUT021 vision is stated as "create a dynamic Canadian research and development 
community contributing to a sustainable, globally competitive Canadian automotive sector 
resulting in enhanced quality of life for Canadians" [AUT021, 2009]. 
SECOND PART 
WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
CHAPTER 3 
SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chapter presents the main contributions of this work on service provisioning for vehicular 
environments. A secure service architecture complying with spontaneous on-demand services 
on the road is defined in the following chapters. These chapters, in an article based format, 
represent the evolution and development of this thesis project starting with the definition of 
security models for VANETS. The analysis of different models served to define the proposed 
security model for vehicular environments which is described in section 3.1. An element in 
the form of private authority has been introduced in the security model for the generation of 
security attributes to protect the delivery of the service. 
A major milestone in this project is the definition of the district service architecture which is 
mentioned in section 3.2. In this architecture, session parameters are granted to on-demand 
users based upon the validation of user credentials. The service request process for a single-
hop communication is given in section 3.3 on which proper validation grants the user the right 
to retrieve a service advertised by the roadside infrastructure. In the case where the 
communication requires the participation of intermediate nodes to deliver the requested 
service due to transmission rage constraints; then, multi-hop communication needs to be set 
up. This is addressed in section 3.4. In the case where mobility between adjacent district 
service domains occurs; then, the interaction of multiple district domains is required to 
maintain the ongoing service session and guarantee the scalability of the service on the road. 
This type of communication is described in section 3.5. Finally, different types of service 
applications are addressed in section 3.6, where the focus is on commercial applications and 
their deployment on top of the proposed service architecture. 
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3.1 Secure service model 
In the proposed architecture, the use of pseudonyms and PKI model involves the presence and 
participation of both governmental and private trusted authorities. Basically, the certified keys 
provided by official authorities must allow secure communications between two vehicles or a 
vehicle and a RSU. The new element introduced is the private authority which is responsible 
for the generation of temporary security attributes. This feature can guarantee that 
heterogeneous applications from different service providers can coexist while sharing the 
same the roadside infrastructure. A detailed description of the security model is given in 
Chapter 4. 
3.2 District service architecture 
A service district domain is defined in this project as a logical zone that is mapped to a 
geographical area where a set of services from different roadside providers are broadcasted by 
the wireless infrastructure. The elements comprised within the service domain are in charge 
of processing and validating incoming requests from potential users. The service district 
domain may not have knowledge in advance of the prospective users. The main module 
elements in the scalable service architecture are described in detail in Chapter 7. A brief 
description is given below: 
The security module is composed of a subset of modules designated as GA and PA. 
Within a district domain, any disclosed public key certificate is subjected to 
verification. The security module generates the corresponding session keys for both 
the user and service provider. Moreover, a set of pseudonyms are generated which can 
serve as temporary identifiers for both the user and the service provider. The 
pseudonyms are valid only during the active service session. 
The banking module is the entity which is responsible for the issuance of on-demand 
credit units. These are the credentials that give the right to use a specific service. Of 
course, there must be a pre-established relationship between the banking entity and the 
user. This can be based on a special type of banking credential pre-assigned off-line. 
Once a successful validation is done, the banking entity is able to dispatch the 
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corresponding credit units and transaction identifiers which can specify the amount of 
content data to be retrieved or the maximum duration time for the service session. 
The session manager is responsible for establishing associations with other external 
session managers for the purpose of supporting scalability between multiple district 
domains. Any exchange of information between different district domains will be 
performed through the interaction of current participating session managers. 
The accounting module creates temporary registers to keep track of transitory users. 
These registers record the dispatched session parameters of temporary users. 
The authorization module grants resources assignation when validations at the other 
modules have been completed. 
The policy module defines the way the information is treated based on its labeled 
queuing priority and/or assigned bandwidth. 
3.3 Single-hop communications 
The sequence of messages and operations is described in detail in Chapter 6. This type of 
communication is initiated from the OBU to the neighboring RSUs. First, the OBU has to 
send a request message which includes its actual credentials in order to receive any specific 
announced service from a registered service provider. The collected information at the RSU is 
sent to the current district service domain where the session manager generates a session ID. 
In the security module, the public key certificates disclosed by the OBU need to be verified for 
their revocation status. If this validation succeeds, a session key and pseudonyms are 
generated for both OBU and the provider. In the banking module, a validation of the disclosed 
banking credentials and service affordability for the user is checked in order to generate the 
session credit units. For accounting purposes, temporary registers and associations for both 
the user and service provider can be created while it is authorized for that specific service 
session. At this point, all the parameters generated for that session are collected, protected and 
sent back to the corresponding recipients which are both the OBU and the provider. 
3.3.1 Single-hop analysis 
The analytical model for the single-hop communication scenario is given in Chapter 7 where it 
is defined in the single-hop initiation request protocol SHI-RQ. The cumulative signaling 
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cost is based on the addition of individual costs at each tier process in the single-hop 
communication. The individual costs involve the related processing costs for performing data 
processing, cryptographic operations and the related link costs. 
The single-hop simulation scenario is based on a user-to-district service domain tier process 
for processing a service request deployed in a wireless network topology as described in 
Chapter 8. The objective of the response time analysis is to verify its feasibility in a mobile 
environment when service requests are executed in a single district domain. From the results 
obtained, it was observed that the average response time values for the generation of service 
session attributes remained acceptable. These simulations were performed for a realistic 
number of mobile nodes and with an increased number of concurrent vehicles per access 
point. 
3.4 Multi-hop communications 
This type of communication requires some sort of incentives for participating nodes as their 
local resources are utilized at every received and forwarded message. Along the forwarding 
path, a chain of certificates must be built through public key certificates for every single 
intermediate node. In Figure 3.1, there are for example three intermediate nodes and the final 
user, in which all the nodes attach their corresponding public key certificate in the forwarding 
chain. At the banking entity, there is an association between an incentive unit and its 
corresponding public key certificate which also serves to encrypt a dispatched bonus unit and 
respective timestamps. Consequently, at every forwarding node, the current node will be able 
to decrypt its bonus unit by using the corresponding private key. The following list 
summarizes the steps of the above procedure of which full details can be found in Chapter 6. 
1. The intermediate node attaches its public key certificate. 
2. The banking module generates bonus unit and timestamp and they are encrypted with 
intermediate node's public key certificate. 
3. At intermediate node, the received message is decrypted with the node's private key. 
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Figure 3.1 - Multi-hop communications 
3.4.1 Multi-hop analysis 
The analytical model of the multi-hop communication scenario is given in Chapter 7 where the 
multi-hop initiation request protocol (MHI-RQ) is defined. The cumulative signaling cost is 
based on the sum of individual cost at each tier process in the multi-hop communication. The 
individual costs involve the related processing costs for performing data processing, 
cryptographic operations and the link costs. 
The multi-hop simulation scenario is based on the presence of intermediate nodes when a 
service request takes place as described in Chapter 6. The objective of the response time 
analysis is to verify its feasibility in a mobile environment when service requests are executed 
out of the transmission range of the roadside infrastructure. From the results obtained, it was 
observed that the average response time values for a service request were acceptable within a 
specific number of intermediate nodes. As expected when increasing the number of 
intermediate nodes the average response time increases as well, sometimes beyond acceptable 
values. 
3.5 Service scalability support 
In order to provide scalable solutions across multiple domains, the exchange of control 
messages is required between adjacent service domains so that information about active 
service parameters is shared among operating session managers. Interconnection mechanisms 
need to be established at a logical level between neighboring district domains. This is 
described in detail in Chapter 8. These mechanisms will allow service parameters from an 
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active session to be shared between two concurrent district domains in order to maintain an 
active session alive without the need for the user to be registered for a new session at the new 
district domain. Additionally, scalable services between multiple district domains are likely to 
support the interoperations of heterogeneous access technologies 
3.5.1 Scalability analysis 
The analytical model for the extended connectivity request protocol EC-RQ is given in 
Chapter 7. The EC-RQ protocol is intended to provide as means for ensuring continuous 
connectivity when a vehicle changes from one district domain to an adjacent one. The 
exchange of current session parameters takes place when performing handover operations 
between different service district domains. The cumulative signaling cost is based on the sum 
of the individual cost at each tier process in the extended communication. 
In the scalable simulation scenario described in Chapter 8, the average response time was 
observed to be acceptable when sharing session information even when the number of 
requesters increases. The response time values achieved by a single district domain are higher 
compared to those obtained from two and even three district domains. This is because the 
corresponding initial request process for a single district domain involves more tier elements 
and more processing to set the original session parameters. 
3.6 Service Taxonomy 
Different types of services are described in Chapter 9 such as safety, convenience and 
commercial applications. The performance of some type of applications such as HTTP, 
database, voice and video was studied for moving vehicles while using the mechanisms of the 
proposed architecture. The results collected were relative to the response time with acceptable 
results. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this thesis project key characteristics and models for service environment in the vehicular 
context have been presented. The major concern is to provide a robust and secure transfer of 
information between a vehicles and a provider in a spontaneous on-demand manner. A 
scalable secure service provisioning architecture was presented, thatcomprises the presence of 
public and private certificate authorities collocated with accounting and banking entities 
interacting with active district domains. One main advantage of the district service 
architecture is that it promotes collaboration of the forwarding peers as the architecture 
generates incentives for every participating vehicle. 
Three main types of request messages can take place in vehicular scenarios: a single-hop, 
multi-hop and a scalable service request. The simulation studies performed for single-hop, 
multi-hop and multiple district scenarios showed satisfactory response time values when 
executing service session requests. 
A wide variety of heterogeneous non-safety applications can be designed on top of the district 
service architecture in order to offer spontaneous on-demand service access. Security of the 
exchanged data is preserved at all times since a service request is originated by the user till the 
delivery of content service from the provider. 
CHAPTER 4 
CONFERENCE PAPER IEEE LCN ON-MOVE 
2007 
This paper was presented in the IEEE ON-MOVE Workshop with the IEEE Local 
Communication Networks Conference (LCN) 2007, October 14-17 2007, Dublin, Ireland. 
The title of this paper is 'An AAA study for service provisioning in vehicular networks'. The 
paper gives a survey and analysis of existing approaches from an AAA perspective in mobile 
environments, which includes security, privacy and billing mechanisms. The concepts defined 
in this chapter serve as the starting point for the development of the proposed service 
architecture. 
4.1 Abstract 
4.1.1 Resume en francais 
Ce document etudie les elements cle d'une solution pour l'authentification, l'autorisation, et la 
facturation lors de la prestation de service dans les reseaux vehiculaires. Differentes solutions 
ont ete etudiees pour identifier leurs avantages et inconvenients selon les parametres 
principaux devaluation. Les efforts de recherche futurs doivent adresser ces elements pour 
fournir un cadre approprie d'approvisionnement de service pour le futur deploiement des 
reseaux vehiculaires. 
4.1.2 Abstract 
This paper investigates the key elements for a scalable solution of authentication, 
authorization, and accounting for service delivery in vehicular networks. Different approaches 
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were studied to identify their advantages and disadvantages according to main evaluation 
parameters, two of which are scalability and latency. Upcoming research efforts need to 
address these elements to provide an appropriate service provisioning framework for the future 
deployment of vehicular networks. 
4.1.3 Index terms 
Vehicular networks, AAA models, service provisioning, security, privacy, billing. 
4.2 Introduction 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETS) are networks that are enabled by short to medium-
range communication systems for vehicle-vehicle or vehicle-roadside communication. The 
potential benefits associated to enabling road-safety applications through VANETs are well 
known. These include real-time collision avoidance warnings and the exchange of driving 
parameters among vehicles for a safer driving. Besides these useful and sometimes vital 
functionalities, another trend of functionalities which involves commercial non-safety related 
services is also envisioned by sharing the vehicle communication channel with decentralized 
mobile applications from different service providers. The array of these commercial services 
can be broad, ranging from internet access, vehicle infotainment, and navigation assistance to 
transportation logistics management and high speed automatic toll collection. The success of 
service provisioning models for VANETs for a commercial purpose depends on the 
implementation of robust architectures that are able to maintain their overall performance for 
end users when facing different real vehicular situations. In particular, new challenges arise 
related to security mechanisms, privacy of user information, and billing for services in a 
highly mobile and sometimes multi service provider (SP) context. A key point for maintaining 
robust service provisioning resides in the capacity to manage a series of security mechanisms 
which comprise authentication and authorization of subscribers. These mechanisms will 
provide to the involved parties a secure way to exchange information. Additionally service 
provider (SP) policies can regulate the provisioning of user profiles and they also can define 
the application of billing models. Moreover, in VANETs environments, billing processes can 
be extended for service message forwarding among vehicles. This can be done by the 
implementation of incentive and collaborative mechanisms to foster propagation of 
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information for service delivery. This paper investigates the key elements for a scalable 
solution of authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) suitable for service delivery 
in VANETs. 
In section 4.4, a brief description of AAA challenges involved in service provisioning for 
VANETs is given. In section 4.5, different existing approaches of AAA elements are 
presented. Section 4.6 makes an evaluation of the previous approaches based on different 
criteria according to VANETs characteristics and a simulation of a vehicular scenario is 
presented. Finally, section 4.7 presents some conclusions. 
4.3 AAA challenges in VANETS 
An AAA architecture is a centralized trusted model widely used by mobile network operators. 
A description of access models can be found in Appendix B. In this model key cryptography 
is built around a key management system for authentication and authorization purposes. In the 
case of service provisioning for VANETs, user authorization includes two levels: 
authorization to access a radio channel at the road unit and authorization to access a service 
application at the SP. Once a user has been fully authenticated, the SP grants him with the 
right to access services. This permission can be issued by using service credentials but SP 
policies can define the restrictions to access a service. Finally, a billing server infrastructure 
needs also to be available to charge for service usage. 
In the following we will expose some specific issues that need to be addressed; primarily 
security, privacy, and billing mechanisms, in order to make VANETs service deployment 
secure for users and viable for SP. 
4.4 Service concepts in VANETS environments 
4.4.1 Security concepts 
Security is a key point in the implementation of AAA models. It is important to keep in mind 
that threats in VANETs are not exclusively intended to affect vehicles; threats can also target 
SP. In a vehicle-vehicle communication scenario, a major concern is the injection of false 
information by manipulating position or speed parameters. Another well known attack is the 
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denial of service (DoS), which can be caused by jamming the radio channel at the link layer or 
at the routing layer by saturating the vehicles forwarding capacity [Blum and Eskadarian, 
2004]. A third attack is impersonation, where a malicious vehicle pretends to be another 
vehicle by forging one or more identities. Diverse types of cryptographic methods for 
authenticating data have been developed to secure network communications, For the purpose 
of this study, we briefly describe some security concepts that can be used in the VANET AAA 
context. 
Asymmetric Cryptography. This type of authentication is based on the use of public (publicly 
known) and private (secret) keys for authenticating two parties. The public and the private 
key are mathematically related but it is nearly impossible to retrieve a private key from a 
public key [DoD Report, 2004]. In essence, vehicle A would have the key pairs {KA, K~A) 
where KA is the public key and A?A is the private key. To secure the communication link 
between vehicle A and B, vehicle A obtains vehicle B 's public key KB and uses it to encrypt the 
message. To decrypt the message vehicle B uses its private key KB- The resulting security 
features are authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. 
Symmetric Cryptography. This is considered a lightweight authentication scheme since it 
uses a shared secret key between two parties; thus, it is not dependant of any centralized 
infrastructure for key distribution and management. Basically, vehicle A and B must agree in 
having a secret shared key {KAB} before exchanging data and this key will be used to encrypt 
and decrypt messages. The resulting security features are authentication, integrity but not 
non-repudiation. This is because there is no trusted entity that binds the encrypted message 
with the corresponding real identity of the sender. 
Digital signatures. Signatures provide a way to legitimize messages. They are created by 
encrypting the message with a private key K and decrypted by using a hash function with a 
public key K [DoD Report, 2004]. In the case when vehicle A wants to sign a message M, it 
uses its private key KA to compute the digital signature as {M)KA. At the receiver, the digital 
signature is verified by using A's public key, i.e. {{M}KA}KA. Occasionally, a collision 
resistant one-way hash function is applied to the message before generating the digital 
signature [Oppliger, 2002]. Note that the SIG notation is also use to represent digital 
signatures. 
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PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). This is a robust infrastructure based on asymmetric 
cryptography which provides generation, distribution and management of public key 
certificates [Mishra and Nadkarni, 2003]. The core of PKI resides in the Certification 
Authority (CA) who is charge of managing keying certificates. The main function of 
certificates is to bind the identity of an entity to a public key. For instance, the public key 
certificate intended to a vehicle is delivered in the form of a digital signature SIGKCA(KA), 
where KCA is the private key of the corresponding certification authority (CA) and KA is the 
public key of vehicle A. 
4.4.2 Privacy concepts 
Privacy issues for service provisioning in VANETs regard primarily preserving the anonymity 
of a vehicle and/or the privacy of its location. 
Anonymity. It is defined as the state of a vehicle being not identifiable by any other party. 
Anonymity can be achieved by employing pseudonyms issued by a certificate authority which 
will be in charge of assigning those pseudonyms to real vehicle identities. Pseudonyms are 
defined as temporary identities which change over times [Capkun et ai, 2004]. In following 
sections, approaches using pseudonyms will be referred-to as time-based. In general, time-
based pseudonyms provide identity privacy comprising a time metric to determine the renewal 
frequency of pseudonyms. The degree of privacy will be bound to the pseudonyms updating 
rate. (e.g. every minute). This means, that the degree of privacy increases with the updating 
rate. Another variant of this type of pseudonyms is what is called speed-based pseudonyms, 
where the pseudonyms change based on variations in the vehicle's velocity. 
Location Privacy. It refers to the capability of preventing any other party to associate the 
vehicle's locations with its identity or pseudonyms. This type privacy is primarily intended 
for location based services (LBS). For instance, vehicle A located in a specific location might 
broadcast its information using its pseudonym; however, a third party in the surrounding can 
associate the user's pseudonym with its current location. To offer location privacy, schemes 
need to masquerade the position of the vehicle. Two examples of location privacy schemes 
are: 
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i) Mix-Zones. This scheme is intended to provide location anonymity every time an update of 
pseudonyms is performed in a geographic area shared by various vehicles. The changes from 
previous to new pseudonyms cannot be tracked due to the use of a silent period agreed on by 
the vehicles within the area, followed by a communication period where all vehicles change 
their pseudonyms at the same time; thus, causing mislead of eavesdropping activities. 
ii) Geo-bound Pseudonyms. This scheme consists of assigning a set of pseudonyms according 
to the geographic region. This implies that the movement patterns of a vehicle will define the 
frequency of changes in pseudonyms, and therefore, minimizing the risk of being tracked. 
4.4.3 Billing concepts 
It is possible to separate billing models into two fundamental domains: i) A billing process 
that takes place at the SP infrastructure, whose main function is to charge subscribers for the 
use of all sorts of resources. This charging may vary depending on the SP pricing policies 
commonly placed in an account server. In this context, we can consider two strategies as 
presented in [Moustafa et al, 2005]: the first one is a fixed fee, where the subscriber pays a 
fixed amount every period of time. The second strategy is based on charging the subscriber 
according to his actual consumption of resources. In general, it is worth assuming that a SP 
can be associated with multiple services and distributed in multiple road units. So, each 
service could own different access control policies and accounting schemes. 
ii) The second domain is mainly oriented to ad hoc environments and deals with the presence 
of intermediate vehicles to reach the subscriber and the SP. In the case of VANETs, multihop 
approaches can be used where the participating vehicles propagate messages beyond their 
radio transmission range. For this purpose, incentive approaches for forwarding and 
collaboration must be considered as proposed in [Mohan and Joiner, 2004] and [Obreiter et 
al., 2003] for mobile ad hoc networks. In the VANET context, the adapted schemes aiming to 
foster cooperation between vehicles can follow two strategies: 
- Account based systems are based on the fact that intermediate vehicles in the routing 
path require remuneration incentives to be willing to forward other's packets. Given 
this condition, the participant nodes need to be aware of the neighbors' accounts or 
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"virtual money" [Buttyan and Hubaux, 2000] to whether facilitate forwarding or drop 
packets. It might be considered that the issuance of accounts to vehicles is done by 
trusted business entities with strict remuneration policies. 
- Reputation based systems are based on the trustiness of the routing path considering 
previous forwarding experiences with intermediate vehicles. This means, the behavior 
of the participating vehicles is observed and evaluated to create trusted routing paths. 
In general, the strategy does not consider tangible remunerations but instead it 
incentives collaboration by assigning reputation metrics on vehicles. 
4.5 Existing approaches for VANETS 
4.5.1 AAA approaches for VANETS 
There has been a few works on providing AAA solution elements for VANETs. An access 
control scheme for application services in VANETs is proposed in [Moustafa et al, 2005]. 
Here, the authors present an AAA framework to provide authentication and authorization 
based on a Kerberos model. Once a user request is released, the Kerberos Server at the SP site 
responds with a Ticket Grant Ticket (TGT). If succeeded, the user is eligible to be granted 
with a Ticket Grant Service (TGS), which manages authorization to access information 
services. Moreover, the authors proposed a Kerberos proxy allocated in the access point (AP 
or ROAD UNIT) to save bandwidth resources. After this process is complete, the user 
receives an IP address (IPv4) from a DHCP server and a public key certificate. With this 
certificate key the user will be able to authenticate other users through the generation of a pair 
wise master key (PMK) for mutual authentication. A major drawback is the high maintenance 
cost of the server infrastructure. Additionally, it is necessary to assess the end-to-end delay of 
the AAA process to deem its feasibility for the deployment of VANETs especially in such an 
extensive mobility context and dependence on internet connectivity and fast handover 
schemes. 
4.5.2 Privacy approaches for VANETS 
In [Sampigethaya et al, 2005] a mix-zone location privacy scheme called Caravan is 
proposed. According to the authors, the main concern is to allow any vehicle to be able to 
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achieve unlinkability between two or more of its locations while being tracked by an 
adversary. To achieve this, the approach combines a navigation group, i.e vehicles sharing the 
same geographical zone, with a random silent interval between updates of pseudonyms. 
Within the navigation group only one vehicle known as Group Leader (GL) is responsible for 
transmitting updates of pseudonyms to the group members after a silent interval. As a result, 
this scheme reduces the possibility to track a specific vehicle by misleading the attacker with 
other vehicle pseudonyms at the same time. In [Dotzer, 2005], it is addressed privacy issues in 
VANETs. Specifically the author assumes the use of pseudonyms as identifiers that can be 
mapped to identities, and that change frequently over time. The approach used to validate this 
scheme considers a trusted authority that is responsible of storing real identities and handling 
their mappings to pseudonyms. Within the vehicle, there is a tamper resistant device in the 
form of a smart card which stores the set of pseudonyms and credentials for accessing 
services. In [Raya and Hubaux, 2005] it is considered the deployment of an Electronic 
License Plate (EPL) as a unique identifier of the vehicle and which can be issued by a trusted 
authority. Regarding privacy, it is proposed the use of anonymous key pairs that change 
frequently according to the driving speed and can be preloaded into the vehicle Tamper Proof 
Device (TPD) by a certificate authority. 
In summary, all the previous approaches use pseudonyms but differ in the way pseudonyms 
are distributed and updated, i.e. by a GL in Caravan or preloaded in a TPD. 
4.5.3 Billing approaches for VANETS 
There has been to date, no integrated billing approaches for VANETs that cover both their ad 
hoc and the infrastructure sides. Given the special characteristics imposed by VANETs, 
mainly on ad hoc environments, we cover in the following some relevant billing approaches in 
the multi-hop domain rather than billing models in a fixed network domain. 
An account based approach for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS) is presented in [Buttyan 
and Hubaux, 2000]. The main idea is that a node employs a currency called nugget to "pay" if 
it originates a request. The intermediate nodes acquire nuggets from the sent packet and then 
forward the later. The nugget units are distributed dynamically along the routing chain. One 
possible drawback of this scheme is that the number of nuggets to reach a new destination is 
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not known in advance. In [Buttyan and Hubaux, 2003], it is proposed a counter unit called 
nuglet stored in a tamper resistant hardware module with cryptographic capabilities. The 
function of the nuglet is to count the number of originated and forwarded packets within a 
node. All the packets must be parsed and certified by the hardware module. If a node 
forwards a packet, its nuglet counter increases by one. If the node originates a packet, the 
nuglet decreases by one. If the counter becomes negative, the node is isolated and not allowed 
to originate messages. All packets must be parsed by the security model. 
An alternative collaboration approach involving routing protocols for ad hoc environments is 
shown in [Mohan and Joiner, 2004]. There, the authors propose a model relying on a load-
based routing approach to distinguish between forwarding and originating packets in the 
network. For route metrics, a load value takes track of the number of packets buffered per 
node which relates to the number of originated and forwarded packets. A node in a zone 
knows the topology of every neighboring node and maintains a load/hop distance table in its 
cache. For forwarding, the approach combines a load based hybrid routing (LHR) and a zone 
routing protocol (ZRP). The advantage of this scheme is that it gives a precise knowledge of 
the nodal activity. To stimulate cooperation the routing protocol chooses a least loaded path 
forcing nodes with minimum loads to forward more packets. 
Based on the reputation incentive scheme, the Watchdog protocol [Obreiter et al, 2003] main 
objective is to detect non collaborating nodes by observation and reports retrieval from other 
nodes. The protocol maintains a buffer of transmitted packets and observes forwarding 
activity of intermediate nodes by comparing each overhead packet with the packets in the 
buffer. If the packet has remained in the buffer longer than a defined timeout interval, the 
protocol marks a node as misbehaved. Furthermore, the protocol classifies routing paths 
according to their trustiness to avoid forwarding packets through misbehaving nodes. 
Another reputation incentive scheme is the Confidant [Obreiter et al, 2003] which works 
similarly to Watchdog in detecting malicious nodes and isolating them by using a reputation 
system. The scheme consists of the presence of a monitor entity which verifies that every 
transmitted packet by a node is forwarded by the next node. If the next node fails to forward 
the packet, then a warning message is released to alert about the corresponding malicious 
node. Subsequently, the system builds a routing path by ranking the nodes and removing the 
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paths containing malicious nodes. The difference with Watchdog stands in the fact that 
Confidant excludes misbehaving nodes from routing paths. 
From the works presented above, and given proven billing models for wireless infrastructure-
based networks not presented here, one can see that a remaining open issue in billing models 
for VANETs relies in the integration of billing mechanisms that can be implemented 
seamlessly both at the infrastructure and at the ad hoc network, and that can be easily operated 
at the SP. The challenge relies in that the billing process performed on the accounting server 
at the SP site, needs also to be aware of the forwarding transactions carried out by the 
vehicles. This can be thought of in terms of a billing hybrid scheme for VANETs. 
4.5.4 Security approaches for VANETS 
There have been different proposals for securing data in vehicular environments. In [El Zarki 
et al., 2002] a Driver Ad Hoc Networking Infrastructure (DAHNI) is proposed. The authors 
assume vehicular ad hoc networking with access to a fixed infrastructure and which is 
intended mainly for traffic management. For security the authors implement digital signatures 
based on RSA (Rivest Sharmir Algorithm) encryption. These digital signatures are issued 
along with timestamps and sequence numbers to provide authentication between two parties. 
For managing public keys, a PKI infrastructure is envisioned adding robustness to the system. 
In [Raya and Hubaux, 2005], it is addressed the challenges of implementing security in 
VANETs. Similarly to [Raya et al, 2006], the security architecture is composed by a 
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI), where a CA issues certified public/private key 
pairs to vehicles. Authors also consider a hardware device tamper proof (TPD) to keep keying 
materials. In the authentication procedure, the vehicle signs each message with its private key 
and attaches the corresponding public key certificate. For digital signatures, the encryption 
method is ECC (Ellyptic Curve Crytographic) with a significant reduction on the packet size. 
In [Blum and Eskandarian, 2004], it is described the threats on inter-vehicular 
communications and present their project called SecCar. They assume a PKI architecture and 
a virtual infrastructure formed by cluster heads. The later are responsible for signing 
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messages and disseminating them via a unicast transmission. A limitation of this approach is 
that it can create a bottleneck when traffic increases. It also increases the packet overhead. 
Besides the research works mentioned above, in [Choi et ai, 2005] a different perspective on 
securing VANETs is presented. The work states a model that supports a symmetric scheme 
over hybrid architectures without the need of a centralized infrastructure. The authentication 
between vehicles and base stations (BS) is performed through a message authentication code 
(HMAC), which is a cryptographic hash function that uses a symmetric key. The HMAC 
verification is done with the shared session keys which are computed by the vehicles and the 
BS using pre-shared long lived pseudonyms. According to this proposal, the non-repudiation 
feature can be achieved by means of a trusted entity (most of the time off-line) which is 
responsible of providing a link between an identity and a corresponding pseudonym. 
In summary, it is possible to classify security approaches existing in current works into two 
broad branches, i.e. symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms implemented within a PKI 
infrastructure, where repudiation is assured by asymmetric mechanisms. 
4.6 Evaluation of existing approaches 
In this section, we present a qualitative evaluation as well as some quantitative evaluation 
measures for the different AAA element approaches presented earlier. Similar to [Fonseca and 
Festag, 2006], we evaluate the approaches described in the previous sections as having good, 
average or poor performance for a number of criteria. The following criteria have been 
examined for all categories of AAA elements: scalability, packet overhead, latency, and 
processing. 
Scalability: it is related to the level of network performance as the number of vehicles 
increases. Three levels of scalability can be noted good (large networks), average (medium 
size) and low (small networks). 
Adaptability: it refers to the way the network topology converges to changes in its topology. 
The difference with scalability is that the latter refers to the capacity to extent services and 
support a large number of users. 
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Packet Overhead: it deals with the additional data that is appended to the message to provide 
the particular element of AAA. Three levels of packet overhead where considered. 
Processing: it refers to the computational resources required for the computing and processing 
related to an AAA element. Three levels of processing requirements where considered. 
Latency: It comprises the total time delay of message or data generation and/or propagation 
and/or processing involved in the logical operation of a particular AAA element. This 
parameter can be directly related to the processing and packet overhead criteria. If the 
processing and/or packet overhead increase, the expected latency will increase as well. The 
latency has a direct impact on the degree of feasibility or adequacy of an AAA element in the 
VANET context. The higher the latency, the bigger the requirements on the performances of 
handover and mobility management mechanism on the networking level for VANETs. 
4.6.1 Analysis for security approaches 
In addition to the evaluation criteria mentioned above, we also consider here the adaptability. 
The latter refers to the ability of the approach to handle and support frequent changes in the 
VANET topology especially. Note that this criterion is related to the scalability of the 
network. The level of adaptability can be good (support frequent changes), average (medium 
support) and low (minimum support). 
Table 4.1 shows a comparison among symmetric, asymmetric and digital signatures schemes. 
Table 4.1 Comparison of security schemes 
Scalabiltiy 
Packet OH 
Processing 
Latency 
Adaptability 
Symmetric 
Average 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Average 
Asymmetric 
High 
Average 
High 
High 
High 
Signatures 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
As shown in Table 4.1, symmetric algorithms have average scalability since a secret key must 
be shared between two parties. Complexity increases as the number of vehicles increases, 
since new shared keys need to be created for every incoming vehicle. Symmetric schemes 
have, however, low processing requirements since unique secret keys are already known by 
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the parties; thus, the packet overhead is also low independently of the selected encryption 
mechanism. For example, HMAC using a symmetric key can be generated by a SHA-1 hash 
function, which is 20 bytes long. The main advantage of symmetric algorithms is that 
exchange of information can be performed in short periods of time; as a result, one can assume 
that end to end latency is low which is desirable in such highly mobile environment. Note 
that, symmetric schemes offer authentication and integrity protection to data but they do not 
assure non-repudiation. For example, when law requisites need to identify and punish 
misbehaving activities. But as described in [Choi et ai, 2005] it is possible to retrieve 
identities from a trusted entity built around a symmetric scheme. 
In the case of asymmetric schemes in PKI, they pose good scalability and adaptability to 
frequent changes in extended VANETs since the distribution of key pairs and certificates is 
performed by a centralized entity. In contrast, the main disadvantage is the high processing 
requirements which suggest an implicit increase in the end-to-end delay. Regarding the packet 
overhead, it is considered average since no additional signaling packets are required along 
with the message. It is worth noting that digital signatures use asymmetric mechanisms, thus, 
scalability and adaptability to frequent changes remains good as long as the mechanisms use a 
centralized key distribution. Regarding the packet overhead, it increases due to the signing 
and verification process for every transmitted message. This also has a negative impact in the 
computational processing. Nevertheless, as proposed in [Mohan and Joiner, 2004], processing 
problems can be alleviated by using specific hardware devices in charge of storing keying 
material and signing messages. Moreover, as explained in [Fonseca and Festag, 2006], power 
constraints due to high processing requirements are not a concern in VANETs since vehicles 
are equipped with long life batteries. 
In the following, we analyze through simulations the effects of packets size when using 
digitals signature on the overall round-trip delay. We consider a request-reply registration 
scenario where a requester sends signed registration messages to a nearby road unit (RU) in 
order to assess the impact of the message round-trip delay (RTD) [Raya et ai, 2006]. This 
RTD is given by, 
TRTD(M) - 2*(Tsign(M) + TTX(M) + Tverijy(M)) (1) 
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where TRTD(M) represents the round-trip delay for a registration message M. This involves that 
a registration request messages is attached with the vehicle's signature and on the other side 
the RU also signs the reply messages. Tsign(M) is the time to generate a signature of message 
M, TTX(M) and Tverijy(M) is the time to transmit and verify message M, respectively. It is possible 
to approximate the processing time for an ECDSA signature such as given in [Raya et ah, 
2006]. Notice that there is no handshaking in the previous formula; it only represents the 
round trip delay. The time values for this signature are given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Signature Processing times 
Operation 
Generation 
Verification 
Transmission 
Time(ms) 
3.255 
7.617 
0.110 
Simulations were implemented in NS-2 simulator using MAC 802.1 la module with a data rate 
of 54 Mbps. We evaluated the round-trip delay at different vehicular speeds and different 
packet size. 
Figure 4.1 shows the number of packets received at different speeds considering registration 
messages of 256 bytes with a periodicity of 100 ms. As can be seen, the lowest amount of 21 
packets received is reached at 50 m/s. It can be inferred that as long as the vehicle is moving 
at high speeds, the periodicity of the registration messages should be increased since the 
vehicle approaches rapidly the boundaries of the radio transmission range. The maximum 
distance achieved between the RU and vehicle was 550 m and beyond this distance no 
request-reply messages were received. 
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Packets received 
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Figure 4.1 - Received packets vs speed 
Figure 4.2 shows the round trip delay at 10 m/s (continuous line) and 40 m/s (dash line) speeds 
with a registration message of 256 bytes and a periodicity of 50 ms within a 5 s transmission 
window time. As shown in the graph, the round-trip delay at 10 m/s presents several delay 
peaks due to farther positions from the RU at that transmission time window compared to a 
vehicle moving at a 40 m/s. 
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Figure 4.2 - Round trip delay vs time 
4.6.2 Analysis for privacy approaches 
In addition to the general evaluation criteria mentioned above, we also consider here the 
unlinkability. It refers to the property of not being identifiable from the previous to the current 
position. The level of unlinkability is considered to be high, average and low. Packet 
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overhead depends on the additional data appended to the message to provide privacy attributes 
and latency comprises the additional time delay caused by the generation of privacy attributes. 
Table 4.3 - Comparison of privacy schemes 
Metrics 
Scalability 
Overhead 
Processing 
Latency 
Unlikability 
Time-based 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Mix-zones 
Average 
High 
Average 
High 
High 
Geo-bound 
Average 
High 
Average 
Average 
Average 
As shown in the Table 4.3, the time-based privacy presents high scalability features due to 
every vehicle generates its own pseudonyms independently from any third trusted entity or 
any delimited geographic area. The corresponding packet overhead deals basically with the 
type of cryptographic key used to generate the pseudonym. A common cryptographic scheme 
is HMAC with a fix length of 160 bits using SHA-1 [Capkun et ai, 2004] and consequently 
the processing requirement is low. The communication transmission does not have a relevant 
latency impact if the generation of pseudonyms for a specific vehicle uses fast encryption 
schemes, e.g. MD5 or SHA-1. Moreover, the renewal of pseudonyms can be predefined 
depending on time or speed parameters. Regarding unlinkability, time-based approaches are 
oriented to provide identity anonymity and they are not intended to support location 
anonymity. 
The mix-zone approach presents average scalability features since it is oriented for a delimited 
area with a registration control for the members of a secure area. The overhead and latency 
are considerably high especially if the registration access to the area is configured in a cluster 
mode, where control mechanisms relies on a vehicle supervisor entitled to control and 
distribute pseudonyms. This configuration can cause a severe bottleneck effect if the number 
of node member increases. Unlinkability is the salient feature since multiple pseudonyms will 
be transmitted in the zone simultaneously with no possibility to correlate the current position 
and numerous pseudonyms for a specific vehicle. 
The geobound scheme assigns a predetermined set of pseudonyms to a specific geographic 
zone. Similar to the mix-zone approach, there is a registration and access control performed 
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by a principal entity, in the corresponding area in order for the vehicle to retrieve local 
pseudonyms. Therefore, there is an average scalability since every zone distributes and 
monitors its pseudonyms in the bordered area. The packet overhead will have a significant 
impact when the vehicle changes from one zone to and adjacent zone. This implies a 
registration process in the new zone to receive the related pseudonyms. Latency is considered 
average since once the vehicle is registered in the zone there is a direct distribution of 
pseudonyms. Even though, pseudonyms change depending on the geographic zone, 
unlinkability is not fully assured if the pseudonyms are being tracked by a third party from a 
zone to another. From the above discussion, one might think that time based approaches best 
suit the characteristics of VANETs but their major drawback is that location anonymity is not 
guaranteed. In some vehicular scenarios, a combination of time based and location base 
privacy approaches might be required, so further analysis must to be done on this subject. 
4.6.3 Analysis for billing approaches 
We compare reputation systems in the form of the Watchdog and Confidant approaches and 
account schemes in the form of load based and credit based approaches. Scalability of billing 
approaches is related to the capability of the incentive approach to handle large size network. 
Packet overhead is related to the additional data appended to the message to assure 
cooperation between vehicles. Latency comprises the additional time delay caused by the 
implementation of incentive approaches. Additionally, we consider the negotiation criterion 
which refers to the capability of a vehicle to negotiate incentive units with an authorized 
entity. In general reputation schemes do not support this feature. 
Table 4.4 - Comparison of incentives schemes 
Metrics 
Scalability 
Overhead 
Processing 
Latency 
Negotiation 
Watchdog 
Average 
Average 
Low 
Low 
No 
Confidant 
Average 
Average 
Average 
Average 
No 
Load-based 
Average 
High 
High 
Low 
No 
Credit 
High 
Average 
High 
Average 
Yes 
As seen from Table 4.4, the Watchdog scheme holds an average scalability capacity since each 
vehicle must keep a trustiness metric and knowledge from all the vehicles in the forwarding 
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chain. A possible limitation appears if the routing path extends. There is an average packet 
overhead caused by the report of vehicles and observation of the forwarded packet in the 
routing chain. Moreover, the routing metric calculation and buffering of the packet overhead 
is carried out by each vehicle after transmitting a packet. This means, that the reputation 
actions come after the routing event, i.e. detection of abnormal behavior, and consequently 
with no relevant impact the overall latency. As mentioned in section 4, this is a reputation 
based incentive scheme intended to operate in the network layer with no negotiation 
capabilities. 
Confidant has an average scalability especially when the number of vehicles increases due to 
the maintenance of the routing tables after the reputation system has ranked every vehicle in a 
routing path. Consequently, there is a significant impact on the packet overhead and 
processing when the alarm message is triggered to alert trusted vehicle from malicious nodes. 
Routing paths have to be reordered and ranked affecting the overall latency. Similar to 
Watchdog, this is a reputation based incentive scheme intended for the network layer with no 
negotiation capabilities. 
The hybrid load based routing protocols presents an average scalability since every vehicle in 
a specific zone knows the topology of the neighboring vehicles within the zone. Problems will 
rise up if the number of vehicles increases. To control the access of vehicles in the zone, 
access protocols have a big impact on processing and packet overhead. Regarding latency, the 
packet will follow the least load routing path within the zone assuring a minimum end-to-end 
delay. In this scheme no negation is available since it uses a load metric based on the number 
of packets to define routing paths within the zone. 
Account based approaches, as nuggets or nuglets schemes provide good scalability since every 
vehicle manages its own counter independently of any exchange of routing tables from 
neighboring vehicles. The main assumption is that counter units cannot be modified by the 
users due to the existence of tamper resistant hardware [Buttyan and Hubaux, 2005]. Since 
every packet needs to pass through the secure hardware it verifies and inserts the encrypted 
current counter in the packet header causing an increase in overhead and processing 
requirements. This implies also a significant impact on the overall latency. The main 
advantage is that this approach support negotiation between the vehicle and the account entity 
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responsible of assigning counter units; thus, flexible remuneration can be established for 
specific network connections. 
Considering a business perspective in VANETs, the account based approaches are more likely 
to meet the characteristics of dynamic billing applicable in ad hoc environments. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This work presented an AAA study focused on service provisioning in VANETs. Security is 
an element that is central to AAA approaches. Two major categories of security mechanisms 
are researched in current works, i.e. symmetric and asymmetric schemes. Based on the latter, a 
PKI infrastructure with digital signatures can be implemented offering a robust secure scheme. 
PKI has some significant drawbacks in the context of VANETs such as a high processing 
requirement and consequently an increase in the end to end latency. However, major benefits 
can be outlined from this scheme considering the potential deployment of road access 
infrastructures with the approval and support of governmental authorities. 
Regarding privacy issues, these are interested in preserving identity or location anonymity. 
For the latter, mix zones and geobound schemes were analyzed while time based pseudonyms 
were considered to provide identity privacy. In some vehicular scenarios, a combination of 
time based and location base privacy approaches might be required, so further analysis must 
be done on this subject. 
One major issue when implementing billing models for VANETs is the integration of robust 
billing mechanisms that can be implemented at the infrastructure and at the ad hoc level of 
VANETs and be operated seamlessly at the SP. The resulting model may need to provide 
incentives to vehicles to foster collaboration between them. In ad hoc environments, the 
account based approaches are more likely to meet the characteristics of dynamic billing in 
VANETs. The following chapter covers the security model which is the foundation of the 
service architecture in order to provide secure session parameters [Coronado and Cherkaoui, 
2007]. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONFERENCE PAPER ITS-UBIROADS IN IEEE 
GIIS 2007 
This chapter presents the paper published at the International Workshop for Intelligent 
Transport Systems ITS UBIROADS, co-located with IEEE Global Information Infrastructure 
Symposium GIIS, July 2-4 2007 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The title of this paper is 'Secure 
Services in Vehicular Networks'. This chapter defines a secure model suitable to maintain 
secure communications in a vehicular environment. This secure model definition will serve to 
define an extended service architecture to provide on-demand services on the road. 
5.1 Abstract 
5.1.1 Resume en francais 
Le succes des deploiements courants d'une serie de services pour les conducteurs et les 
passagers permet d'envisager un futur prometteur pour les services bases sur les reseaux 
vehiculaires. Des architectures securisees remplissant des conditions de mobilite vehiculaires 
doivent etre concues afin d'offrir les communications fiables sur Jesquelles ces services 
peuvent etre deployes. A cette fin, une architecture comprenant les entites gouvernementales 
et privees est presentee en ce document. Des scenarios securises d'approvisionnement de 
service sont illustres et donnent une vue d'ensemble sur la facon dont des mecanismes 
securises peuvent etre mis en oeuvre application pendant les sessions de service demandes par 
les vehicules. 
5.1.2 Abstract 
The current deployment of a variety of services for drivers and passengers envisions a 
promising future for vehicular networks (VN). Secure architectures fulfilling VN 
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requirements must be designed in order to offer reliable communications on top of which these 
services can be deployed. For this purpose, a trusted authority architecture including 
governmental and private entities is presented in this paper. Furthermore, secure service 
provisioning scenarios are illustrated giving a broad view on how secure mechanisms can be 
implemented during service sessions. 
5.1.3 Index terms 
Vehicular networks, service provisioning, security. 
5.2 Introduction 
Nowadays, current research works dealing with diverse aspects of vehicular networks (VN) 
are carried out by automotive industry in conjunction with some governmental entities and 
academic entities. Some of the initial efforts in this field began with the development and 
standardization of vehicular communication technologies. That is the case of DSRC in North 
America and Japan, as well as some European projects such as FleetNet [Hartenstein et ai, 
2001], and NoW (Network on Wheels) [Gerlach, 2005]. One of the main objectives of these 
technologies is to enable precaution information to drivers in the aim to reduce the number of 
traffic accidents. For instance, DSRC communication capabilities will allow the broadcast of 
safety messages between vehicles in the proximity of an unsafe area to alert drivers of 
imminent dangers on the road, and allowing them to take preventive actions with sufficient 
time to avoid accidents. The deployment of such technologies originally intended for critical 
applications, also opened the opportunity to provide a vast variety of other business driven 
applications. Examples on this realm include driver assistance navigation, road information 
services, and infotainment services for passengers (e.g. games, file downloads, video on 
demand, Internet connectivity). Even though, some of these applications may have real-time 
constraints, they encompass different requirements and characteristics compared to those 
concerning safety applications. For example, service delivery is usually targeted to a specific 
vehicle or passenger, but communication technologies would broadcast the requested service 
within the limits of the radio transmission range. As a result, this introduces new challenges in 
vehicles and users authentication. Also, service delivery might involve forwarding and 
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propagating data in an ad hoc mode beyond the communication range of an access point. 
Vehicles forwarding data might behave in a malicious way based on the premise that 
neighbouring vehicles are considered to be untrusted entities by nature. In this context, new 
challenges arise to support reliable transfers of information among unknown vehicles and 
service providers (SP). In general, it is required that future vehicular service systems 
guarantee the availability, reliability of services, as well as, security and privacy of users. 
Secure architectures fulfilling VN requirements must be designed in order to offer reliable 
communications on top of which vehicular services can be deployed. 
In this paper we introduce a trusted authority architecture which comprises the collaboration 
of governmental and private entities. Secure service provisioning scenarios are also illustrated 
giving a broad view on how secure mechanisms are used during service sessions. In section 
5.3, we give a brief description of the main communication elements directly involved in the 
architecture proposed in this paper. In section 5.4, we present the proposed security model 
and describe the main function and its elements in typical single hop and multi hop scenarios 
in section 5.5. Finally, some discussion in section 5.6 and conclusions in section 5.7. 
5.3 Secure service provisioning architecture 
Most of the secure models rely on a Certification Authority (CA) which is responsible of 
distributing and managing certified cryptographic keys between communicating parties. CAs 
are also responsible of keeping control of records and identification of vehicles. In our 
proposed architecture, we rely on the use of pseudonyms and a PKI model involving both 
governmental authorities and private trusted authorities. 
5.3.1 Governmental trusted authorities (GA) 
It is possible to consider the type of key provisioning by GA as permanent or semi-permanent 
depending on governmental policies and regulations. This control might allow an official 
authority to identify the real identity of vehicles under certain legal situations. In [Raya and 
Hubaux, 2005], it is proposed that regional governmental authorities and possibly car 
manufacturers could be in charge of these operations. Once the security material is available, 
it is preloaded in tamper-proof devices within the vehicle. 
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In essence, the certified keys provided by GAs must allow secure communications between 
two vehicles or a vehicle and a RSU, even if no previous communication between them has 
been set up. This principle is supported by the assumption of the execution of strict control 
and registration procedures applied to all vehicles and RSUs within the fixed infrastructure. 
5.3.2 Private trusted authorities (PA) 
In the proposed architecture, PA may also be involved in a certification process. Based on a 
business premise, we might think in terms of fixed infrastructures which involve the partaking 
of heterogeneous applications from different service providers. For this reason, it is not 
suitable to consider the set of pseudonyms and key certificates associated to a vehicle to be 
preloaded in advance before contacting a specific SP. Such a scenario would in fact mean that 
a user must previously store the public key for every SP he would like to contact and also its 
corresponding set of pseudonyms. In our architecture, PA represents certified companies in 
charge of providing pseudonyms, key distribution and key management for on-demand 
requesters, i.e. users and SPs. The difference between GA and PA relies in that the latter 
issues temporary key certificates and pseudonyms valid only during the service session. This 
means, every time a user requests access to a service, a new pseudonym and key certificates 
are assigned for that specific session. Certainly, active collaboration between the GA and PA 
legitimate all communicating parties. 
The elements involved in the proposed architecture are presented in Figure 5.1. These 
elements can be used both in a compulsory service subscription scheme and in a temporary 
service registration scheme. In the first scheme, the user is required to register previously in 
the SP's records in an off-line process and be submitted to an authentication and access 
control procedure performed in the SP's domain during an on-line process. In the second 
scheme, no previous subscription is needed. This is the case, for example, when a SP 
advertises on-demand services through the roadside infrastructure, however, the exchange of 
this type of information must also be secured. It is worth noting, that we assume a previous 
trust relationship between the SP and RSU, since the MSW must contain accurate and reliable 
information of available SPs. 
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The operation of the architecture and its elements is illustrated in two typical scenarios of 
single-hop and multi-hop service provisioning. 
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Figure 5.1- Secure service architectural elements 
5.4 Single-hop service provisioning 
This might be the typical case of a service provisioning scenario where the vehicle has 
relatively slow mobility or stays immobile before a nearby RSU infrastructure; thus, it can be 
inferred that the service session can be established within the radio transmission range. In a 
subscription scheme, one might think that most of the SPs would require detailed user 
information for contract procedures, but for operation purposes real user information must not 
be disclosed to any other party. Therefore, the employment of pseudonyms can guarantee user 
privacy from eavesdropping activities in the surroundings. 
As discussed earlier, preloaded key certificates and pseudonyms are provided by GA and must 
allow any vehicle to establish a secure communication with its peers. This can also be 
extended to the communication between the vehicle and the RSU. On the other hand, the 
generation of temporary pseudonyms and key certificates for service sessions must be taken 
by PA. Figure 5.2 illustrates a general single hop scenario. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the RSU is logically connected to the MSW and this 
latter provides a Provider Service Table (PST) containing a list of service identifiers, addresses 
and detailed data from all the SPs registered in that specific RSU. For the analysis of this 
scenario, assume that a potential user obtains the PST information which was broadcasted by 
RSU A within the transmission area. At this moment, the user might know the type of service 
that he is willing to request. 
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Figure 5.3 - Single hop registration diagram 
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Figure 5.3 show the registration diagram in a single hop scenario. Initially in step 1, user A 
transmits a signed service request message to RSU A containing its preloaded pseudonym, 
current time and service identifier retrieved from the PST list. At the RSU, the signed 
message request is verified and then passed to the MSW in step 2. At the MSW, the user's 
service request is parsed and the service identifier is matched with a specific SP name and IP 
address, as well as the PA 's IP address. In step 3, a secure-attributes request message 
containing the preloaded user's pseudonym is forwarded from the MSW to the PA. Once the 
PA receives the request message, the certainty of the preloaded pseudonym needs to be 
verified by the GA by sending a validation request message in steps 4-5. Forged pseudonyms 
can be detected since the GA is responsible of issuing official security attributes for all 
vehicles. As soon as the validation is retrieved, in step 6 the PA is able to generate and 
forward to the MSW both a temporary pseudonym and key certificates. The resulting signed 
reply message intended for the user is then transmitted via the RSU in steps 7 to 8. 
Subsequently, in step 9 the PA generates both temporary pseudonym and key certificates for 
the SP via the MSW in the same way as it was done for the user. 
Once, temporary pseudonyms and key certificates are available at both ends; the user can 
transmit a signed session request message containing its username and password to be 
validated by the SP databases in the case of a subscription-based scheme. Pseudonyms are 
dispatched along with the session parameters and encrypted by the user's public key. Then the 
user can use its pseudonym when retrieving the service. Additionally, pseudonyms might be 
traceable by the district domain. At this point, the SP will be able to authorize or reject the 
session request message based on the user's profile and/or SP's policies. Note that in the case 
of temporary registration scheme, the SP creates temporary registers in its databases for that 
specific user, thus there is no need to assign the user with a permanent username or password. 
If the session request is authorized, the SP generates a set of credentials exclusive only for the 
service session (step 10), thus credentials will expire after its use. In general, all the 
information is secured by signing and verifying messages through the entire path from the user 
to the SP. 
Moreover, to minimize the risk of eavesdropping activities that correlate the temporary 
pseudonyms with actual user identities by malicious parties, it is possible to consider changes 
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of pseudonyms on a time-based expiration scheme during the service session. That means that 
the user will need to request a new set of secure attributes to the PA when the current ones 
have already expired. 
In general on this provisioning model, authentication, integrity and non repudiation 
requirements are guaranteed at each connection point. 
5.5 Multi-hop service provisioning 
In this scenario, there are two communication approaches to consider; one related to ad hoc 
dissemination among vehicles, mostly consisting of position-based routing protocols (e.g. 
geocast addressing); and the second one is a forwarding scheme comprising topology-based 
routing protocols, as commonly used in fixed networks. On the ad hoc side, it is assumed that 
vehicles are able to communicate each other through wireless technology within a certain 
transmission range (up to 1 km for DSRC for example). Furthermore, vehicles are most likely 
able to determine their position parameters and also the position to the closest RSU when this 
is beyond the radio transmission range. This can be possible since it is expected that the 
vehicles adapted for VN and RSUs will include positioning systems devices such as GPS 
transceivers as explained in the previous section. A general ad hoc to infrastructure 
communication scenario is shown in Figure 5.4. 
For the ad hoc domain, a secure position-based ad hoc routing means to include the vehicle's 
position coordinates within the addressing parameters used to forward messages to their 
corresponding geographical destinations. Here, the original message is signed by the sender's 
private key including its position coordinates, certificate and a timestamp. Then, the 
intermediate vehicle validates the previous vehicle' signature, removes the certificate and 
records the position of the previous vehicle. This is to verify the authenticity of the previous 
vehicle. Then it attaches its own signature and certificate and forwards the new message to 
the following intermediate vehicle and so on until the messages reaches the final destination. 
It is worth reminding that initial secure attributes provided by GAs must allow any vehicle to 
establish a secure communication with its peers. As seen in Figure 5.5, the protocol is similar 
to the one explained in the single hop scenario. The main difference between both diagrams 
stands in the ad hoc part. 
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Figure 5.4 -Multi-hop scenario 
For the analysis of this scenario, assume that a potential user obtains the PST information from 
the RSU and which was propagated beyond the radio transmission area. Initially, user B 
forwards a signed service request message to the user A as shown in step 1. The parameters 
contained on the messages comprise the preloaded pseudonym, position coordinates, 
certificate, service identifier obtained from the PST list and the RSU's position. 
When the message arrives to user A, the signature from user B is verified and the certificate is 
removed. After this is done, user A signs the message and appends its own certificate. In 
steps 2-3, the signed message passes to the MSW via the RSU. At the MSW, the information 
from user B is retrieved and parsed to be processed. In step 4, a secure attribute request 
message is sent to the PA regarding the information of user B. At this point, the PA contacts 
the GA in order to verify the virtual certainty of the current pseudonym of user B. Once this is 
done, the PA is able to generate the correspondent temporary pseudonyms and key certificate 
for user B (steps 5-7). 
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After this, a reply message which includes a temporary pseudonym and key certificates are 
forwarded back to vehicle B following the same route as the initial request message (steps 8-
10). Consequently, the PA provides the secure attributes to the SP via the MSW in step 11. 
Now, both user B and the SP have acquired the secure mechanisms to exchange information 
from the ad hoc side till the fixed network. Therefore, user B can send an access request 
message intended to reach the SP and which contains its username and password. When the 
SP receives this message, the SP can grant or refuse the provision of credentials depending on 
its business policies and user profile. If authorized, the SP replies to the user a signed message 
including the service credential and a certificate. The route backwards follows the same route 
as in the initial forwarding. It is worth noting that the certificate appended by the SP is the one 
issued by the PA, while the certificates appended by the intermediate vehicles are issued by 
the GA. Note that this study does not consider major drawback effects regarding mobility 
issues as high speed mobility, multipath signal propagation or handovers schemes. 
In summary, the exchange of service messages is secured by adding signatures on each 
forwarding point. This procedure can guarantee that the message is legitimated by the 
participating intermediate vehicles along the route from the user to the SP. One should keep 
in mind that this condition can be accomplished only if there is a collaborative behaviour 
between vehicles; otherwise, the implementation of individual incentives might be required to 
foster their cooperation. 
5.6 Discussion 
As can be noticed from these scenarios, one limitation of the previous models deals with the 
packet size and processing overheads since every message needs to be signed and verified at 
every forwarding point. This can become a significant issue especially for the ad hoc scenario 
if the number of intermediate vehicles to reach the destination increases. On the other hand, 
the advantage of implementing robust security schemes based on PKI becomes evident. This 
means that integrity, authentication and non-repudiation features of data are guaranteed by the 
use of digital signatures which in fact relies on the validation of not only one but two trusted 
authorities. 
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Figure 5.5 -Multi-hop registration diagram 
In addition, the use of temporary pseudonyms increases the protection against possible privacy 
attacks; nevertheless, location privacy cannot be provided, especially in the multihop scheme, 
since the delivery of services depends on position based routing protocols for message 
forwarding. Further simulation analysis concerning the evaluation of the overall performance 
needs to be performed. Also, the analysis of location privacy techniques must be considered 
when service provisioning takes place on dynamic vehicular ad hoc networks. 
5.7 Conclusions 
One major concern for service provisioning in VN is to provide a robust and secure transfer of 
information between the user and the SP. Based on the premise that neighbouring vehicles are 
not trusted entities, as well as SP's, the presence of trusted authorities is required to provide 
security attributes to communications. The trusted authorities considered in this work can be 
classified into governmental and private entities. The first ones, as public bodies, keep strict 
control of vehicle records and provide certificates to vehicles. The second entities provide 
temporary pseudonyms and certificates to parties under on-demand service situations. The 
interaction between both trusted entities guarantees the legitimization of the communicating 
parties. Delivery of services might be performed in a single-hop or a mutli-hop to reach the 
fixed infrastructure. In both delivery scenarios, the right to access a service is issued by the 
SP in the form of credentials associated and valid for a specific service session. There are 
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still some open issues to be considered, one of them is location privacy in secure delivery 
models. 
The following chapter comprises the definition of the proposed district service architecture 
based architectural elements to offer spontaneous on-demand service on the road. [Coronado 
and Cherkaoui, 2009]. 
CHAPTER 6 
JOURNAL OF AUTONOMOUS AND ADAPTIVE 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS - IJAACS 2009 
This chapter presents the paper published in the Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive 
Communications Systems - IJAACS by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 2009. The title of this 
paper is 'A secure service architecture to support wireless vehicular networks'. This chapter 
defines the elements of the district service architecture which supports the delivery of 
temporary session service attributes. 
6.1 Abstract 
6.1.1 Resume en francais 
Les elements cles pour les VANETS ont ete etudies dans ce travail pour les communications 
vehiculaires. Ces elements peuvent servir de base pour identifier les composants principaux 
dans un cadre de service approprie. Nous proposons une architecture de service qui comprend 
la presence d'autorites publiques et privees pour fournir une communication securisee. 
L'objectif de cette architecture est la livraison de services d'informations securisees offerts sur 
demande au bord de la route. Dans cette etude, nous decrivons deux types de scenarios de 
service: un saut et multi-saut. Les travaux futurs de recherche devront etre orientes sur 
l'approvisionnement de services qui ont un potentiel prometteur pour le deploiement futur 
duplications commerciales dans les VANETS. 
6.1.2 Abstract 
Key elements and different existing approaches intended for VANETS were studied in this 
paper dealing with security, identity privacy and accounting issues. These issues can serve as 
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the basis for identifying the main components of an appropriate service provisioning 
framework. It is proposed a secure service provisioning architecture which comprises the 
presence of public and private certificate authorities collocated with banking modules. The 
purpose of this architecture is to facilitate the delivery of information services offered at the 
roadside infrastructure. In this study, it is described two types of delivery scenarios: single-
hop and multi-hop. These scenarios provide a more detailed view on how secure service 
provisioning can be implemented and what type of challenges might be tackled. Future 
research work needs to be focused on service provisioning which has a promising potential for 
the future deployment of commercial applications in VANETS. 
6.1.3 Index terms 
Vehicular networks, AAA models, service provisioning, security, privacy, billing. 
6.2 Introduction 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETS) are networks that are enabled by short to medium-
range communication systems for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-roadside (V2I) 
communication. The potential benefits associated to enabling road-safety applications through 
VANETS are well known. This type of applications includes real-time collision avoidance 
warnings, as well as the exchange of driving parameters among vehicles for a safer driving. 
Besides these useful and sometimes vital functionalities, another trend of applications which 
involves commercial non-safety related services is also envisioned by sharing the vehicle 
communication channel with decentralized mobile applications from different service 
providers. The array of these commercial services can be broad, ranging from internet access, 
vehicle infotainment, navigation assistance to transportation logistics management. The 
success of service provisioning models for VANETS from a commercial perspective depends 
on the implementation of robust architectures that are able to maintain their overall 
performance when facing different real vehicular situations. In particular, new challenges 
arise concerning security mechanisms, privacy of user information, and billing for services in 
a highly mobile and sometimes multi service environment. A key point for maintaining robust 
service provisioning resides in the capacity to manage a series of security mechanisms which 
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comprise authentication and authorization of subscribers who possess dynamic behaviours. 
These mechanisms must provide to the communicating parties a secure way to exchange 
information. Additionally, service providers can regulate the provisioning of their services by 
implementing specific user profiles, as well as defining service delivery policies supported by 
their business models. Moreover, in VANETS environments, billing processes can be 
extended for service message forwarding among vehicles. This can be done by deploying 
incentive and collaborative mechanisms to foster service delivery independently of the 
physical location of the destination. 
In common information services architectures, the deployment of Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting models constitute a fundamental part for the deployment of 
services mainly used by network operators and e-commerce applications [Housley and Aboba, 
2007; Atwood, 2007]. In the VANET context, the distribution of security features must be 
built around a key management system for authentication purposes. For accessing the 
network, user authorization might include two levels: first, authorization to access a radio 
channel at the roadside unit (RSU); second, authorization to access a specific service 
application at the service provider. Once a user has been fully authenticated, the provider 
grants him with the right to access the service. This permission can be issued by using service 
credentials depending on the provider's specific policies. Additionally, an accounting server 
infrastructure needs also to be available for charging purposes and metering for service 
consumption. In the following some specific issues that need to be addressed: primarily 
security, privacy, and billing mechanisms in order to make VANETS service deployment 
secure for users and viable for service providers (SP). 
This work describes a secure service provisioning architecture which support spontaneous on-
demand services based on the presence of diverse certificate authorities as well as banking 
entities which will facilitate the delivery of content data. 
6.3 Secure service provisioning for vehicular networks 
As mentioned before, access models main tasks are to grant network and service access to 
users if they meet established access control regulations and to keep the corresponding users' 
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records consistently. These responsibilities are essential part in the development of business 
models and sustainability of information services. As on-demand services will be mostly open 
to all public on the road, contents of exchanges between users and service providers must be 
kept reliable; especially, when user identities are exchanged or financial transactions are 
performed. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, it is introduced the notion of Service District domain. A service 
district is a logical zone that is usually mapped to a map zone where a set of services from 
different SP are offered. Different elements contained within the administration of the district 
service entity are logically interconnected between them. The depicted access interfaces are 
the entrance points for the access routers to the service core. Access routers have two main 
functions. On the one hand, they connect roadside units which handle communication within 
the wireless medium. On the other hand, they connect a set of registered information service 
providers residing at the fixed network. These are just intermediate routers from the RSU to 
the fixed network. For simplicity purposes access routers can be considered as a part of the 
fixed network of the service district domain. 
In general, authentication is performed in the security module which can comprise the 
presence of multiple certificate authorities or their corresponding proxy modules. In the 
proposed architecture, the authentication of communicating participants is guaranteed by 
providing security features during the initial communication setup between a users and a SP. 
78 CHAPTER 6. JOURNAL PAPER IJAACS 2009 
Transport 
Governmental Auth. 
Banking 
entity 
District service architecture 
Authentication / Key distribution 
Banking module 
Proxy 
Proxy security 
GA 
Security 
PA H- -\ Authorization Accounting/ Metering 
Access 
interface 
Vehicular environment 
Access 
Router 
Registered 
SP1 
Registered 
SP2 
Registered 
SP3 
Fixed network 
Figure 6.1 - Secure service architecture model 
One way to secure communication in highly mobile environments with two communicating 
vehicles is described as follows: 
1. Vehicle A publishes its corresponding public key certificate (preloaded by a 
governmental authority) to vehicle B. 
2. Vehicle B generates a hash function to share a secret key KAB with vehicle A. 
3. Vehicle B encrypt secret key with vehicle A's public key. 
4. Vehicle A decrypts with its own private key the received shared secret key KAB-
5. Both vehicle A and B have the shared secret key to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
79 
In the proposed architecture some assumptions have been considered. First, the security 
module must be capable to support and classify different types of requests depending on their 
priority and/or delay susceptibility. For some situations, the security module must rely just on 
the validation of the disclosed certificates by the requester without generating any kind of 
temporary cryptographic keying material. Second, on-demand services do require temporary 
cryptographic keying material in order to support content delivery. To verify the non-
revocation state (certainty) of the disclosed requesters' certificates [Housley et al, 2002], the 
following steps have to be considered: 
A. Verification of the user transit related certificate based on public transit Certificate 
Revocation lists (TCRL) which contains the serial numbers of the revoked transport 
official certificates and pseudonyms. For validation of user's certicates, CRLs are required 
to detect any compromise certificate. 
B. Verification of the user temporary related certificates based on local private certificate 
revocation list (PCRL), it also contains the serial numbers of the revoked temporary 
certificates and pseudonyms (on-demand services). 
C. If verification succeeds; security attributes for the requested session are generated for on-
demand services. 
Now, to secure the content of the new temporary cryptographic material (session key and 
pseudonyms) generated by the PA, the main tasks performed by the PA are enlisted as follows. 
1. Issuing of Ksession session key, PA's certificate and signature, i.e. CertpA {PKPA, SIGpriv/pA 
(PKPA)}, where PKPA is the PA's public key and PrivPA is PA's private key 
2. Pseudonyms are generated by the PA as PIDj for the user and PID2 for the 
corresponding service provider. 
3. Encyption by using the shared secret key (KpA/USer) to protect the dispatched security 
attributes, involving the new pseudonym, timestamp and session key, i.e. 
Enc/cpA/userfPID, timestamp, KseSsionJ- The PA is in charge of generating the active shared 
key for both the user and service provider. 
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4. The PA builds associations between the user's captured pseudonym, the new 
pseudonym (PIDi), timestamps and common session key. 
5. The PA builds associations between the providers's captured pseudonym, the new 
pseudonym (PID2), timestamps and common session key. 
In this process, it is considered that temporary session keys hold short validity periods for the 
purpose of short frequent update periods; hence, increasing the security level during the 
session. If. the priority of the message does not deal with safety purposes but with 
consumption of information services; then, it must be a requirement to count with the presence 
of banking entities, as well as, accounting elements which need to be in place to ensure 
revenues for service providers. In general, any kind of information exchange related to 
banking transaction must be collected and analyzed. As can be seen in service architecture, 
banking entities shall be responsible for extending on-demand credit units in order to grant the 
use of information services, as well as for issuing banking and service consumption policies. 
The accounting module contains specific policies which define the way resources are utilized 
for a given user and also for the type of service requested. 
It is assumed that there must be a pre-established relationship between the banking entity and 
the user for validation purposes which can be based either on user id or some specific banking 
credentials. Validation of the requester by the banking entity is performed after the 
authentication of communicating parties has been completed; that is, when session keys are 
available for the provider and the user. Once the validation of the user is performed by the 
banking proxy module and if successful, the banking entity is able to dispatch corresponding 
credit units which can specify the amount of content data to be retrieved or maximum duration 
of the service session. 
A challenge to tackle arises within the vehicular environments given the ad-hoc behaviour of 
neighboring nodes, and collaboration of nodes may be necessary for the delivery of 
information up to the final destination. As a result, a reliable incentive scheme distributed 
through the forwarding path among the participating nodes must be deployed. Additionally, 
reputation systems can be implemented along the forwarding chain to monitor the correct 
delivery of packets. The SET (Secure Electronic Transaction) scheme is not considered in this 
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proposal due to the incentive scheme is intended to be delivered in multi-hop environments, 
which is not the case for the SET. 
6.4 Single-hop session attributes 
This might be the typical case of information service deliveries where the vehicle has 
relatively slow mobility or is within proximity before a nearby roadside unit (RSU); the 
service session can then be established within the radio transmission range. One of the most 
likely technologies to be considered for a wide deployment in urban and rural areas is Direct 
Short Range Communications (DSRC). A feature of this technology is that it supports seven 
service and two control channels where the services offered are frequently broadcasted by an 
operating RSU. Roadside units are assigned with public key issued by the administrative 
authority. Public certificates are validated by its digital signature. This set of services is 
contained in a list called Provider Service Table (PST). 
For the analysis of this scenario, it is considered an on-demand service request where services 
are openly offered to transitory vehicles (see Figure 6.2). First, it is assumed that a potential 
on-board unit (OBU) obtains the PST information which was broadcasted by RSU within the 
radio transmission area. The OBU sends an initial message to the RSU notifying its presence. 
Then, the RSU can reply to the' message by requesting the OBU's security attributes. Initially, 
the OBU transmits a signed service request message to RSU A containing its preloaded 
pseudonym, public key certificate, current time and the service identifier retrieved from the 
PST list (step 1). Note, that sensitive information such as pseudonyms and key certificates is 
encrypted by using the pre-shared key between the OBU and the PA. Pseudonyms are 
associated with its corresponding public key certificate. At the RSU, the signed message 
request is verified by using OBU's public key and then passed to the access router (step 2). 
Notice that for the sake of simplicity, it is considered that the RSU and SP share the same 
access router. At the access router (AR), the OBU's service request is parsed and the service 
identifier is matched with a specific SP name and identifier, as well as the PA's address. A 
request message containing the current OBU's pseudonym and key certificate is forwarded 
from the AR to the PA (step 3). Once the PA receives the request message, the preloaded 
pseudonym needs to be verified by the GA by sending a validation request message. Forged 
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pseudonyms can be detected since the GA is responsible of issuing official security attributes 
for all vehicles. As soon as the validation is retrieved, the PA is able to generate the 
pseudonyms and session keys for the OBU and the SP, respectively (step 4). Before 
distributing this security attributes to the OBU and SP, a validation by the banking, accounting 
and the authorization modules might be performed (step 5). 
Depending on the type of banking policies applied, the OBU might be requested to disclose its 
banking credential which serves as an identifier for its verification and possible eligibility to 
get credit units issued. This process assumes a secure path by encrypting baking credentials 
through a pre-shared key between the banking proxy and the OBU. Banking credential and 
pre-shared key must match otherwise the information sent by the user to the banking proxy 
cannot be retrieved. Once the validation at the banking module takes places and succeeds, a 
set of banking credit units is issued for the OBU of the service. For accounting purposes, an 
association with the current pseudonym, service utilization and banking attributes must be 
created. At this point (step 6), all the information pertaining to the OBU and the SP is 
collected by the PA and encrypted with the pre-shared keys KpA-obu and KpA-Sp, as well as, 
appended with the corresponding PA's public key certificate, respectively. 
1. CertpA-obufPKpA, Timestamp, EncKpa-obu{PIDobu, credit, Ksession}, SIGPA[PKPA]} 
2. CertpAspfPKpA, Timestamp, EncKpa-sp{PIDsp, credit, Ksession}, SIGPA[PKPA]} 
The composed secure message is forwarded back to the corresponding recipients via the AR 
(step 7-8). At this point, a secure service delivery process can take place by employing the 
secret session key between the OBU and the SP (step 9). 
Notice that during this process, there are no distinctions between a user and OBU; even 
though, it is likely to have a one-to-many relation where one OBU can be shared by multiple 
users. In this case, it is considered a one-to-one relation where one OBU corresponds only to 
one user to simplify the scenario illustration.To minimize the risk of eavesdropping activities 
that correlate the temporary pseudonyms with actual user identities by malicious parties, it is 
possible to consider changes of pseudonyms on a time-based expiration scheme during the 
service session. That means that the user will need to request a new set of secure attributes to 
the PA when the current ones have already expired. In general on this provisioning model, 
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authentication, integrity and non repudiation requirements are guaranteed at each connection 
point. 
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Figure 6.2 - Schematic service authentication and content delivery 
6.4.1 Analysis of a single-hop scenario 
In this section, it is addressed the total time needed to perform a typical request-response in a 
single hop scenario for a vehicle requesting access to a service. This process involves the steps 
1-9 described earlier. Time is critical for vehicular connectivity because of the high mobility 
of the connecting node (vehicle). In order to represent the exchange of messages in the 
proposed architecture, it is used the Application Characterization Environment (ACE®) 
whiteboard from the OPNET® modeler P14.5 wireless suite [Opnet, 2008]. The ACE 
whiteboard is a robust tool suitable to evaluate the behaviour of different tier processes within 
a simulation environment. For this analysis, it is considered cumulative processing time at 
each stage of the communication model which has to deal with the execution of cryptographic 
operations. These processing time values are based on the benchmark speeds given in 
[Crypto++, 2007] for different cryptographic schemes. These time values are used as 
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references in order to estimate the total response time during a simulated on-demand 
requesting process. The corresponding time values are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6 . 1 - Crypto++ benchmark time values 
Operation schemes 
RSA 1024 signature 
RSA 1024 verification 
RSA 1024 encryption 
RSA 1024 decryption 
DH 1024 key generation 
HMAC(SHA-l) 
Processing Time 
(ms) per operation 
1.42 
0.07 
0.07 
1.52 
0.44 
6.279/byte 
From Table 6.1, digital signatures are based on the RSA cryptographic algorithm with a fixed 
length of 128 bytes. The corresponding signature verification processes are performed by 
each tier stage, as well as, related encryption/decryption operations when transmission 
sensitive information is required. Moreover, HMAC operations are necessary when 
generating pseudonyms (32 bits) at the OBU and at the authentication tiers, respectively. For 
key generation, the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm can be employed at the authentication tier. 
Recall that security associations are performed at the security module. 
Regarding connectivity parameters, the bandwidth for the fixed network is set to 1 Gbps while 
the bandwidth for the OBU is set to 54 Mbps given the maximum data rate allowed in DSRC. 
The maximum packet length was set to 1024 bytes. Furthermore, it is assumed 20 ms latency 
at each tier process for additional processing operations besides the processing time values 
inherent to cryptographic operations. Notice that the time for an OBU to discover a RSU in 
the proximity is not considered, neither is the time for the RSU to broadcast discovery 
parameters in its surroundings. The objective of the analysis is to quantify the total response 
time needed to request on-demand services. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the total response time is represented on a time scale on the top 
of the chart which helps to visualize the performance of the entire tier process. From this 
chart, the elapsed time for a user to retrieve the appropriate access and security attributes from 
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the fixed network is around 0.7 s; where the highest consumption of processing time resides at 
the authentication tier given the generation of keys, pseudonyms and verification tasks. The 
obtained value (0.7 s) is acceptable for the purpose of the scenario even if the vehicle is 
travelling at highway level speeds. Therefore, the value is acceptable, if: 
a) After the request is responded to, the vehicle even at high speed is still within the reach 
of the same access point. 
b) From the user point of view the perception of the connection to the service is 
instantaneous. 
Let us consider for example a vehicle moving at speeds reaching 140 km/h, which is the 
maximum speed supported by DSRC, and also a service coverage range of 500 m realistically 
offered by the current RSUs of the same technology, given constraints such fading due to 
topology. If it assumed the existence of adjacent RSUs, overlap zones can be of a 
recommended 1'5% (75 m) at both sides of the service zones. In 0.7s, and with a maximum 
speed of 140 km/h, a vehicle would have travelled an additional 28 m. Of course, to allow 
seamless handover transitions, a mechanism capable of detecting current access parameters 
and updating the access associations from the previous RSU to the new RSU shall be present. 
Additional analysis has been performed in this study by building a network topology in the 
Opnet Wireless Project Editor. The objective is to deem the performance of the system when 
increasing the number of requests which are handled at the service architecture. To implement 
this topology, an ACE file was used which contains the sequence of messages and their 
corresponding tier processing times, as a customized task configuration in the Project Editor. 
Figure 6.4 shows the network topology as implemented in the Project Editor. The tier 
elements are represented as LAN workstation devices while the OBU is represented by a 
WLAN mobile device. The starting simulation time was set at 100 s and the application 
profile is configured to handle inter-repetition executions for the duration of the simulation 
time. Additionally, the application profile was set to support concurrent request messages; 
therefore, this can reflect the impact on the application processing when increasing the number 
of mobile nodes. Moreover, the total simulation time is set to 20 s and mobile nodes are 
configured with an urban speed of 60 km/h. As can be seen in Figure 6.5, the average 
response time for a single node, 15 and 30 nodes become around .71 s, .73 s and .75 s, 
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respectively. From these results, there is a slightly difference on the overall average response 
time for 30 nodes; therefore, the obtained values remains appropriate for those traversing 
nodes requesting services along the service coverage area. 
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Figure 6.5 - Single-hop average time response 
6.5 Promoting multi-hop collaboration 
For the analysis of this scenario, it is necessary to focus on the distribution of incentive units 
along the multi-hop path when the messages have to be propagated beyond the limited radio 
transmission area in order to get to destination. 
Basically, at the secure service architecture the validation and generation of security attributes 
for the corresponding user and the SP follows the same procedure as in the single-hop 
scenario. The difference relies in the ad hoc environment where sensitive information is 
encrypted at the authentication phase by using the secret key between the user and the PA. For 
the payload delivery phase, the information is encrypted by using the temporary session key 
between the user and the SP. In either case, there is no chance for intermediate nodes to 
extract the contents of the transmitted message since they do not have the corresponding keys 
to decipher the messages. Then, the main tasks to be performed by intermediate nodes are to 
validate the preceding sender's signature by using the corresponding neighbour's public key 
certificate and to forward the packet with the current node's signature. 
Based on the forwarding path followed during the initial authentication process, banking 
entities can provide bonus units along with timestamps for those nodes participating in the 
forwarding path. These incentive units promote active participation of neighbouring nodes 
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and can serve as cumulative benefits for later rewards. Some kind of incentive is necessary as 
local resources are utilized at every single forwarding node in order to deliver the payload 
messages up to the final user. 
Along the path, it is considered that a chain of certificates must be built through public key 
certificates for every single intermediate node (see Figure 6.6). At the banking entity, there is 
an association between a bonus unit and its corresponding public key certificate which also 
serves to encrypt the dispatched bonus units and respective timestamps. Consequently, at 
every forwarding node, the current node will be able to decrypt the bonus unit by using the 
corresponding private key. The following list summarizes the above procedure. 
1. Intermediate nodej sends public key certificate CertoBui-
2. At the banking module, bonus unit and Timestamp (Ts) are encrypted with nodei public 
key certificate, EnckcertOBwibonuSi, Ts} 
3. At intermediate nodej, message is decrypted with nodej's private key, DeckprvoBUi{bonuSi, 
Ts}. 
Additionally, each node must have a specific buffer to store all received bonus units. 
However, there is an open issue to solve in the way that what if the n-node accepts the bonus 
unit but it fails to deliver payload packets. For now, it is assumed that the delivery of packets 
through the intermediate «-node is guaranteed. Clearly, this assumption possesses the risk of 
getting bonus units without participating in the packet delivery. For the ad hoc environment, 
some possible solutions can come with the deployment of reputation systems such as 
watchdog [Fonseca and Festag, 2006] in charge of monitoring the forwarding behaviour of 
every single node in the delivery path. If an intermediate node fails trustworthiness, this node 
is discarded from the forwarding path. Appended certificates are required to assure 
collaboration and generation of incentives. A description of different ad hoc routing protocols 
can be found in Appendix A. 
In summary, the exchange of service messages is secured at every forwarding point. This 
procedure can guarantee that the message is legitimated by the participating intermediate 
nodes along the path from the user to the SP. Furthermore, this scheme promotes 
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collaboration between nodes through the use of incentives issued at the fixed infrastructure. 
Appended certificates are required to assure collaboration and generation of incentives. Recall 
that the access protocol requires this forwarding list of intermediate nodes, but the payload 
traffic is not affected by the overhead caused by the appended certificates. 
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Figure 6.6 -Distribution of incentives in multi-hop scenario 
6.5.1 Analysis of a multi-hop scenario 
For this scenario, the benchmark values are taken for cryptographic operations given in Table 
5.1. It is also considered an average propagation delay between two nodes of 20 ms, as 
experimented by [Eichler et al, 2004], when using AODV protocol for vehicular ad hoc 
routing. The processing time regarding each intermediate node in a multihop path corresponds 
to the time required for signature generation, as well as verification of signatures from 
neighbours. In the response message from the fixed network for the mobile source, an 
additional decryption process must be considered at each intermediate node in order to decrypt 
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the information (bonus) issued by the banking entity. Recall that incentives are intended to 
promote forwarding among participating nodes. 
As can be seen in the time scale on top of the chart in Figure 6.7, the total response time 
required for the user to retrieve the appropriate access and security attributes from the fixed 
network when there are four hops is around 1.3 s, where the highest consumption of 
processing time still resides at the authentication tier. 
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Following the same reasoning as in the high speed single-hop scenario, it might be considered 
a group of 4 vehicles traveling at an average speed of 140 km/h within a service range of up to 
500 m; then, in 1.3 s, and with a maximum speed of 140 km/h, a vehicle requesting service 
would have travelled an additional 50 m, and the same for the last hop. With 4 hops in the 
propagation path, the total time response should still be acceptable. 
Additional analysis has been performed by implementing the ACE multi-hop tier process in an 
ad hoc topology. The mobile nodes are located with a separation distance of 500 m between 
each other and are configured to support the AODV routing protocol. The mobile nodes are 
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also configured with an urban speed of 60 km/h. In the simulation setup, the RSU is 
represented by a MANET base station device which is a gateway which can support the 
AODV routing protocol. The starting simulation time was set at 100 s and duration time of 10 
s. The application profile is configured to handle inter-repetition executions for the duration 
of the simulation time. These are the results for a single request message in multiple-hops, is 
not for streaming payload traffic in a multihop environment. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, the 
average response time for three, five and 10 intermediate nodes become 1, 1.5 and 2.2 s, 
respectively. As expected when introducing additional intermediate nodes, the average 
response time increases. 
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6.5.2 Discussion 
Major challenges dealing with transitory and dynamic behaviour of users must be tackled in 
order to offer consistent services on the road on an on-demand basis. The main premise is that 
the user might request services anytime, anywhere and without being attached to a home 
network provider. In order to support commercial applications, charging operations must be 
executed to validate the affordability of the potential user, as well as, to guarantee a secure 
service delivery. The advantage of implementing robust security schemes becomes evident, 
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especially, when sensitive information has to be delivered in a vehicular environment, and also 
to make service provisioning viable for service providers. Security becomes also priority 
when information needs to be forwarded through unknown and at the same time not trusted 
vehicles. With this proposed architecture, data is protected at all times and keeps the key 
features of any protected communication; that is, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. 
Moreover, the use of temporary pseudonyms increases protection against possible privacy 
attacks. An additional issue that might arise is the possible control and regulation of services 
and their policies by official authorities. This can represent an overwhelming structure in the 
way services are offered and granted, especially, in the case when user privacy might be 
affected since official authorities are the ones who validate public certificates. 
To the best of our knowledge, no other works have estimated such response delay for 
accessing services in complete tier process architecture for vehicular networks as it is 
presented in this study. The simulation studies performed for the .architecture show that the 
delay overhead due to service access is acceptable for both single-hop and multi-hop scenarios 
even when vehicles travel at high speeds and the number of requesting vehicles increases. 
Evidently, the longer a forwarding path, the longer the delay for security processes to take 
place; which may lead to disconnecting from an access point before a response is delivered 
back to the requesting vehicle. Additionally, an unstable forwarding topology among vehicles 
would have a significant impact in the forwarding path which facilitates the request-response 
process through intermediate nodes. Disconnections among forwarding vehicle may hinder 
long term sessions between a requester and a provider. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter relevant characteristics and models for service environments in the vehicular 
context have been presented. The major concern is to provide a robust and secure transfer of 
information between a vehicles and a provider. Key elements regarding the implementation of 
service provisioning in VANETS and different existing approaches were studied concerning 
security, identity privacy, accounting and billing issues. It is worth noting that most of the 
existing security approaches propose PKI infrastructure given the possible compulsory 
requirements imposed by VANETS. These previous elements served as the basis for 
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identifying the main components of an appropriate service provisioning framework. It is 
proposed a secure service provisioning architecture which comprises the presence of public 
and private certificate authorities collocated with accounting and banking entities. The 
purpose of this architecture is to facilitate the delivery of information services offered at the 
roadside infrastructure. The main goal of the security module is to verify the certainty of the 
holder's key certificates and pseudonyms by using certificate revocation lists. Additionally, 
the security module must generate the corresponding secure attributes for the user and the 
service provider as well. These attributes comprise the generation of a shared session key 
where payload data can be protected and also the distribution of the corresponding temporary 
pseudonyms. 
One major issue when implementing billing models for VANETS is the integration of robust 
mechanisms that can be implemented at the infrastructure level and also at the vehicular 
environment. This proposal provides incentives in the form of bonus units for those 
participating vehicles which contribute in the delivery of information through the forwarding 
path. Incentives could represent potential benefits for future banking transactions. The 
simulation studies performed for the architecture show that the delay overhead due to security 
mechanism is acceptable for both single hop and a typical multihop scenario even when 
vehicles travel at high speeds. Long term connectivity becomes an issue in multihop 
scenarios. Solutions may need to integrate robust architectures to support the interaction of 
multiple RSUs which can handle seamless handover operations, efficient security 
mechanisms, and also efficient ad hoc delivery. 
The next chapter details the analytical model of an extended service district architecture and 
analize the corresponding cost in terms of delay and performance when increasing the 
numbers of users. [Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2009]. 
CHAPTER 7 
JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND 
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, WILEY 2009 
This chapter presents the paper published in the Journal Security and Communication 
Networks by Wiley-Blackwell. The title of this paper is 'Performance Analysis of Secure On-
demand Services for Wireless Vehicular Networks'. This chapter covers the analytical model 
and performance for on-demand services for different vehicular communication scenarios. 
7.1 Abstract 
7.1.1 Resume en francais 
Ce travail adresse les parametres necessaires pour offrir des services securises sur-demande 
aux usagers vehiculaires au bord de la route. Trois types de protocoles de demande de service 
sont introduits dans notre travail pour le cas d'un saut (SHI-RQ), connectivite etendue (CE 
RQ) et multi-saut (MHI-RQ). Le modele analytique et 1'etude de cout pour les protocoles sont 
presentes. Notre analyse couvre le cout total de la latence pour chaque protocole d'acces. 
L'analyse rend compte des caracteristiques de mobilite et de densite des vehicules voyageant a 
travers les domaines de service. Les resultats analytiques montrent des couts acceptables pour 
un nombre realiste de vehicules voyageant aux vitesses permises sur la route. 
7.1.2 Abstract 
Wireless vehicular communications pose significant challenges for the deployment of next 
generation roadside services. Some important issues that must be tackled are security, billing 
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and reliability while guarantying a scalable service delivery. This paper addresses the 
assignation of secure service session parameters upon the reception of on-demand service 
requests by an incumbent services district domain and studies and analyses the performance of 
the underlying mechanisms. Three types of service request protocols are introduced in this 
work defined as single-hop (SHI-RQ), extended connectivity (EC-RQ) and multi-hop (MHI-
RQ) service requests. A detailed analytical model and cost study for the access protocols are 
presented. The analysis covers the estimation of total cost in terms of latency for each access 
protocol with different mobility characteristics and vehicle densities within the service 
coverage area and across different serving district domains. The analytical results are 
consistent with the experimental one and show that the signaling cost in terms latency remains 
acceptable for a realistic number of serviced vehicles even at high speeds. 
7.1.3 Index terms 
Vehicular networks on-demand services, service provisioning, security, billing. 
7.2 Introduction 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETS) are networks that are enabled by short to medium-
range communication systems for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-roadside (V2I) 
communications. The main difference between safety and commercial applications relies in 
that a prospective requester must be subjected to a verification of his affordability to retrieve a 
service. On this regard, billing mechanisms in vehicular environments must be designed in 
order to grant the right to use of an intended service. The array of these commercial services 
can be broad, ranging from internet access, vehicle infotainment, navigation assistance to 
transportation logistics management. The potential of vehicular communications will rely on 
the way services are discovered, accessed and they are kept reliable through different wireless 
technologies. All these factors are likely to determine how business models are offered at the 
roadside infrastructure and how these solutions can be maintained scalable through different 
network domains. 
In this work it is defined signaling protocols based on service architecture proposed in 
[Coronado and Cherkaoui, 2008] which is intended to offer secure service provisioning for 
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spontaneous on-demand service requests. The main motivation is based on the premise that 
vehicles may request services anytime, anywhere and without being attached to any sort of 
home network. For this work, it is analyzed the performance of the signaling cost of the 
proposed protocols carried out between the requester and the service district domain. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A description of the elements comprising the 
service district domain architecture is given followed by the message notation of the proposed 
signaling protocols. An analytical model with expressions of the corresponding signaling 
costs, followed by the analysis of the mobility model and numerical results are presented. 
Finally, this work ends with the conclusions. 
7.3 Service district domain architecture 
In this section, it is explained the main signaling protocols involve in the request of on-
demand services offered on the road and which requests are processed by the serving 
administrative service architecture. First, it is defined the service district domain as a logical 
zone that is mapped to a geographical area where a set of services from different roadside 
providers are broadcasted by the wireless infrastructure. As can be seen from Figure 7.1, 
elements contained within the administrative control are logically interconnected between 
them. These elements are in charge of processing and validating incoming requests from 
potential users. Given the fact that transitory users can possess high mobility and sometimes 
unpredictable trajectories, the service district domain may not have knowledge in advance of 
the potential user; therefore, the district domain has to rely in specific mechanisms suitable for 
this kind of environments. In the depicted architecture, access routers are illustrated as part of 
the core network but their main function is to provide connectivity to the RSU based on DSRC 
technology and the registered service providers. 
Authentication of the public key certificates disclosed by requesters relies on the validation of 
the non-revocation state (certainty) of those certificates through certificate revocation lists. 
For the analysis, it is assumed that disclosed public certificates include their digital signature; 
therefore, a verification process of digital signature takes place. Even though, this is an open 
architecture the distribution of session parameters must be secured at all times to the 
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corresponding recipients by encrypting the information with the user's public key in the case 
of the user and with a secret shared key between the provider and district domain. 
Transport 
Governmental Auth. 
District domain service architecture 
Certification Authorithies 
PA Proxy 
GA 
Authentication 
Accounting Session Mgr Access Policies 
Accessfouter 
Vehicular environment 
V Registered SP n^ 
Fixed network 
Figure 7.1 - Extended service model 
Banking validation resembles a credit-card payment modality where the capacity of the 
potential user to afford a specific service can be verified by an external banking entity or by a 
proxy module within the district service architecture. Notice again that validation of the 
requester by the banking entity is performed after the authentication of potential 
communicating parties has been successfully completed. Once a successful validation of the 
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user takes place, the banking entity is able to dispatch the corresponding credit units and a 
transaction identifier that specifies the amount of content data to be retrieved or the maximum 
time duration for the service session. 
Regarding the presence of the session manager, its main function is to establish associations 
with other external session managers for the purpose of supporting scalability between 
multiple district domains. Any exchange of information between different district domains 
will be performed through the interaction of current participating session managers. This 
module is also responsible of creating a session ID and for collecting all the session 
parameters before being forwarded to the RSU. 
For the establishment of the service request protocols, three main types of request messages 
must be parsed and executed accordingly by the operating service district domain. The scope 
of this analysis is based on three main entities at the service district domain which comprise 
session manager, security and banking modules. 
1. Single hop Initiation request protocol SHI-RQ. This set of messages is intended to 
initiate a service request in a single-hop vehicular to infrastructure modality. 
2. Extension connectivity request protocol EC-RQ. This protocol is intended to provide 
continuous connectivity when a vehicle changes from one district domain to an 
adjacent one. Exchange of current session parameters takes place when performing 
handover operations between different service district domains. 
3. Multi-hop Initiation request protocol MHI-RQ. This set of messages is intended to 
initiate a service request in a multi-hop environment. 
It is assume that the fixed infrastructure is based on a trusted model which includes the RSU 
and service district domain architecture. In the following it is expressed the message notation 
for the aforementioned protocols. 
7.4 Single-hop initiation service request protocol [SHI-RQ] 
A SHI-RQ message identifies a single-hop V2I on-demand service request which is executed 
by the OBU. First, the OBU sends an initial message to the RSU notifying its presence. And 
the RSU can reply to the message by requesting the OBU's public key certificates and 
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intended service identifier. It is assumed that the initial exchange of SHI-RQ messages is part 
of the service discovery mechanism. The enlisted message notation described below is 
illustrated in Figure 7.2 and the definition of acronyms is given in Table 7.1. 
1. Once service discovery is completed, the OBU sends an extended request message 
which includes the service ID which identifies the service the user is willing to acquire; 
public certificate which includes a digital signature; an encrypted banking credential 
and sequence number. A digital signature is implicit in the certificate structure; for 
instance, a certificate (X.509) includes the public key and the digital signature. Recall 
that there must be a pre-established relation between the prospective user and the 
banking entity for charging purposes. The costs of services can be distributed such as 
data cost, operational cost, infrastructure costs meaning profits for the service provider 
and the owner of the infrastructure (district domain). Digital signatures utilize the 
user's private key and they are validated by using the user's public key. 
OBU -* RSU: Certow,Srv _id,Enc{Bnk _id\Kbn^bu,Seq{ OBU 
2. When the SHI-RQ is received at the RSU containing a specific service ID, the RSU 
sends a request message to the SP for initialization purposes denoted as SPfSHI-RQJ. 
Then, the service provider (SP) replies with its public certificate and sequence number. 
SP ->• RSU: Certsp, SeqSP 
3. The RSU parses and collects the information retrieved from the OBU and SP, 
respectively; and relays the service request message to the session manager (SM) 
which resides at the service district domain. Request messages are appended with the 
requester's certificate (public key and digital signature). 
RSU —>SM :CertspCert0BU,Srv_id,Enc{Bnk_id}K ,SeqOBU,Seqsp 
4. The SM issues a session identifier which will serve as index for the whole validation 
process taken at the service district domain for either a successful or a fail attempt 
during the subsequent validation steps. A relayed message is sent to the SEC module 
which contains the public key certificates for both the user and SP. Here, digital 
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signatures are verified and public certificates are checked their revoked status based on 
the most recent CRL. 
SM —> SEC : CertSPCertOBU,SS__id,Srv_id,Enc\Bnk_id}K ,SeqOBU,Seqsp 
5. The SEC module relays the users banking parameters for their validation to the 
banking entity. There must be an association between the user public certificate and 
the corresponding shared secret key at the banking module; as a result, the banking 
module can distinguish the appropriate user record and charge the user accordingly to 
the service requested. If validation of the user's affordability is successful, a limited 
credit unit (credential) is generated for the specific use of the service; otherwise, the 
validation process is aborted. 
SEC -> BNK : CertOBU,SS_id,Srv_id,Enc{Bnk_id}K^gbu,SeqOBU 
6. After BNK module verifies the affordability of the potential user for that specific 
session, if successful, the BNK sends back to the SEC module a message including a 
transaction identifier, timestamp and the encrypted credit unit by using the shared 
secret key between the user and the BNK. 
BNK —> SEC : SS _ id, Srv _ id, Enc\Crd _ unt]K , Trn_ id, T, SeqQBU 
7. Now upon reception of a satisfactory message, the SEC module is capable of 
generating the serving session key for the user and provider, as well as, the temporary 
user and provider ID (pseudonyms), respectively. The information intended for the 
provider is encrypted with a shared secret key between the registered provider and the 
district domain. The protected session parameters for the user include session ID, 
encrypted temporary user ID, session key, encrypted credit unit, transaction ID, 
sequence number and district identifier. All session parameters for the users are 
encrypted by using its public key. The composed message is sent back to the RSU via 
the SM which acknowledges the validity of the session. 
SEC -*a SM{\) ->A RSU: Enc{PIDx, SS _ id, Distjd, Kss, 
Enc{Crd unt} ,TrnJd,T,SeqOBU\ 
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Now, the protected session parameters for the provider comprise the session ID, temporary 
SP ID, session key, transaction id, timestamp and sequence number. 
SEC-*a SM(2)^h RSU:Enc{PID2,SS_id,Kss,Trn_id,T,SeqSP}K 
The relayed composed session parameters intended for the user within the wireless 
environment is appended with the RSU public certificate. 
RSU -> OBU: Enc{PIDx, SS _ id, Dist _ id, Kss, Enc{Crd _ unt}Kbk ^, 
Trn_ id, T, SeqOBU} , Certh lRSU 
9. The relayed composed session parameters intended for the provider is appended with 
the RSU public certificate. 
RSU->SP:Enc{PID2,SS_id,Kss,Trn_id,T,SeqSP}K ,Cert RSU 
Figure 7.2 shows the exchange of messages for the SHI-RQ protocol. 
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Figure 7.2 - SHI-RQ exchange messages 
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Table 7.1 - Parameters for on-demand services 
Symbol 
PID1 
PID2 
Kss 
CertRsu 
CertoBu 
Crdunt 
&-pa-sp 
J^-nser 
Ss_id 
Srvid 
Trnid 
T 
Certsp 
Bnkid 
SeqoBu 
Seqsp 
Distjd 
Definition 
User pseudonym 
Provider pseudonym 
Session key 
RSU public certificate 
User public certificate 
Credit bonus unit 
Shared key authority-provider 
User public key 
Session ID 
Service ID 
Transaction identifier 
Time stamp 
Service provider certificate 
Banking credential 
User sequence number 
SP sequence number 
District identifier 
Extension connectivity request protocol [EC-RQ] 
An EC-RQ message refers to the extension of service connectivity request upon a 
discovery of a new district domain (see Figure 7.3). For this case, the OBU sends an 
initial EC-RQ message to the new discovered RSUj. Then, the recently discovered 
RSUj can reply to the message by requesting the OBU its current incumbent district 
identifier and session ID. Because the EC-RQ is a petition of connectivity for an 
existing session, RSUj replies with its public key certificate, so the OBU can encrypt 
its disclosed parameters with the RSUj's public key. In this case, the OBU sends an 
encrypted message which includes the current session identifier, temporary user 
identifier, transaction id, public certificate, district identifier and sequence number. 
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OBU -> RSUj : Enc{CertOBU, SS _ id, PIDX, Trnjd, Dist _ id, SeqOBU} 
2. Once this encrypted message is received at RSUj, the latter sends an EC-RQ request 
message to SMj to initiate a connectivity session identifier for the prospective session. 
RSUj —> SMj : CertOBU,SS_id,PIDX,Trn_id,Dist_id,Seq0BU 
3. SMj contacts SMj based on the disclosed district identifier in order to validate the 
session parameters which the user claims to hold. The link is considered to be secured 
between interconnected session managers. 
SMj -> SM, : Enc{SS _ id, PIDX, Trn_ id, Dist _ id, SeqOBU} 
4. SMj response the request to SMj. If the validation succeeds, a successful message is 
released (RSP); otherwise, a denial message is issued. Those shared keys are related to 
the current session manager and the previous one. Communication between session 
managers must be secured. 
SM. -+SM,: EnclRSP,SS_id,,Dist_id„PID.,SeqOBU \ 
J J KSMj-SMi 
5. Once a positive response is received at the new district domain, a new temporary 
register is created at SMj to continue offering service continuity. The composed 
message is encrypted by using the OBU's public key which includes the successful 
response, new session ID at district j , temporary user and increased sequence number. 
Recall that a certificate includes the public key and the digital signature. 
SM. ->a RSU, ->b OBU:EnclRSP,SS_idnDistr_idt,PID,,Seq0BU \ 
J J *• 7 . 7 'Komi 
ure 7.3 shows the exchange of messages for the EC-RQ protocol. 
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7.6 Multi-hop initiation request protocol [MHI-RQ] 
This part covers the initial service request protocol suitable for multi-hop environments. For 
this study, it is considered that there must be an exchange of public keys and validation of 
digital signatures for intermediate nodes in the multi-hop forwarding. The MHI-RQ protocol 
should follow the same validation steps as those performed in the SHI-RQ (see Figure 7.4); 
however, additional considerations to foster participation among forwarding nodes need to be 
defined. Notice that services are propagated through intermediate nodes. 
A MHI-RQ request is first transmitted after a forwarding chain has been established to reach 
the broadcasting RSU. This forwarding chain consists of all participating nodes which agree 
to deliver messages between the final recipients up to the fixed network. The establishment of 
the forwarding chain is assumed to be part of the discovery mechanism in a multi-hop 
propagation mode within a single district domain. The anchor intermediate node is attached to 
one RSU, though handover from different RSUs must be maintained. 
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1. Given the fact that message delivery has to pass through different intermediate nodes, 
OBUj sends an encrypted MHI-RQ request by using the RSU's public key, previously 
retrieved during the discovery process, so there is no way for intermediate nodes to 
retrieve sensitive information from the source. The request message contains the 
service identifier, protected banking credential and sequence number. Additionally, 
the source public certificate is appended to the message. 
OBUj —> OBUj : Enc\Srv_id,Enc\Bnk_id\K ,SeqOBU ) ,CertOBU 
2. OBUj is the anchor node which communicates directly to the broadcasting RSU. OBUj 
relays the information received from OBUj to the local RSU. Recall that intermediate 
nodes attach their public certificates which will serve at the banking module for the 
generation of incentives. 
OBUj -> RSU : Enc\Srv_id, Enc{Bnk _ id}K , SeqOBUj j , CertOBU , CertOBU 
3. The RSU sends a request message to the corresponding SP based on the Service 
identifier provided by the requester. The SP replies with its public certificate and a 
sequence number. 
SP^> RSU: CertSP,SeqSP 
4. The RSU collects the data coming from the forwarding chain, as well as, the SP and 
relays the decrypted message to the SM. 
RSU —»SM:CertSPCertOBU ,CertOBl] ,Srv_id,Enc{Bnk_id}K ,SeqOBU ,SeqSP 
5. The SM creates a new session identifier for the prospective session. Additionally, the 
SM relays the received the data to the SEC module which contains the public 
certificates of all participating nodes for their validation. If any holder in the chain of 
public certificates is found to have a revoked status in the CRL, the processing of the 
service request is aborted. 
SM —> SEC : CertspCertOBU ,CertOBU ,SS_id,Srv_id,Enc\Bnk_id\K , 
SeqOBUt,Seq 
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6. The SEC module relays the user's banking parameters for their validation at the 
banking entity. 
SEC —> BNK : CertOBU ,CertOBU ,SIS_id,Srv_id,Enc{Bnk_id\K ,SeqOBUi 
7. In the BKN module, the user will be charged according to the service requested. If 
validation is successful, the BNK generates credit units for the requester, as well as, 
the bonus units for each participating node which can serve for later rewards. The 
credit unit for the user is encrypted by using a pre-established shared secret key while 
bonus credentials are encrypted by using the public key for each corresponding 
intermediate node. Additionally, it is generated a transaction identifier and a 
timestamp. 
BNK —> SEC : CertOBU , CertOBU , SS _ id, Srv _ id, Enc {Bns }K , 
Enc{Crd _unt]
 K ,Trn_id,T,SeqOBUj 
8. The SEC module relays the satisfactory message to the SM. The information intended 
for the SP is encrypted with a shared secret key between the registered provider and 
the district security module, while the information intended for the user is encrypted 
with its public key. This encrypted message included the session key, temporary user 
ID, encrypted credit units, transaction identifier, timestamp and sequence number. The 
bonus credential for the intermediate node is appended to the secured composed 
message. Encryption of the session parameters maintains the integrity of the whole 
requesting message. 
SEC -> a SM{\) ->b RSU : Enc\Enc{Crd_unt}K ,Trn_id,SeqOBU \ , 
bnk-obu I KoBV 
PIDX, Dist_id, SS_id, Kss, CertOBU , CertOBU , Enc{Bns}K 
SEC^a SM(2)^>b RSU :Enc{PID2,SS_id,Kss,Trn_id,T,SeqSP) 
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9. RSU relays session parameters to OBUj which serves as an anchor point for the multi-
hop mode to the fixed infrastructure. OBUj retrieves its bonus units by decrypting it 
with its private key. 
RSU -> OBUj : Enc{PIDx,Dist_id,SS Jd,Kss,Enc{Crd_unt}Kb t ^,Trn_id,T,SeqOBUi } , 
CertOBU , CertOBU , Enc{Bns)K , CertR lRSU 
10. The message is forwarded through the multi-hop environment to its final destination. 
Notice that OBUj and OBUj are non trusted intermediate nodes; though they may not 
share a secret key. 
OBUj -^ OBU, : Enc{sS_id,PID^,Kss,Enc{Crd_unt}Kbt b,Trn_id,T,SeqOBU \ ,CertOBUi 
11. On the other hand, the RSU sends the corresponding session parameters to SP which 
includes the shared session key. 
RSU -> SP: Enc{SS _ id, PID2, Kss, Trnjd, T, SeqSP }K 
Figure 7.4 shows the exchange of messages for the MHI-RQ protocol. 
OBUj 
I C )isc[MHI-F 
1
 [MHI-RP 
! <T> 
!, @) 
i 
OBUi 
!Q]
 ( | 
j* 
I 
I 
! 
SP 
[MHI-RP] I 
© ! 
1^ 
i 
P TMHI-R 
(S) 
® 
(S> 
RSU 
* i 
31 ! 
1* 
<*> 
cm 
SM 
* i 
1 
(5) 
(S^> 
SEC 
1 
(8) 
(7) 
BKNG 
Figure 7.4 - MHI-RQ exchange messages 
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7.7 Analytical model 
In this section, the cost variables are defined regarding data processing to each tier process 
involved in the district domain architecture, as well as, the link cost for the propagation 
medium and the cost related to perform cryptographic operations. Table 7.2 enlists the 
symbols for the corresponding cost values and their definitions. 
Table 7.2 - Cryptographic, link and processing costs 
Symbol 
W/ 
e 
p 
wa 
a 
n 
Definition 
wireless link cost to wireless infrastructure 
wired link cost: SP and RSU 
wired link cost: RSU and district domain 
wireless link cost ad hoc medium 
wired link cost within a district domain 
wired link cost for domain interconnection 
Data access processing cost 
c, 
c2 
C3 
c4 
c5 
c6 
OBU data access processing cost 
SP data access processing cost 
RSU data access processing cost 
SM data access processing cost 
SEC data access processing cost 
BNKG data access processing cost 
Cryptographic cost 
SES 
SET 
SDS 
SDT 
Sy 
sx 
sz 
Encryption cost by using public keys 
Decryption cost by using private keys 
Encryption cost by using secret shared keys 
Decryption cost by using secret shared keys 
Related cost for validating signatures 
Related cost for generating signatures 
Related cost for generating pseudonyms 
In the following it is denoted the total signaling cost for each set of request messages. 
A. Signaling cost for a SHI-RQ message is expressed as: 
Q w = 4 * w / + 3 * C , + SET + SDT +SX + SES + SDS 1 
RSI J = * ^ 3 ' ^ P FT DT Y 
CSP=2*C2+2*0 + Sx 3 
CSM=2*a + 2*C4 4 
CSEC =2*a + 2*C5+2x(SDT+SET+Sy+Sx+Sz) 5 
where the total signaling cost for a SHI-RQ request becomes as: 
c ~c +r +r +r +r 7 
^SHl-RO ^OBU ^^RSU ^^-SM ^^SEC ^ ^BNKG ' 
B. Signaling cost for an EC-RQ message is expressed as: 
COBU, =4*w,+3*Ci+SET+SDT +SX 8 
CRSUJ = 2 C 3 + 2 p + SET + SDT + SY 9 
CSMj=2*C,+2*r] + SES+SDS 10 
where the total signaling cost for an EC-RQ request becomes as: 
C =C +C +C +C 12 
^ E C - R Q ^OBW RSUj ^^SMj T ^SM, l z 
C. Signaling cost for a MHI-RQ message is expressed as: 
COBU, = 4 * w a +3*C, + S £ r + Sfl7. + ^ + 5 £ S +SDS 13 
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COBUj=2*w,+3*Cl+Sx+Sr+Sor 14 
CRSU=4*C3+2*P + SET+SDT+3*SY ^ 
CSP = 2*C2+2*0 + Sx 16 
C S M =2*a + 2*C4 17 
CS£C = 2*a + 2 * C 5 + 2 x ( S o r + S £ r + S r + S x + S z ) 18 
where the total signaling cost for a MHI-RQ request becomes as: 
c =c +r +c +c +c +c 20 
^MHI-RO ^OBU, T ^OBU, ~ ^ RSU T ^SM T ^ S £ C T ^BNKG ^ " 
Notice that the total cost for each signaling protocol becomes the cumulative cost of each 
participating tier element. A single initial request would have a total cost of CSHI-RQ to deliver 
session parameters to the user. In the case of requesting an extension of a service the total cost 
becomes CEC-RQ- In the multi-hop mode, CMHI-RQ would represent the total signaling cots for a 
single service request. 
7.8 Mobility model 
Given the fact that vehicles can possess high mobility and dynamic behavior, there can be 
different mobility scenarios which the service district domain has to deal. For instance, if a 
user gets attached to a RSU that user must be able to request and maintain an on-demand 
service session within the coverage area. This can be depicted as the case where the vehicle is 
immobile or travels with low mobility under the coverage of a single RSU. Notice that a 
service district domain can manage several RSUs under its jurisdiction. Another scenario 
might be case where there is a transition between adjacent RSUs under the same district 
domain. Additionally, the interaction between adjacent service districts domains are intended 
to maintain mid to long-term sessions, so information of active session parameters can be 
shared through multiple district domains. Finally, a scenario in the multi-hop environment can 
be considered where a vehicle can request a service session when it is out of the radio 
transmission coverage of the closest RSU. 
I l l 
For analysis purposes, it is considered the fluid model proposed by [Zhang and Pierre, 20081] 
in order to deem the mobility behavior of the mobile nodes when traversing through different 
service coverage areas. The coverage areas are assumed to be circular and contiguous and 
with a node direction uniformly distributed [0,27t) [Nguyen and Harmen, 2001]. First, the 
border crossing rate out of the coverage area is defined within a single RSU in the incumbent 
service district domain as expressed in [Wu, 2003]: 
7ZV 
//. = , 21 
4RS 
where Rs is the radius of the circular area of the transmitting RSU and v is the average vehicle 
speed. This formula represents the rate when a vehicle is passing through the current coverage 
area given by the RSU. The border crossing rate out of the serving district domain to an 
adjacent one is given by: 
where Rm is the radius of the serving district domain. The above formula represents the 
changing rate from one service district domain to the second one. Notice that a service district 
domain can have multiple RSUs. The border crossing rate for the mobile that stays without 
changing district domain is given by: 
TtV 
Ms-Mm= — \Rs RmJ 
23 
Now, to evaluate the total signaling cost it is necessary to consider the effect of interdomain 
mobility which includes the values of the respective border crossing rates (/is and ftm). The 
total cost expression includes the cost values for executing the SHI-RQ and the EC-RQ 
protocols, as well as, the impact of the border crossing rates, vehicle density and the service 
area. 
CT = p* A(CSHI_RQ* N*{jus- MJ + C^Q* Mm) = 
4 Ks Km Km 24 
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where p is the vehicle density as defined in [Zhang et al, 2002] for user density, A is the total 
service area and N is the number of RSUs. 
Additionally, it is sometimes useful to introduce the parameter of Session to Mobility Ratio 
(SMR) given in [Zhang and Pierre, 20082] which is defined as the relation between the session 
arrival rate and the RSU border crossing rate. This means that the user will be able to request 
certain number of independent sessions within a district service domain. The SMR is 
expressed as follows: 
SMR = -^ 25 
Ms 
Where X.s is the session arrival rate and /us is the RSU border crossing rate. 
7.9 Numerical results 
For the evaluation of the aforementioned signaling protocols, it is assumed that the related 
costs in terms of latency (seconds) to estimate the overall signaling cost. The list of the 
corresponding costs is contained in Table 7.3. Regarding the costs of security operations, 
benchmark values are provided by Crypto++ [Crypto, 2009] concerning the implementation of 
cryptographic operations. In the case of digital signatures, these are based on the RSA 
cryptographic scheme with a fixed length of 128 bytes and for asymmetric 
encryption/decryption operations it is also considered the RSA (128 bytes) scheme. 
Moreover, SHA-1 operations are necessary when generating temporary user 
identifiers/pseudonyms (32 bits) at the security module tier. It is also considered that the AES 
(128-bit key) mechanism for encryption/decryption when using shared secret keys. 
Furthermore, it is assumed 20 ms latency for data processing at each tier element and also set 
the link cost for the wireless medium at 5 ms and for the fixed network at 2 ms. 
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Table 7.3 - Cryptographic, link and processing values 
Symbol 
W/ 
# 
P 
W0 
a 
n 
Ci 
c2 
c3 
c4 
Cs 
Cs 
SES 
SET 
SDS 
SDT 
Sy 
Sx 
sz 
Value in (s) 
0.005 
0.002 
0.002 
0.005 
0.002 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.031 
0.007 
0.031 
0.0142 
0.007 
0.0142 
0.044 
To evaluate the signaling performance of each protocol it was used MATLAB®. It was 
observed that in the case of SHI-RQ, it would take 0.765 s for a single vehicle to receive a 
response from a district domain for an initial request made. Notice that this value is the 
response round trip time for a single access request message. IP assignment is not an issue if 
IPv6 is used for IP addressing. For the EC-RQ, it would take 0.365 s when the vehicle makes 
a request for extended connectivity to a different district domain. Here, the current session 
parameters are shared between the session managers of the participating district domains. 
These results show a slight variation but it can be concluded that cost expressions for the SHI-
RQ and EC-RQ are consistent with the result obtained by the ACE. Now, from the previous 
114 
values if it is considered a single RSU with a coverage radius of 250 m and a moving vehicle 
with maximum speed of 40 m/s, then the vehicle would cross approximately the RSU's 
transmission range (500 m) in 12.5 s. This means that the vehicle would have sufficient time 
to execute the SHI-RQ protocol and retrieve the corresponding session parameters from the 
district domain. Regarding the MHI-RQ protocol it was observed that it would take 0.945 s 
for a vehicle in a multi-hop transmission mode to request session parameters to the serving 
district service domain. This latency value includes the participation of only one intermediate 
node. Results were obtained by using the total signaling cost based on the related cost values 
of table 7.3. 
Figure 7.5 shows the performance of the overall latency for the MHI-RQ when the number of 
intermediate vehicles increases. With a maximum number of 10 intermediate nodes, the 
latency cost reaches nearly 2.2 s for a single MIH-RQ request while for a single intermediate 
node the latency cost is around .94 s. In this case, the addition of intermediate nodes does not 
impose a significant impact on the signaling cost since there is only one request at a time 
being processed by the district domain. However, at the banking module there is more 
processing operations since bonus units have to be generated for each participating node. 
Figure 7.6 shows the performance evaluation of the mobility model which includes the 
corresponding signaling costs for the execution of the SHI-RQ and EC-RQ protocols. 
Additionally, it considers the impact of the related border crossing rates with a district domain 
radius of 1 km and a RSU radius of 250 m. In this graph, it can be observed that when the 
average speed increases, the border crossing rate for the RSU coverage increases, as well as, 
the border crossing rate for the district domain. As a result, a vehicle moving at high speeds 
will need to perform more EC-RQ requests since it changes rapidly between contiguous 
district domains. It can be observed that a cost of 10 s with a vehicle density of 0.0002 (200 
vehicles/km") is reached with an average speed of 40 m/s. As expected, when the vehicle 
density increases, the total signaling cost increases. Finally, in Figure 7.7 it is observed the 
trend for the signaling cost against the SMR which represents the session arrival rate per 
border crossing rate. The maximum cost value obtained corresponds to a SMR of 30 with 
vehicle density of 0.0006 and with an average speed of 20 m/s. As expected, when the session 
arrival rate increases at the district domain, the total signaling cost increases. 
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7.10 Conclusions 
sim 
Figure 7.7 - Signaling cost Vs SMR 
Given the fact that commercial roadside service can coexist with the operation of safety 
messages where safety issues are open for public interest, the same concept can be applied to 
no-safety applications but with the presence of charging elements in order to generate profits 
for the providers of the content data, as well as, for the authority of the district domain. For 
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user authentication, the service district domain relies on the verification of certificate 
revocation lists which will contain the most recent list of certificates which possess a 
revocation status. Additionally, signature verification is necessary in order to assure that the 
request message belongs to the holder of the certificate. 
In this paper, the analytical model of the secure service district domain architecture has been 
presented. Three main initiation request protocols are described as SHI-RQ, EC-RQ and MIH-
RQ. When a vehicle initiates a request message in the form of a SHI-RQ to a specific service 
district domain through the operating roadside infrastructure, if the validation is successful the 
user (OBU) will be granted with the corresponding session parameters which includes a 
temporary session key, as well as, a credential unit issued by the banking module. 
When the current user changes from one district domain to an adjacent one, then upon 
detection of the new district domain an EC-RQ message is executed with the objective to 
trigger the exchange of information between the previous and the new session manager. This 
means, that on-going session parameters can be extended to other service district domains. 
Regarding the MHI-RQ message, this is executed when the requester vehicle is involved in a 
multi-hop transmission. At the district domain, the banking module will be responsible for 
generating credit unit for the requester, as well as, bonus units for each participating node. 
These banking credentials are encrypted by using the public certificate for each intermediate 
node. For this study the signaling cost is expressed in terms of latency for SHI-RQ, EC-RQ 
and MHI-RQ protocols. It was also analyzed the mobility model in order to assess the total 
signaling cost which involves the signaling within an initial district domain and when the 
vehicle moves to another domain. This mobility model will depend on the values of border 
cross rate for staying within the district domain and for moving out the domain. As a result, 
the obtained values remain acceptable for a reasonable number of vehicles even when 
increasing the speed. 
Finally, interesting research work might be oriented to tackle highly dynamic trajectory 
patterns in unstable networks, especially when a large number of vehicles are involved and 
their trajectory patterns become unpredictable. The study of QoS provisioning in ad hoc 
environments represents a significant challenge regarding the way the packets must be handled 
and delivered by not trusted intermediate nodes. Additionally, the implementation of secure 
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and robust ad hoc routing protocols would allow an effective forwarding scheme in complex 
and unstable network topologies. One possible approach is to consider the implementation of 
secure geographic multicast which guarantees integrity of the data and privacy of the 
participating nodes without compromising the performance of the system. 
Chapter 8 is dedicated to the study of the scalabilty of the service district architecture 
including different scenarios in a heterogeneous network environment with simulation analysis 
in terms of the access request time. 
CHAPTER 8 
JOURNAL OF MOBILE NETWORKS AND 
APPLICATIONS, SPRINGER 
This chapter presents the paper submitted to the Special Issue of Advances and Applications 
for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks in Mobile Networks and Applications in Springer 2009. The 
title of this paper is 'Supporting scalable secure service access for vehicular environments'. 
This chapter covers scalability with multiple district service domains when a moving vehicle 
travels from one domain to the other. 
8.1 Abstract 
8.1.1 Resume en francais 
Dans ce travail, nous proposons un modele pour offrir un service securise quand differents 
domaines de service successifs sont responsables d'envoyer de parametres de service aux 
utilisateurs sur-demande d'une maniere dynamique. L'objectif de cette architecture est de 
faciliter une livraison de service en presence des multiples domaines. Nous avons analyse le 
temps moyen de reponse pour un utilisateur faisant la demande d'un service securisee, de 
meme que, le temps de reponse moyen pour un utilisateur pour avoir acces au service pendant 
que celui traverse des nouveaux domaines de service dans un environnement de 
communication heterogene. L'analyse donne un apercu sur comment les services sur demande 
pourront etre fournis dans les environnements vehiculaires heterogenes. 
118 
119 CHAPTER 8. JOURNAL PAPER MONE 2009 
8.1.2 Abstract 
Service provisioning elements and different existing approaches intended for vehicular 
networks were studied in this paper, mainly related to security, accounting models. The 
purpose of this architecture is to facilitate a scalable delivery of services offered at the 
roadside infrastructure in the presence of multiple district domains. Through simulations, it is 
analyzed the average response time for a user to request a secure session, as well as, the 
average response time for a user to gain this access while roaming across successive new 
district domains in a heterogeneous environment. The analysis provided a good insight on how 
secure service provisioning can be implemented in future heterogeneous vehicular 
environments and what type of challenges need to be tackled. 
8.1.3 Index terms 
Vehicular networks, service provisioning, security, scalability. 
8.2 Introduction 
New challenges arise concerning security mechanisms in VANETS which are augmented by 
the fact that any solution in the transit system needs to be scalable both geographically and 
with the amount of concurrent users. Most of the solutions might be required to be deployed 
on heterogeneous environments since different access infrastructure will inevitably coexist 
along the road. This can be the case of different types of networks such as DSRC, UMTS, 
WiMAX, GSM, etc. On this regard, the delivery of information for VANETS must be 
subjected to Quality of Service (QoS) policies to guarantee certain level of bandwidth and 
network availability. However, QoS parameters satisfaction can be challenging due to the 
high number of vehicles circulating on the road that are potential consumers of the services 
offered along the roadside, and also due to their high mobility. In order to maintain a reliable 
service provisioning, some key factors must be maintained such as low delay, sufficient 
bandwidth, low jitter, and low loss of information. Adding security mechanisms may typically 
add delay due to additional treatments, and consume some bandwidth. In the case of vehicular 
environments, delay can be critical due to the high mobility of vehicles while traversing 
different networks. 
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This work addresses scalability issues on the proposed district secure access architecture based 
on the presence of key modules which provide temporary session parameters for vehicles 
requesting service access on the road. The architecture can be extended in a scalable way by 
the interaction of district domains that can comprise heterogeneous wireless technologies. 
Scalability support will depend on the information shared among multiple service district 
domains. The results show that the delay introduced by the security mechanisms is acceptable 
and scales well with the number of vehicles and when different district domains are present. 
The rest of the paper includes an analysis of multiple service district domains scenario 
regarding the average service access response time in a scalable heterogeneous topology. 
8.3 Secure access for vehicular environments 
In general, access schemes are intended to grant network and service access to potential users 
only if specific access policies and regulations are fulfilled by current requesters. Access 
control mechanisms promote the development of reliable information service architectures in 
extended communication systems for scalability purposes. On this regard, significant 
challenges arise when trying to support scalable service provisioning models in vehicular 
networks due to the existence of several issues among which there is the potential presence of 
multiple service providers, network technologies. Additionally, one of the main challenges in 
vehicular environments is their transitory behaviour which makes it difficult to establish 
consistent connectivity to wireless fixed infrastructures independently of the user geographical 
location and/or traffic patterns. 
In an on-demand service subscription scheme, the provider has poor or even no knowledge of 
transitory requesters. For instance, on-demand requests can be pictured in scenarios where the 
roadside infrastructure advertises information services from specific content providers to 
potential users. On-demand services can be considered as services that are open to virtually all 
vehicles that travel in the proximity of an access network where the services are offered. It is 
clear, however, that exchanges of information between users and providers must be kept 
reliable and secure in such open-to-all scenario, especially, when sensitive information such as 
financial transactions is exchanged or when user identities are disclosed. Additionally, when 
financial transactions take place, such as in a per-use based billing scheme for using services, 
121 CHAPTER 8. JOURNAL PAPER MONE 2009 
strict regulations must be complied to and detailed records must be kept regarding all 
transactions performed. That means that after validations have been completed in the 
precedent modules, assignation of resources can be issued. 
The delivery of information services from the fixed network to vehicles must also support the 
implementation of Quality of Service (QoS) schemes and policies. The execution of QoS 
policies defines the way data exchanged as part of the service provisioning, is treated based on 
its labeled queuing priority and/or assigned bandwidth. These policies can be established 
when both users and providers respectively agree to provide and accept a specific service level 
in some so called service level agreement (SLA). The cost related to the type of service level 
offered may vary such as the better the quality and resources guaranteed, the higher the cost 
for a service delivery. 
User authentication is performed at the security module of the district administrative domain 
which can comprise multiple certificate authorities and/or their corresponding proxy modules. 
In the proposed protocol, the authentication of requesters is guaranteed by providing security 
features during the initial communication setup between users and providers. 
Some assumptions have been considered in the architecture. First, the security module must 
be capable to support and classify different types of requests depending on their priority and/or 
delay susceptibility. It is worth to emphasize the importance of sorting the type of service that 
can be delivered by the roadside infrastructure. As aforementioned, the type of priority 
appended to the service request will determine the level of QoS provisioning. Service policies 
are contained at the policy module that defines the way a service provisioning must be 
handled. From the vehicle perspective, there might be some situations where safety-related 
messages or sensitive-delay data must be treated as fast as possible; so a service taxonomy can 
allow that safety-related messages be tagged with a higher priority compared to that intended 
for commercial services. 
The authorization process grants resource assignation when validations at the previous 
modules have been completed. That means that after validations have been completed in the 
precedent modules, assignation of resources can be issued. Regarding the presence of the 
session manager, its main function is to retrieve information from the accounting module and 
establish associations with other external session managers for the purpose of supporting 
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scalability between multiple district domains. Any exchange of information between different 
district domains will be performed through the interaction of current participating session 
managers. Session managers can be considered as being the entities responsible of the final 
stage of the response process to a service request from a vehicle. They assemble all the 
parameters created for a specific service request before sending back the secure attributes to 
the corresponding parties. 
A single district domain case is a typical case of service deliveries where the vehicle has 
relatively slow mobility or stays immobile before a nearby roadside unit (RSU) within a single 
district domain; thus, it can be inferred that the service session can be established along the 
radio transmission range of the wireless access technology. One of the most likely 
technologies to be considered for a wide deployment in urban and rural areas is Direct Short 
Range Communications (DSRC). A feature of this technology is that it supports seven service 
channels and two control channels used by RSUs to frequently broadcast services offered in an 
area. This set of services is contained in a list called Provider Service Table (PST). 
Broadcasting of services can be used in those control channels. Recall that messages can be 
appended with priority and having top priority those messages labelled as critical. 
Even in a single district domain scenario, it is likely that heterogeneous wireless access 
technologies must be supported in order to provide a scalable service delivery solution that 
extends over a large geographic area. Therefore, in this scenario, it is considered the general 
case where different wireless technologies must interact to guarantee continuity on the service. 
8.4 Multiple district domains 
In mobile environments, it might be situations where vehicles request and get access to a 
service while moving from one district domain to another while on the road. For this reason, 
interconnection mechanisms need to be established at many logical levels between 
neighboring district domains. In particular, it is necessary to put in place mechanisms to 
facilitate the exchange of information regarding temporary active session registers. This is to 
allow service parameters from an active session be shared between two concurrent district 
domains in order to maintain an active session alive without the need for the user to be 
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registered in a new session at the new district domain. If a vehicle is requesting access to a 
service in a district domain different from the one where the access was initially granted, the 
current district must contact the previous district in order to retrieve the original user session 
parameters. This relay based approach allows the user to have continuity in the session 
parameters when requesting access from a new district domain. The inter-district messages 
are encapsulated at the transport layer (TCP) and forwarded through the fixed network. 
Consider a scenario where user A has already been granted access to a service by Districto with 
all the necessary service attributes as shown in Figure 8.1. 
District service domain 0 District service domain 1 
Vehicle A 
Figure 8.1 - Session parameters exchange between two district domains 
When user A moves to District] while keeping the same service session, the RSU at District] 
detects an ongoing session and requests from user A to disclose the corresponding session 
parameters. In this process, user A sends a signed response message to the new district domain 
containing its original district identifier, session expiration time, temporary user id 
(pseudonym), session identifier, transaction identifier and public key certificate (step 1). 
Additionally, the response message is tagged as an ongoing service session by the RSU. 
Notice, that this information is independent of the neighbor discovery messages proper to 
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handover operations at the link layer. Once District receives the information user A through 
session manageri, an encrypted request message is sent to session managero at Districto (step 
2). The information contained in the initial request message compromises the claimed session 
id, temporary user id, district id and user's public key certificate. When session managero 
receives the request message, the retrieved session identifier is processed to verify the 
certainty of all the parameters contained in the temporary record at the local accounting 
module. If the related validation is successful, session managero sends to session manager] a 
success response message along with the active session parameters from the source local 
register. Then, the information to be shared between the two districts includes the validated 
session id, temporary user id, service id, transaction identifier, session timestamp and 
expiration session time (step 3). After this collection of data is done, the response message is 
encrypted between both districts. Notice that session keys are not exchanged during this 
procedure since they belong exclusively to the user and the corresponding service provider. 
When the response message is received by session manageri at District^ the retrieved 
information is matched with the information disclosed by the user in order to guarantee the 
certainty of the active session (step 4). If this verification is successful, a new temporary 
register is created at the local accounting module containing the extracted information. Once 
validation of all the parameters has been performed, access is granted to the user via the RSU 
(step 5). For instance, during the validation of the session expiration time values, the original 
one retrieved from the Districto and the one disclosed by the user are compared. If both values 
are the same, then the validation succeeds. Otherwise, the validation fails and the user request 
is rejected. 
Regarding banking transactions, the transaction identifier for that specific session is compared 
to the one retrieved from Districto and the one disclosed by the user. The validation succeeds 
if both credit identifiers are the same. Otherwise, the validation fails and the user request is 
rejected. Notice that the session id is kept the same along the duration of the existing session. 
If a session is terminated, a new access request process and validation has to be performed at 
the new district domain. 
When multiple districts are involved, a chain of relayed districts is formed, i.e. {Districts 
Distric ,+/,..., Distric >+„}. An illustration of this is presented in Figure 8.2, where district 
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domains have to deal with different wireless access technologies. In order to provide more 
reliable solutions, the service architecture must interoperate regardless of the type of wireless 
access technology deployed on the road. 
District C 
. . domain 
Figure 8.2 - Multiple district domains in a heterogeneous environment 
It is worth to emphasize that the active session key is already assigned between the user and 
service provider from the initial service request to protect any exchange of information 
between these two entities. Now, when entering to a different district domain, a validation of 
the current session that the user claims to have needs to be corroborated by the previous 
district domain. If the validation from the previous district domain is successful, then the new 
district domain allows access to the transitory user. The communication between district 
domains is considered to be protected; hence, avoiding any kind of forge of information along 
the established links between district domains. No need to generate a new set of session keys 
is required since the information between the service provider and the user is protected by the 
original session key. Moreover, a user can request a new session at any district regardless of 
its location without being attached to any one in particular. The process described earlier was 
intended only to guarantee the continuity of the service parameters upon entering a new 
district domain without the need to initiate a new request. 
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8.5 Evaluation of district domains 
Introducing security mechanisms, authentication, authorization, and accounting schemes is 
mandatory for a realistic deployment of service offerings on the road for vehicles. Even 
though these mechanisms are necessary, a general concern when deploying security 
mechanism in any architecture is the additional overhead and latency introduced to get access 
to and to deliver a service. Latency can result from both the additional time required to 
exchange additional messages, and the processing time required by the communicating entities 
to make use of those messages. In the case of vehicular environments, getting fast response 
time becomes particularly important given the speed at which vehicles travel and may room 
from one network to the other on the road. 
For the purpose of analyzing the proposed architecture, the overall schemes of exchanging 
messages described earlier were implemented in the OPNET® modeler 14.5 wireless suite. It 
was also considered the cumulative processing time which has to deal with the execution of 
cryptographic operations at each stage of the communication model. These processing time 
values were based on the benchmark speeds given in [Crypto, 2009] for different 
cryptographic schemes as shown in Chapter 6 Table 6.1. The aim is to estimate the total 
response time during a simulated on-demand request-response process in both single domain 
and multiple domain scenarios. 
For simulation purposes, it was considered a network topology consisting of three district 
domain representation as shown in Figure 8.3. The core network at each district is 
implemented as router nodes which interconnect the related district node elements, the service 
provider and the mobile node. The maximum packet length was set to 1024 bytes and 20 ms 
latency at each tier process for data processing operations besides the processing time values 
inherent to cryptographic operations. Though data processing times may vary depending on 
each tier, this amount of time can be considered reasonable for the scope of this work. 
The tool employed to define the access request tier process was the Application 
Characterization Environment ACE® which is is a robust tool for evaluating the behavior of 
different tier processes within a network simulation environment. The exchange of request-
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response messages was implemented as an ACE file and deployed in the network topology. 
Each tier process in the ACE is assigned to an actual node element in the OPNET project 
editor for simulation purposes. The statistic results will reflect the effects of the actual 
response time based on the network topology. Figure 8.4 represents the deployed ACE tier 
process and which represents the time taken by each tier stage for a session request-response 
within a single district domain. On the top of the ACE chart, there is a time scale that 
represents the total elapsed time during the message exchange process. In Figure 8.5, it is 
shown the ACE tier process corresponding to exchanges between two district domains to relay 
session parameters. 
Figure 8.3- Network topology 
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For the network topology in order to represent different wireless access technologies, it was 
deployed for the first district a WLAN router as an access technology, for the second district a 
WIMAX base station and for the third one again a WLAN access router. Even though, a 
district domain configuration is likely to manage many wireless access technologies, in this 
scenario every district only has one access point/base station. A handover among different 
access technologies within the same district domain does not involve new 
authentication/authorization procedures. Therefore it is irrelevant from the point of view of the 
simulation analysis of the architecture. For simulation purposes auto-assigned IP address are 
configured for mobile nodes when passing through different subnet. 
The objective of the simulations is to estimate the response time it takes for a vehicle to 
request secure service access within a service district domain, and the response time involved 
when two and three district domains exchange information. The coverage area offered by 
each antenna in the simulation is set to 1000 m. First, it was performed sets of simulations for 
1, 15, 30 and 80 vehicles by deploying the corresponding ACE process with a total simulation 
time of 300 s each and with a uniform inter-repetition time between 1 and 3 s. Each vehicle in 
the simulation was executing new 100 service requests distributed uniformly during the 
simulation time. More than one service request per vehicle is likely to happen within a time 
frame, given the fact that for example many embedded systems in future cars may need access 
to specific independent services. Figure 8.6 shows the average response times for service 
access for 1, 15, 30 and 80 vehicles. These result times are 0.883 s, 0.888 s, 0.895 s and 1.01 s, 
respectively. The highest response time is experienced in the 80 vehicles setup while the 
lowest time values correspond to the single vehicle setup. The difference between the values 
of one and 30 vehicles varies around 12 ms and does not represent a significant impact on the 
average response time. However, the maximum response time is reached at the 80 vehicles 
setup given the increase of the concurrent communicating vehicles. It was noticed that with an 
even greater number of vehicles the performance of system degrades considerably. Figure 8.7 
shows that results for 80 vehicles, it is experienced the highest variation in response time with 
a maximum peak above 1.25 s. This behavior is given due to an increase in the number of 
service requests which have to be processed by the simulator concurrently. 
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The impact of distance was analyzed within the coverage area for a group of 15 nodes which 
were located at a distance of 400 m from the access point compared to a distance of a few 
meters close to the access point. 
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Figure 8.7 - Variation time in a district 
Overall, for the single district domain scenario, average response time for a single vehicle 
remained below 0.89 s. For this time, if it is considered that a vehicle travels at a speed of 100 
km/h, the vehicle would have traversed a maximum of 25 m which is smaller than the 
overlapping zones between any two adjacent coverage areas at both sides of a district domains 
(15%). Figure 8.6 and 8.7 belongs to WLAN since these results are for the first district 
domain. The second district domain considers WiMax as an access technology. 
The objective of the second set of simulations was to estimate the response time in a multi-
district domain scenario. When a change of district domains is performed by a vehicle, a set 
of messages has to be exchanged between the two district domains. The source district 
domain and the neighbor district domain need to share information about the current session 
parameters in order to allow the user to have access to a current service at the new district 
domain. 
For a first simulation setup, it was included the corresponding ACE process for two district 
domains within the network topology. Additionally, multiple service requests performed 
uniformly during a total simulation time of 240 s and with a uniformly inter-repetition time 
131 
between 1 and 2 s. The average response times for service requests performed by 1, 15, 30 
and 80 vehicles that remain static at a traversal zone from the first to the second district. To 
get the average response time from a different access technology a WIMAX router node was 
deployed as a base station in the second a district domain. Results regarding the WiMax 
access technologies are related to the extended connectivity between the first district domain 
and the second one. The response time is retrieved when the mobile node enters into the 
WiMax domain. 
Figure 8.8 shows that the average response times are around 0.47 s, 0.48 s, 0.50 s and 0.57 s, 
respectively for 1, 15, 30 and 80 concurrent vehicles. The time difference between the highest 
and lowest time values is about 100 ms. Figure 8.9 shows that the results obtained for 80 
mobile nodes presented the highest variation in the response time with a maximum peak 
response time of nearly 0.8 s. In general, the tier process for a two district domain requires 
less response time and the processing compared to that obtained for a single district domain. 
In the case where a mobile node is moving at a speed of 100 km/h, the effective distance to 
perform the discovery of the new district domain and the corresponding handover operation 
would occur at adjacent overlapping zones. The time required to traverse the overlapping 
zone, 150 m, would be 5.4 s, which is an order bigger than the average response time. 
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Note that autoassigned IP addressing was configured on mobile nodes. In IPv6 addressing no 
DHCP infrastructure would be required since the large number of available IP addresses. 
The last set of simulations was targeted towards evaluating the average response time when 
three adjacent district domains are involved in relaying session information. The third 
scenario depicts the situation were three district domains are present. As a result, three district 
domains have to share the current session parameters to maintain an ongoing session. This 
process involves the communication of session information through the core routers between 
districtz, district/ and districto, where the former one is considered the district that issued the 
original service parameters for a requesting mobile node. A WLAN access point was 
configured at the last district domain and with the corresponding ACE process for three 
district domains. Figure 8.10 shows the average response time for requests originating from 1, 
15, 30 and 80 coexisting vehicles with time values around 0.57 s, 0.59 s, 0.60 s and 0.65 s 
respectively. The difference between the single vehicle and the 80 vehicles scenario results is 
around 80 ms. The results for the 80 vehicles setup experienced the highest variation with a 
maximum peak of .78 s, as shown in Figure 8.11. 
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From the results obtained in these simulations, it was observed that the response time values 
for the generation of service attributes are acceptable in a single district domain for a realistic 
number of mobile nodes co-existing in an area up to 80 concurrent vehicles per access point. 
In the case where session parameters need to be shared among multiple district domains, the 
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average response time is also acceptable for sharing session information even when the 
number of requesters increases. It could also be noticed that the response time values 
achieved by a single district domain are higher compared to those obtained from two and even 
three district domains. This is given because the corresponding initial request process for a 
single district domain involves more tier elements and more processing to set the session 
parameters. The idea to share and corroborate on-going session parameters between district 
domains is to avoid the need to request a new service session; therefore, less tier stages and 
processing is involved. 
8.5.1 Discussion 
The advantages of implementing robust security schemes for service delivery are evident 
especially when sensitive information has to be forwarded through unknown and at the same 
time not trusted vehicles. In this study, it was analyzed the impact of providing secure access 
in the vehicular context and proposed mechanisms for scalable secure delivery solutions that 
can guarantee access to on-demand service users while moving through different district 
domains. On-demand services rely on the premise that vehicles display by nature a transitory 
behaviour across different district domains where service offering are present. Service 
providers on the road might have poor or even no knowledge of requesters (vehicles). The 
simulation studies of the proposed architecture show that the average response time when 
requesting services on the road would be acceptable for vehicular environments. The response 
time when multiple district domains are involved also remained acceptable when using two 
different types of wireless access technologies. 
One major issue that must be tackled regarding vehicular environments relates to the high 
dynamics experienced by ad-hoc vehicle-to-vehicle communication where information 
services must be delivered beyond the transmission range of any roadside infrastructure. An 
unstable forwarding topology among vehicles would have a significant impact on service 
delivery performance to a vehicle beyond the provider. In such a case, long term service 
sessions between a requester and a provider may not be guaranteed by the service provider or 
existing networks. In this type of environment it would also be difficult to guarantee QoS 
parameters to vehicles, and best effort service agreements may be the only types of SLA that 
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would advisably be made available from a service provider to service requesters since service 
providers cannot guarantee delivery parameters beyond the first hop. The implementation of 
efficient vehicular ad hoc routing protocols is needed to enable a good service performance, 
especially, when the delivery of data for the service is delay or bandwidth sensitive. A 
thorough benchmark study is needed to evaluate the suitability of different existing routing 
protocols for being used with the proposed architecture in an on-demand service delivery 
scheme. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, relevant characteristics about service provisioning and access architectures in a 
vehicular context have been presented in multiple district domains. A major concern in 
vehicular environments is the need to provide robust and secure access to services where 
reliable delivery of information from providers to vehicles must be guaranteed in a 
heterogeneous environment. 
The service architecture comprises the presence of public and private certificate authorities, 
session managers, policy entities, accounting, authorization and banking modules within a 
multiple district domain context. The main goal of the security module is to verify the 
certainty of the holder's key certificates by using public and private certificate revocation lists. 
Additionally, the security module generates the corresponding session keys for both the 
requesting user and the solicited provider. The policy module in the architecture is in charge of 
defining service policies and regulations. At the banking module, a validation takes place in 
order to certify that the user's baking credentials can afford the requested service. The 
accounting module generates a temporary record concerning all the service parameters 
associated to the transitory user. The authorization module grants resource assignation when 
validations at the previous modules have been completed. One of the main parts of this 
architecture deals with the implementation of session managers which are responsible for 
facilitating the transfer of existing and valid session parameters to other session managers 
located at different district domains. The communication between session managers helps 
extend service delivery when a vehicle with an active service session moves to a district 
domain different from the one where the service parameters where originally received. 
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The purpose of the presented architecture is to facilitate the delivery of services offered at the 
roadside regardless of the type of wireless access technologies. It was evaluated the average 
response time for a vehicle requesting a secure session, as well as, the average response time 
for a user requesting continuity in access in new district domains in a heterogeneous 
environment. The results showed that the response time for service access requests are 
acceptable even when increasing the number of vehicles within the network topology. 
The following chapter introduces a service taxonomy for commercial applications such as 
web, database, voice and video-based applications in a vehicular context and their 
corresponding simulation results. 
CHAPTER 9 
SERVICE TAXONOMIES IN VEHICULAR 
NETWORKS 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a service taxonomy for vehicular applications. A description of safety 
applications is given in section 9.2. Safety applications are considered to have the highest 
priority level of all incoming and outgoing transmissions of a vehicle. One perspective of 
service taxonomy is the one based on the Vehicular-infrastructure Integration (VII) for the 
North American region which is addressed in section 9.3. Another perspective of service 
taxonomy is the one provided by the CVIS project conceived for the European region also 
covered in section 9.3. Since safety applications are not in the scope of the proposed district 
service architecture, only the implementation of non-safety applications has been studied and 
analyzed in section 9.4. To evaluate the performance of non-safety applications, simulation 
scenarios were performed. 
9.2 Safety Applications 
Safety applications involve the exchange of messages between vehicles or between the 
infrastructure and vehicles to assist drivers in handling unexpected events on the road, and 
avoid or minimize the risks of potential dangers. Safety messages can also provide trajectory, 
status and position information to vehicles in the vicinity with a multi-hop communication 
[Marousek et al., 2008]. Additionally, communication with the fixed infrastructure can 
provide additional benefits to improve safety and traffic mobility. 
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Since safety messages require an efficient delivery of messages of life threatening situations, 
they must be dispatched with the highest priority. The transmission of safety messages takes 
place at the MAC level with no further OSI communication layers involved; hence, reducing 
any additional delay due to the other layers. At the MAC level, efficient communication 
capabilities are intended to be setup with DSRC/IEEE 802.1 lp without the common overhead 
imposed by conventional IEEE 802.11 MAC [Jiang and Delgrossi, 2008]. 
9.3 Service taxonomy 
In this section, two types of taxonomies for application services are addressed. The first one is 
based on the Vehicular-infrastructure Integration (VII) for the North American region as 
presented in [Bai et al, 2006] and is described as follows. 
1. Safety applications: these applications assist drivers in handling potential dangers 
on the road. 
2. Convenience applications: these applications are related to the handling of traffic 
management information to maximize traffic flow and traffic throughput. 
3. Commercial applications: these applications provide communication services to 
offer infotainment and informative services to increase driver productivity. 
Some applications related to safety messages in [Bai et al, 2006] are described as follows. 
1. Stopped or slow vehicle advisor: this type of message is triggered in case of 
detecting an immobile or slow vehicle that would represent a potential danger for 
high speed motorists. 
2. Emergency electronic brake: this type of message is triggered in case of detecting 
a sudden stop from the immediate vehicles. 
3. V2V post crash notification: this type of message is sent after a collision has been 
detected to notify oncoming vehicles. 
4. Road hazard condition notification: this type of message is sent in case of 
detecting dangerous conditions on the road. 
5. Road feature notification: this type of message informs about traffic conditions on 
the road. 
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6. Cooperative collision warning: this type of message is triggered in case of 
detecting immobile vehicles in the vicinity. 
The second type of service taxonomy is based on the Cooperative Vehicle-Infrastructure 
Systems (CVIS) [CVIS, 2009] for the European region. The main objective of the CVIS 
project consists of creating a unified technical solution for communication between vehicles 
and infrastructure by means of an application framework. The CVIS prospected software 
applications have three main areas: 
Cooperative Urban Applications. The goal is to exchange data between vehicles and 
RSU from different service providers within urban areas, and create cooperative 
systems for travel data collection, personalized travel information and traffic 
management. 
Cooperative Inter-Urban Applications. These applications are intended to provide 
efficient cooperative services on inter-urban road networks. This will include 
advanced location techniques for vehicle-infrastructure and vehicle-to-vehicle 
communications. 
Cooperative Fleet and Freight Applications. These applications target cooperative 
systems for commercial vehicles offering specific information about actual vehicles 
position, cargo information, etc. This will result in the optimization of delivery 
logistics, and the increase of safety and security features for commercial vehicles. 
According to the definitions given by the CVIS initiative, safety messages are targeted 
towards the following usage: 
1. Priority Applications. Applications which provide the most efficient mobility to 
emergency and official vehicles with a possibility to influence green light cycle at 
traffic lights. 
2. Access Control. This is used to improve traffic management and security measures 
for certain vehicles in real time. 
3. Route Conditions. Route notifications about conditions on the road. 
4. Speed Alert. Speed limits and warning messages of roadside systems are 
transmitted to a vehicle to improve traffic safety and compliance. 
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5. Speed Profile and Advice. A specific speed profile advice is provided to the driver 
in order to better suit the traffic patterns and thus lower speed fluctuations. 
6. Safety warnings. Transmission of relevant applications such as warning about 
obstacles on the road. 
The following table shows the equivalence of applications between CVIS and VII based on 
safety, speed alerts and road condition awareness. 
Table 9.1 - Safety applications for VII and CVIS 
Group 
Safety awareness 
Speed awareness 
Route conditions 
North America VII 
Cooperative collision warning 
V2V post crash notification 
Slow vehicle advisor 
Emergency electronic brake 
Road feature notification 
Road hazard condition 
European CVIS 
Safety warnings 
Priority Applications 
Speed Alert 
Speed Profile and Advice 
Access control 
Route conditions 
The taxonomy proposed by the CVIS European initiative for non safety applications seems 
more detailed than its North American counterpart VII. CVIS gives a more extended 
categorization for applications feasibility in the urban and inter-urban geographical 
applications. What is clear however is that both CVIS and VII standard groups envision that 
safety and non-safety will be deployed using the roadside infrastructure as well as vehicular-
to-vehicular communications. 
9.4 Non-safety applications 
Non-safety applications spam across a variety of services that can provide information or 
some sort of entertainment to drivers such as web access, streaming audio and video. For 
instance, navigation assistance can offer real time traffic information to drivers according to 
their position. Navigation technologies can provide efficient route directions to drivers 
according to the current traffic conditions. Another type of potential application can be 
location-based services (LBS) which are used by service providers to offer services to vehicles 
in the proximity of specific areas. This can be done with the assistance of location servers that 
record and manage current positioning data [Klimin and Karl, 2004]. Salient elements of LBS 
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are the service discovery protocols whose objective is, on the one side, to enable clients to 
discover specific service providers in a geographic region and allow, on the other side, service 
providers to advertise their services in neighboring regions. 
According to [Bai et al, 2006] there are some envisioned non-safety applications that can be 
implemented in vehicular environments: 
1. Remote vehicle personalization/diagnostics: downloading or uploading of 
personalized vehicle settings. 
2. Service announcements: announcements of services to vehicles. 
3. Internet based applications: web services provided by the roadside infrastructure. 
4. Map or database download: vehicles download content from roadside units. 
5. Real-time voice and video: transmission and relay of streaming real-time video 
vehicles or roadside units. 
Current research works envision the deployment of IPv6 as the IP addressing scheme to be 
adopted in vehicles. This is due to the large number of vehicles and network elements that 
would require an IP address. One solution to provide IP addresses is that vehicles generate 
their global IP addresses by using their MAC addresses in conjunction with the IPv6 prefix 
advertised by the current roadside infrastructure [Perera et al, 2006]. The advantages of using 
IPv6 become evident considering a large number of communicating vehicles in the coming 
years. The wide supply of IPv6 addresses (128 bits) is enormous compared to that offered by 
IPv4 (32 bits). 
Non-safety applications can be classified depending on the type of delivery they require, i.e. a 
connection oriented or connectionless based transmissions. The respective transport protocols, 
TCP or UDP, are directly related to the characteristics and nature of the content data. For 
instance, for real-time streaming applications the most suitable protocol to use is UDP while 
for HTTP applications the most suitable transport protocol is TCP. However, generally 
speaking, vehicular applications that rely on TCP or UDP can be classified in one of the 
following categories. 
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1. Database (DB) applications which could represent the access of databases 
containing specific traffic data from navigation services on the road. This is a 
connection oriented application type. 
2. HTTP applications for web based applications to support mobile Internet on the 
road. This is a connection oriented application type. 
3. Voice over IP for real time applications. This is a connectionless based application 
type. 
4. Video over IP for real time streaming applications. This is a connectionless based 
application type. 
The following table shows the classification of some non-safety applications related to their 
corresponding type of transport protocol. 
Table 9.2 - Classification of non-safety applications 
Specific application 
Remote vehicle diagnostics 
Map/database download 
Service Announcements 
Internet 
Voice 
Real-time video 
Type of application 
DB 
HTTP 
Voice 
Video 
Type of Procotol 
TCP 
TCP 
UDP 
UDP 
Based on the above classification, we proceeded to the simulation of the performance of the 
framework proposed in this work in different traffic scenarios in order to assess the behaviour 
of the architecture in realistic scenarios of vehicular applications. 
9.5 Simulations scenarios 
To evaluate the performance of commercial non-safety applications, different sets of 
simulations scenarios were performed by using the OPNET® Wireless Modeler project editor. 
The objective is to assess the response time for commercial vehicular applications in a service 
district domain environment. For simulation purposes, applications can be classified as 
follows. 
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Connection-oriented applications: data content applications are included in these sets 
of simulations such as HTTP and DB applications. 
Real-time steaming applications: for these sets of simulations streaming applications 
such as IP telephony and video were studied. 
9.6 Multidistrict domain scenario 
The simulation setup consists of two service district domains configured with WiMAX as the 
wireless access technology. In a heterogeneous environment, WiMAX can be considered as 
one of the wireless technologies to cover large transmission areas and which is based on the 
IEEE 802.16, also called Broadband Wireless Access. In this case scenario, WiMAX is 
deployed and each district domain contains one base station with a separation distance of 10 
km as depicted in Figure 9.1. The mobile node follows a flat trajectory at different speed 
scenarios of 50 km/h and 100 km/h. The links for the fixed network are configured to be 
serial link point-to-point (PPP) with a bandwidth capacity of 45 Mbps (DS3). 
The multidistrict scenario represents an ongoing session that is being delivered by the first 
service district domain and needs to be relayed to the following service district domain. A 
single message request for extended service is executed between the two districts domains 
before any exchange of payload data can be delivered by the subsequent base station. The 
main parameter to be analyzed is the packet delay since the delivery time becomes a main 
constraint in highly mobile environments. 
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Figure 9.1 Network topology for multidistrict scenario 
From Figure 9.1 two independent and adjacent service district domains are depicted. For 
service district domain 1, the elements are denoted as the security module (SEC); a session 
manager (SM); banking module (BK); a policy module (PL) and authorization module (AT). 
For district domain 2 the elements are denotes as follows. A security module (SEC2); a 
session manager (SM2); banking module (BK2); a policy module (PL2) and authorization 
module (AT2). 
In order to simulate a more realistic network environment, background traffic load was 
introduced at 30% of the network capacity, that can include traffic such as the one generated 
by requests and service delivery to multiple vehicles in the area. No priority concerning safety 
message was configured. Only for the specified application, the type of packet was configured 
depending on the type of application used. 
9.6.1 Database applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a DB application when an ongoing 
session is relayed from the first to the second district domains at vehicular speeds of 50 km/h 
and 100 km/h. The scenario was run 20 times to get the average packet delay from multiple 
144 CHAPTER 9. SERVICE TAXONOMIES IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS 
simulation trials. Figure 9.2 shows the average packet delay for a DB application when a 
vehicle is moving at a speed of 50 km/h. The variance of the results was O.lxlO"3. The 
ongoing application is subjected to the effects of extended service request messages between 
district domains before the actual handover could be performed. The relay takes place before 
117 s of the simulation time with an increase in the packet delay time. The average packet 
delay is around 0.03 s with a content data rate of 50 Kbps. The frequent peaks in delays are 
due to the speed of the mobile node. The average packet loss rate is 0.055. Major packet 
drops occur in the actual handover from district one to the second district. In Figure 9.3, the 
speed of the vehicle is 100 km/h and the packet delay trend presents a high concentration of 
peaks due to the high velocity. The relay takes place at 60 s of the simulation time with a peak 
at packet delay where the extended service message is released between the two district 
domains. Again, the average packet delay remains around 0.03 s with a content data rate of 50 
Kbps. The worse case occurred at higher speeds since the packet delay shows more 
variations. The packet delay results obtained are acceptable for the delivery of DB applications 
even when the service is relayed from one service district domain to the adjacent one. The 
best performance was obtained with a speed of 50 km/h given that at higher speeds the results 
present higher packet delay variations along the simulation time. No multihoming is assumed, 
that is the reason why communications between adjacent session managers is required to 
extend the service. 
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Figure 9.2 - DB packet delay at 50km/h Figure 9.3 - DB packet delay at 100 km/h 
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9.6.2 HTTP applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for an HTTP application in two district 
domains from multiple simulation trials. The variance of the rest of results was 0.3xl0"3. 
Figure 9.4 shows the average packet delay for a HTTP application when a vehicle moving at a 
speed of 50 km/h is crossing the border from one district domain to the following one. The 
relay takes place at 122 s of the simulation time. The average packet delay is 0.15 s with a 
high content data rate of 200 Kbps. As in the previous DB application, the frequent peaks in 
delays are due to the speed of the mobile node. The average packet loss rate is 0.053. In 
Figure 9.5, the speed of the vehicle is 100 km/h and the packet delay trend presents a high 
concentration of peaks due to the high velocity. The relay takes place at 64 s of the simulation 
time with an increase in the packet delay of .22 s. The average packet delay remains around 
0.15 s for a content data rate of 200 Kbps. The packet delay results obtained are acceptable 
for the delivery of a HTTP application in multiple district domains. The best performance was 
obtained with a speed of 50 km/h given that at higher speeds the results present higher packet 
delay variations along the simulation time. 
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Figure 9.4 - HTTP packet delay at 50 km/h Figure 9.5 - HTTP packet delay at 100 km/h 
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9.6.3 Voice applications 
For real-time streaming applications multiple simulations trials were performed. The variance 
of the results was a variance of .15xl0"3. Figure 9.6 shows the average packet delay for a 
voice application when a vehicle moving at a speed of 50 km/h is crossing the limit from one 
district domain. The relay is released at 122 s of the simulation time. The average packet 
delay is around 0.026 s with a content data rate of 25 Kbps. The average packet loss rate is 
0.058. In Figure 9.7, the speed of the vehicle is 100 km/h where the relay takes place at 68 s 
of the simulation time with a noticeable increase in the packet delay. The average packet 
delay is around 0.025 s with a content data rate of 25 Kbps. The packet delay results obtained 
are acceptable for the delivery of a voice application in a multidistrict environment. Again, 
the best performance was obtained with a speed of 50 km/h given that at higher speeds the 
results present higher packet delay variations along the simulation time. 
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Figure 9.6 - Voice packet delay at 50 km/h Figure 9.7 - Voice packet delay at 100 km/h 
9.6.4 Video applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a video application when an ongoing 
session is relayed from the first to the second district domains. Multiple simulations were 
performed. The variance of the results was .15X10"4. InF igure 9.8, the speed of the vehicle is 
147 
50 km/h with a relay of the service at 124 s of the simulation time. The average packet delay 
is around 0.04 s with a content data rate of 100 Kbps. The average packet loss rate is 0.06. In 
Figure 9.9, the speed of the vehicles is 100 km/h and the service relay takes place at 67 s of the 
simulation time. The average packet delay is around 0.04 s for a content data rate of 100 
Kbps. The packet delay results obtained are acceptable for a video application when the 
service is relayed from multiple district domains. The best performance was obtained with a 
speed of 50 km/h given that at higher speeds the results present higher packet delay variations 
along the simulation time. 
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Figure 9.8 - Video packet delay at 50km/h Figure 9.9 - Video packet delay at 100 km/h 
As can be noticed in the above graphs for streaming-applications, voice and video, the 
variation of the packet delay is less compared to those of the connection-oriented applications 
such as HTTP and DB. Variation in the packet delay has a significant impact on jitter which 
is an important factor to keep certain level of QoS. The amount of payload traffic is not the 
same for the applications presented. The delay was end-to-end packet delay (s) one way. 
Multiple simulations were executed and average to get the end-to-end delay. Notice that video 
applications should have higher priority since they are delay and jitter sensitive. The data 
packet was configured as a video-conferencing application. As shown in figure 9.6, 9.7, 9.8 
and 9.9 corresponding to UDP based applications jitter is less as expected given it sensitivity 
to delay variations. Delays are higher for HTTP and DB but are lower for UDP applications. 
HTTP payload traffic is higher than the rest of the applications. 
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9.7 Multi-hop scenario 
The simulation setup consists of a single service district domain with a type DSRC 802.11 
based RSU wireless access technology. The simulation setups are designed to handle 3 then 5 
vehicles hopes for multi-hop communication. The coverage area of the RSU is 1 km as shown 
in Figure 9.10. The elements of the service district domain are denoted as security module 
(SEC); a session manager (SM); banking module (BK); a policy module (PL) and 
authorization module (AT). For the communication between mobile nodes, an AODV routing 
protocol is configured at each mobile node with a forwarding path which introduces additional 
overhead between adjacent mobile nodes. The nodes implement the security related delays for 
communication between adjacent nodes. The mobile nodes follow a straight trajectory with a 
speed of 50 km/h. The links for the fixed network are configured to be serial link point-to-
point (PPP) with a bandwidth capacity of 45 Mbps (DS3). The measure concerning the packet 
loss was considered to be the number of packets received compared to the number of packets 
sent. 
The scenario represents an ongoing session that is taking place in a multi-hop environment in 
a single service district domain. In order to simulate a more realistic network environment, a 
background traffic load was introduced at 30% of the network capacity, to simulate on extra 
load that might be generated by vehicles accessing services in the surrounding areas. Notice 
that background traffic was considered for the applications response and not in the previous 
chapters for accessing services. 
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Figure 9.10 -Network topology for the multi-hop scenario 
9.7.1 Database applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a DB application when an ongoing 
session is forwarded through multiple mobile nodes with a speed of 50 km/h. As in the 
previous scenario, the simulation setup was run 20 times to get the packet delay average from 
multiple simulation trials. The variance of the results was 0.4x10"3. The transmission of 
packets starts after 65 s of the simulation time and when the anchor node is in the coverage 
area. For this setup, to traverse the RSU coverage area the duration of the session needs to last 
50 s. In Figure 9.11, the average packet delay for a forwarding path of three mobile nodes is 
around 0.17 with some peaks over 0.2 s for an application data rate of 150 Kbps. The average 
packet loss rate is 0.002. Figure 9.12 shows the average packet delay for a forwarding path of 
five mobile nodes with higher delays given the presence of more intermediate nodes. The 
results show an increase in the packet delay up to 0.25 s to reach its destination compared to 
the delays obtained when three mobile nodes are present. In general, the packet delay results 
are acceptable even with an increase of intermediate nodes. 
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Figure 9.11 - DB packet delay with 3 nodes Figure 9.12 - DB packet delay with 5 nodes 
9.7.2 HTTP applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a HTTP application when an ongoing 
session is forwarded through multiple mobile nodes with a speed of 50 km/h. Multiple 
simulation trials were performed. The variance of the results was .8xl0"3. InF igure 9.13, the 
average packet delay for a forwarding path of three mobile nodes is 0.10 s for an application 
data rate of 100 kbps. The packet delay is affected by the presence of intermediate nodes. 
The average packet loss rate is 0.0022. Figure 9.14 shows the average packet delay for a 
forwarding path of five mobile nodes. The results show an increase in the packet delay up to 
.15 s to reach its destination compared to the delays obtained when three mobile nodes are 
present. Again, the amount of payload traffic is not the same for the applications. In this case 
the HTTP has higher payload traffic. 
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Figure 9.13 - HTTP packet delay with 3 nodes Figure 9.14 - HTTP packet delay with 5 nodes 
9.7.3 Voice applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a voice application through multiple 
mobile nodes with a speed of 50 km/h. The variance of the results was .3 xl(T3. In r igure 
9.15, the average packet delay for a forwarding path of three mobile nodes is 0.07 s for an 
application data rate of 50 kbps. The average packet loss rate is 0.0061. Figure 9.16 shows 
the average packet delay for a forwarding path of five mobile nodes. The results show an 
increase in the packet delay up to .13 s to reach its destination compared to the ones obtained 
when three mobile nodes are present. 
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Figure 9.15 - Voice packet delay with 3 nodes Figure 9.16 - Voice packet delay with 5 nodes 
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9.7.4 Video applications 
This scenario assesses the end-to-end packet delay for a video application when an ongoing 
session is forwarded through multiple mobile nodes with a speed of 50 km/h. The variance of 
the results was .39x1 (T3. In Fi gure 9.17, the average packet delay for a forwarding path of 
three mobile nodes is 0.08 s for an application data rate of 100 kbps. The average packet loss 
rate is 0.0058. Figure 9.18 shows the average packet delay for a forwarding path of five 
mobile nodes. The results show an increase in the packet delay up to .13 s to reach its 
destination compared to the delays obtained when three mobile nodes are present. 
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Figure 9.18 -Video packet delay 5 nodes 
9.7.5 Discussion 
The results obtained for the multidistrict scenarios are acceptable in terms of packet delay 
when changing between different service district domains. The worse case occurred with 
speeds of 100 km/h since the packet delay shows more variation in the response of the packet 
delay. For DB applications, the packet delay results obtained are acceptable for a light 
payload with a value of 0.03 s. For HTTP heavy applications, the delay was still acceptable 
with a value of .15 s. For voice applications with a class of voice streaming delivery, the 
packet delays were acceptable with a value of .025 s and less time response variation. For 
video applications with a class of streaming delivery with high data rates, the packet delay was 
acceptable with a value of 0.04 s. Streaming applications are more susceptible to the effects of 
higher delays and delay variation values given their real-time nature and thus are prone to be 
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affected by network traffic conditions. As shown in figure 9.6, 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9 corresponding 
to UDP based applications, jitter is less as expected than TCP applications given it sensitivity 
to delay variations. 
The results obtained for the multi-hop scenarios are also acceptable in terms of packet delay 
even when an increased number of intermediate nodes. As expected, the worse case occurred 
when the number of intermediate nodes increased up to 5. For DB applications, the packet 
delay results obtained were acceptable for a heavy payload with values of 0.17 s and 0.25, for 
three and five nodes, respectively. For HTTP moderate applications, the packet delays were 
acceptable with values of .10 s and .15 s for three and five nodes, respectively. For voice 
applications with a class of voice streaming delivery, the packet delays were acceptable with 
values of 0.07 s and .13 s, respectively and with less variation in the response time. For video 
applications with a class of streaming delivery, the packet delays were acceptable with values 
of .08 s and 0.13 s, respectively. Voice and video applications must be guaranteed the use of 
resources even in multi-hop environments. Moreover, video and voice applications should 
have higher priorities than other type of applications due to their sensitive delay 
characteristics. Some data content applications could experience higher delays and be less 
susceptible to higher packet delay variations; however, a reliable and consistent delivery of the 
transmitted data must be assured. In the case of the first scenario there is an actual handover 
between the first district domain and the second one while in the multihop scenario there is no 
handover. Recall that the relay of services between district domains occur at the edge of their 
coverage areas; hence, there is a significant impact on jitter. Additionally, the two scenarios 
employ different technologies, in the first one WiMax and in the second one IEEE 802.11, 
with different packet delays. 
9.8 Conclusions 
Safety and non-safety applications must coexist for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle -to-
infrastructure (V2I) communications. One major constraint in vehicular environment has to 
deal with the application response time when facing highly mobility patterns. As explained 
throughout this chapter, safety applications possess the highest priority to be dispatched and 
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handled by end-users. Moreover, the way services are delivered also depends on the 
designated class of specific services. As the main objective of vehicular networks is to 
increase safety measures on the road by giving timely information to drivers, life-threatening 
messages are given the highest priority and their transfer must be expedited. For non-safety 
messages, those that belong to infotainment category are given less priority over safety 
messages. However, real-time applications as video must be given higher priority over other 
non-safety applications such as web based and database applications. This classification 
assigned to commercial applications will help maintain certain quality of service when 
delivering delay sensitive applications. For instance, applications such as voice should 
possess lower values in packet delay compared to connection based applications but are more 
susceptible to the current background traffic conditions. 
The simulation results showed the impact in the response time for commercial applications 
when experiencing high mobility behavior. For multi-hop delivery, since vehicles will be 
equipped with DSRC transceivers for ad-hoc communication, classes and prioritization 
schemes must be maintained along the forwarding path between intermediate nodes. For 
multidistrict domains deliveries, the intercommunication between district domains should 
impose manageable additional minimum delay. Again, classes and prioritization of services 
must be maintained when there is a relay of services from different service district domains. 
The future of information services offered on the road will depend on the reliability of services 
even when experiencing highly dynamic environments. 
155 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis project key characteristics and models for service environment in the vehicular 
context have been presented. The major concern was to provide a robust and secure transfer 
of information between a vehicles and a provider in a spontaneous on-demand manner. The 
extended secure service provisioning architecture comprises the presence of public and private 
certificate authorities collocated with accounting and banking entities interacting in active 
district domains. The main task of the security module is to verify the credentials of the 
holder's key certificates by using certificate revocation lists. The security module must 
generate the corresponding secure attributes for the user and the service provider as well. 
The simulation results showed that the delay due to security mechanisms was acceptable for 
both single-hop and multi-hop scenarios even when vehicles travel at high speeds. For 
multidistrict domains deliveries, the intercommunication between district domains should 
impose manageable additional minimum delay. For multi-hop delivery, since vehicles will be 
equipped with DSRC transceivers for ad-hoc communication, low latency should be 
maintained along the forwarding path between intermediate nodes. Efficient forwarding 
schemes should be advised among ad hoc vehicular nodes to minimize the number of hops. 
Different ongoing researches are currently addressing this issue with vehicular routing 
schemes and broadcasting. 
In vehicular environments it is expected that information services may have to be delivered 
beyond the transmission range of the roadside infrastructure. An unstable forwarding 
topology among vehicles would have a significant impact on service delivery performance to a 
vehicle beyond the wireless network. In such a case, long term service sessions between a 
requester and a provider may not be guaranteed by the service provider or existing networks. 
One main advantage of the proposed architecture is that it promotes collaboration of 
forwarding peers by generating incentives in the form of bonus units. The dispatched bonuses 
foster collaboration in the delivery of information services through a forwarding path. 
A primary consideration to bear in mind is that safety applications possess the highest priority 
when being dispatched and handed to end-users. As the main objective of vehicular networks 
is to increase safety measures on the road by giving additional information to drivers, life-
threatening messages are given the highest priority and their transmission must be expedited. 
This may of course disturb the delivery of services, but this is of course how it should be. An 
additional consideration to bear in mind also, is that the way services will be delivered will 
also depend on the designated class of the specific service. For non-safety messages, those 
that belong to infotainment category are given less priority over safety messages. However, 
real-time applications as video are given higher priority over other non-safety applications 
such as web based and database applications. This classification to specific commercial 
applications helps maintain certain quality of service (QoS) when delivering delay sensitive 
applications. 
Finally, future research work might be oriented to tackle highly dynamic trajectory patterns in 
ad hoc networks, especially when a large number of vehicles are involved and their trajectory 
patterns become unpredictable. The study of QoS provisioning in ad hoc environments 
represents a significant challenge regarding the way the packets must be handled and delivered 
by not trusted intermediate nodes. Additionally, the implementation of secure and robust ad 
hoc routing protocols would allow an effective forwarding scheme in complex and unstable 
network topologies. One possible approach is to consider the implementation of secure 
geographic multicast which guarantees integrity of the data and privacy of the participating 
nodes without compromising the performance of the system. 
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APPENDIX A 
AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Delivery of service to a vehicle that is outside the range of RSU needs the help of forwarding 
strategies in a multi-hop manner across a number of intermediate vehicles. Simulations have 
shown that the length of a forwarding path is a key factor in service delivery performance in 
multi-hop scenarios. Routing protocols play an important role in lowering the number of 
intermediate nodes. It is then worth attention to give an overview on routing that can be used 
in secure vehicular delivery. Ad hoc routing approaches can be considered as proactive, 
reactive or hybrid depending on how nodes create and maintain their routing information 
within the ad hoc environment. 
Proactive Routing Protocols 
Proactive approaches specify that each node in the network maintains a route to every other 
route in the network at all times. This process of route creation and maintenance is done by 
the implementation of periodic and event-trigger updates. The latter consist of the exchange 
of routing information between nodes given the occurrence of an event. In the case of 
vehicular scenarios where mobility is a major issue, there is a significant impact in the routing 
protocol performance due to the frequency of event-triggered updates, especially when 
mobility increases. 
One advantage of proactive approaches is that routes are available the moment they are needed 
based on a low mobility context. This is because each node consistently maintains an up-to-
date route to every other node in the network. 
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One disadvantage of these protocols is that control overhead can be significant within large 
networks or in networks where nodes possess high mobility; for instance, case of traffic 
intersections or highway exits. Therefore, routing information at each node needs to be 
maintained at all times but present problems to manage scalable networks. 
Destination-sequenced distance vector routing (DSDV) 
This protocol is based on a distance vector approach which uses node sequence numbers to 
avoid the counting to infinity problem. Nodes increment their sequence number whenever 
there is a change in its local neighborhood ensuring the utilization of the most recent 
information. The routing table contains the destination IP address, destination sequence 
number, next-hop IP address, hop count and install time. To update the routing information, 
DSDV uses both periodic and event-triggered routing table updates. For instance, every time 
interval each node broadcasts to its neighbors its current sequence number along with any 
routing updates; then, the receiver uses this information to populate its routing table entries 
using a distant vector algorithm. The updates messages can contain the node's entire routing 
table or incremental which include only those routing table entries that have changes. The 
latter is more convenient in order to reduce processing overhead and bandwidth consumption. 
Optimized link state routing (OLSR) 
OLSR is based on the implementation of multipoint relays (MPRs) in order to reduce the 
overhead of network floods and size of link state updates, as well. The MPR set is selected 
such that when a node broadcasts a message, the forwarding of that message by the MPR set 
will ensure that the message is received by each of its hop neighbors. The MPR set for a given 
node is the set of neighbors that covers the two-hop neighborhood of the node. Nodes learn 
their set of two-hop neighbors through the periodic exchange of Hello messages. Each node 
periodically transmits a Hello message that contains a list of all neighbors. Additionally, there 
is an association for each neighbor with its directionality. When a node receives this Hello 
message from each of its neighbors, it obtains complete knowledge of its two-hop neighbor 
set. 
Once each node's MPR set is selected, routing paths within the network can be determined 
based on any shortest path routing algorithm. Because OLSR is a proactive protocol, each 
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node maintains a route to every other node in the network which might no be suitable for 
vehicular environments. 
Reactive Routing Protocols 
Reactive approaches can be considered more suitable to support vehicular environments given 
that they are intended for on-demand routing; that is, routes are discovered only when they are 
needed. This is due to the dynamic behavior of vehicles which impacts link connectivity with 
frequent changes and additional control overhead. For reactive protocols, when a source node 
needs to send data packets to the same destination, first it checks its route table to determine 
whether it has a route. If no route exists, it performs a route discovery procedure to find a path 
to the destination. The route discovery consists of the network-wide flooding of a request 
message. 
One advantage of these approaches is that signaling overhead is likely to be reduced compared 
to proactive protocols. A drawback might be present when the number of active nodes in the 
network becomes high; then, the overhead generated by the route discoveries approaches 
increases considerably which is in part affected by the route discovery latency. This means 
that the discovery time to find a specific route increases when the number of node increases. 
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) 
AODV provides on-demand route discovery in mobile ad hoc networks. Route discovery 
involves the use of broadcast messages and a unicast reply containing discovered paths. 
Additionally, AODV relies on node sequence numbers to prevent routing loops and for 
ensuring selection of the most recent routing path. AODV nodes maintain a route table in 
which the next hop routing information for destination nodes is stored and maintain. Each 
routing table entry has an associated lifetime value, however if a route is not used within the 
lifetime period, the route is expired. 
When a source node has data packets to send to some destination, it first checks its route table 
to determine whether it already has a route to the destination. If such a route exists, it can use 
that route for data packet transmissions. Otherwise, it must initiate a route discovery 
procedure to find a route. To start route discovery, the source node creates a route request 
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(RREQ) message. The message contains the destination's IP address, sequence number for 
that destination, the source's IP address, current sequence number, a hop count and a RREQ 
ID. After creating this message, the source broadcasts the RREQ to its neighbors. 
When a neigboring node receives a RREQ, it first creates a reverse route to the source node. 
The node from which it received the RREQ is the next hop to the source node, and the hop 
count in the RREQ is incremented by one to get the hop distance from the source. In this way, 
the RREQ floods the network until reaching a route to the destination. 
When a node receives a RREQ, it checks whether it has an unexpired route to the destination. 
A reply (RREP) message is created containing the source node's IP address, the destination 
node's IP address, and the destination's sequence number as given by the node's route table 
entry for the destination. As a result, the destination node unicasts the message to its next hop 
node towards the source node. Once a route is established, it must be maintained as long as it 
is needed. Because of the mobility of the nodes in highly dynamic scenarios, links along paths 
are likely to break so an error message is generated (RERR). 
Geographical routing protocols 
This type of approach is based on the used of actual geographic coordinates through GPS or 
can be obtained through reference points on some fixed coordinate system like a cellular base 
station infrastructure. The use of geographical information can allow control packets or data 
packets being sent in the direction of the destination only if the recent geographical 
coordinates for that destination are known. This reduces the control overhead generated in the 
network; however, all nodes must have continual access to their geographical coordinates for 
these approaches to be useful which can become an issue when the number of nodes increases. 
Location aided routing protocol (LAR) 
LAR is a reactive routing protocol that uses geographical coordinates to direct route request 
messages to the previously known location of the destination. The route discovery procedure 
is based on the creation of route request message (RREQ) for the intended destination. If the 
source has a route to the destination, then the source calculates the expected zone and the 
request zone, and places the coordinates of the request zone into the RREQ message. When a 
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neighbor node receives the RREQ, the node first determines whether it lies in the request zone 
defined in the RREQ. If the node does not lie within the request zone, then it does not process 
the packet. Otherwise, if it does lie within the request zone, it processes the packet and either 
rebroadcast it or sends a reply. The advantage of LAR is that the RREQ message is prevented 
from flooding the entire network because it is intended to areas that are likely to be in route to 
the destination. In the vehicular context, this type of location routing protocol might be 
convenient for the implementation of VANETS since vehicles will be equipped with GPS 
localization systems. 
Hybrid routing protocols 
Hybrid approaches are characterized by the use of both proactive and reactive routing 
components which under some circumstances can optimize the discovery of routes among 
different forwarding areas. 
Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
ZRP defines a zone whose radius is measured in terms of hops; therefore, each node uses 
proactive routing within its zone and reactive routing outside its zone. When the node has 
data packets for a particular destination, it checks its routing table for a route. For intrazone 
routing, ZRP defines the Intrazone Routing Protocol (IARP). IARP is. a link-state protocol 
that maintains up-to-date information about all nodes within the zone. On the other side, ZRP 
uses the Interzone Routing Protocol (IERP) for discovering routes to destinations outside of 
the zone. 
For route discovery, the query message is relayed toward peripheral nodes which support 
interzone routing using routing trees based on the information retrieved from the intrazone 
topology. After receiving the message, the peripheral nodes check whether the destination lies 
within their zone. If the destination is not located, the peripheral nodes bordercast the query 
message to their peripheral nodes. This process continues until either the destination is 
located; once a node discovers the destination, it unicasts a reply message back to the source 
node. 
Clustering, hierarchical and secure routing protocols 
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Hierarchical protocols place nodes into groups (clusters) where the control within a cluster can 
be held and managed by a cluster leader. When a cluster leader already exists, it sends control 
packets on behalf of their member nodes. The cluster boundaries are based on the 
transmission range of the cluster leaders. All nodes within a cluster must be within direct 
transmission range of the cluster leader. Additionally, nodes that are located within the 
boundaries of multiple clusters are called gateways which serve as routers between two 
clusters. In order to elect a cluster leader, there might be an election algorithm in which the 
node with the highest ID within some area becomes the leader for that area. 
An advantage of hierarchical protocols is that hierarchy can be used to implement hierarchical 
addressing schemes. Addresses can be assigned to nodes based on their cluster membership 
and increasing the scalability of the network. Each cluster becomes a node at the next-highest 
cluster level. Some of the disadvantages of hierarchical approaches are that it is necessary to 
keep periodic overhead to create and maintain clusters. This overhead is needed to keep 
current information about cluster memberships and gateway availability. To overcome this 
drawback some clustering approaches are based on an on-demand approach; that is clusters 
are only created when needed. This can be useful in vehicular environments since mobility 
becomes an issue as well as the signaling messages can be reduced. 
To guarantee a secure delivery of messages, ad hoc routing protocols must protect the 
exchange of control messages for route discovery and route maintenance. For instance, the 
Ariadne routing protocol assumes that all communicating nodes have secret keys based on a 
symmetric security model for the exchange of routing updates [Perera et al, 2005]. The main 
disadvantage of the symmetric scheme is that face scalability problems especially in vehicular 
environments where the number of active vehicles can be high. 
A more appropriate solution for VANETs is the use of mix zones which can be used to assure 
privacy in location based services. The way to protect the identity of users is by deploying 
restricted zones where external vehicles do not receive any sensitive information from the 
users within the zone. In this mix zone, vehicles can get group keys from the RSU within the 
zone. As a result, each vehicle potentially can deliver secure messages to its peers within the 
group zone. 
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Access models 
In general, Authorization, Authentication and Accounting (AAA) systems are centralized 
trusted model where security mechanisms are part of a key management system for 
authentication and authorization purposes. The request for a service sent through the 
communication link needs to be authenticated to ensure the certainty of the identity that the 
requester claims to hold. Thus, all messages are validated by authentication mechanisms. 
Once, the subscriber's authentication is performed, an authorization of resources is granted and 
a session setup is established according to the requester's profile. Basically, the authorization 
of the subscriber in vehicular environments includes the authorization to access a radio 
channel at the RSU, i.e. channel allocation and bandwidth designation, as well as authorization 
to reach a service application at the provider's application server. Once a requester has been 
fully authenticated, the provider is able to grant the right to access services. These rights can 
be issued by using service credentials but some restrictions can be imposed by the specific 
service policies. Furthermore, one common mechanism to secure the exchange of information 
at the network layer, i.e. IP applications, is by employing IPSec [Stajano, 2002] (Secure IP) 
which can protect data into two modalities: as an IP authentication header (AH) which is a 
supplementary header of the IP datagram; or as an IP Encapsulating Security Payload (EPS) 
which encapsulates the entire IP datagram ensuring data confidentiality. 
The use of monitoring tools, metering and charging techniques to assess the service 
consumption need to be implemented until the termination of the session. In a context of 
multiple services supply, each service session is composed with a unique session identifier 
[Rensing et al, 2002] allowing the service provider to keep control of the current sessions as 
well as tracking of previous service sessions. 
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Spontaneous On-demand access 
A system capable of supporting spontaneous on-demand services on the road shall be 
considered to grant access to transitory potential users. For highly dynamic scenarios, it can 
be assumed that the service architecture has no previous knowledge of the requesters. As a 
result an authentication process, charging and accounting processes must be performed to 
dispatch the necessary credentials for the user to retrieve the service. One advantage of on-
demand services on the road is that multiple service providers can coexist in the same 
infrastructure enabling the implementation of an extensive variety of application frameworks. 
Kerberos System 
The Kerberos system is a network authentication protocol based on the Needham-Schroeder 
algorithm which provides authentication and key management support [Stajano, 2002]. The 
system comprises an authentication server (AS), a Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and a Ticket-
Granting Ticket (TGT). The AS authenticates the user based on its registers and if this 
operation proceeds, the TGT issues a ticket to the user which will be used to request a service 
ticket to the TGS. Regarding the characteristics of tickets, they have a limited lifetime and 
their objective is that they serve as the credentials to continue the granting process from the 
AS to the TGS in order to retrieve the service. At the beginning of the user's session, the user 
has to enter his password so he can communicate with all the servers that the user is 
authorized to get access. In general, all users need to be registered at the AS and that must 
have their corresponding unique ID and hashed passwords to be matched in the AS database. 
Additionally, the AS must share a secret key with each registered resource server which is 
going to provide the information service. The AS database resides on what is called the 
"Kerberos master" and all changes to the database must be made on the master computer 
system. The main limitation of this approach is that it may result in some problems when 
experiencing highly dynamic changes on the database, especially, when huge database records 
are intended to be recorded such as the case of vehicular scenarios. In general, this structure is 
centralized and rigid, thus it can involve certain constraints about scalability issues. 
The main characteristics of the Kerberos authentication systems as described in [Stalling, 
2006] are the following: 
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A secret key shared between the user and the AS is the hash of the user's login password. 
During login, the user asks the AS for a ticket-granting ticket, which he gets in a packet 
encrypted under the shared secret key. As a part of the login procedure, the user types his 
password into his Kerberos client software, which hashes it and uses the result to decrypt the 
AS's packet. 
Kerberos offers a centralized security policy management. The AS can be instructed to define 
which clients are authorized to proceed with their corresponding servers. 
Kerberos can provide authentication between different realm domains. This allows a client in 
one domain to obtain a ticket for a server in an adjacent domain. Domains are arranged 
hierarchically and an authentication may follow a complex path along the tree. It is needed for 
all servers to be online before the requested ticket can be issued. 
Figure B. 1 - Kerberos authentication model 
Definition of Kerberos exchange messages 
The sequence of messages is depicted in Figure 4.1 and the definition of message is described 
below based on [Stalling, 2006]. 
Authentication service exchange 
Message 1. Client requests ticket-granting ticket 
L C^AS:IDc,IDlgs 
Ticket-Granting Service Exchange 
Message 2. AS returns ticket-granting ticket 
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2 AS -*C:E(KC,Ticketlgs) 
Message 3. Client requests service-granting ticket 
C^> TGS :IDC,IDV,Ticket lgs 
Message 4. TGS returns service-granting ticket 
. TGS —> C: Ticket
 v 
Client/Server authentication exchange 
Message 5. Client requests service 
5 C^V:IDc,Ticketv 
Discussion on access models 
Kerberos is a centralized authentication system based on the generation of ticket services. In 
order to get access to services the client needs to be registered in the Kerberos database, as 
well as, the resource servers which will provide the delivery of services. When the client 
requests some sort of services to the authentication server (AS), if succeeds a ticket-granting 
ticket (TGT) will be issued to the client who will be included in the request message to the 
ticket-granting service (TGS). To retrieve the service, the client will disclose the service ticket 
to the resource server. The Kerberos scheme is based on static registers of clients which in 
some situations can be less convenient, especially when the database becomes larger or 
maintenance of the database must be performed. Conversely, spontaneous on-demand 
services consider the service provisioning of transitory clients even when no previous 
knowledge is available at the service architecture. For that reason, the service architecture 
must be based on an authentication scheme based on disclosure of public certificates when if 
succeeds a session key can be generated for the specific service. Moreover, a billing 
mechanism has to be defined in order to charge and verify the affordability of the potential 
user. Temporary registers can be recorded at the accounting module which will keep track of 
the related parameters issued for the limited session. Another, important element is the 
session manager which will allow the communication with multiple adjacent service 
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architectures in order to extend an ongoing session. In order to support the delivery of 
services it would be necessary to design robust service frameworks which will guarantee a 
secure and efficient operation of service offered on the road. 
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